liberated negroes of the south from practical reenslavement by their former masters, and to authorize Congress to protect the civil rights of these persons by appropriate legislation: Reports of Committees of House, 39th Congress, 1st Sess., Vol. 2, p. 13 et seq. To now invoke its provisions to perpetuate industrial servitude would be a perversion of its beneficent purposes. 3. The hours of labor in certain industries, in which too many hours of service in one day would be injurious to the health and well-being of the operatives, may be reasonably regulated by the state, under its police power. This power legitimately exercised can neither be limited by contract nor bartered away by legislation. [The court cites Holden v. Hardy, 169 U. S. 388, and quotes from Hurtado v. California, 110 U. S. 516 and Commonwealth v. Alger, 7 Cush (Mass.) 53.] 4. The police power cannot be forwarded as an excuse for the enactment of unreasonable, oppressive, or unjust laws. Yet it may be legitimately exercised for the purpose of preserving the public health, safety, morals, and general welfare. 5. The limitation of the law to mills, factories, or manufacturing establishments is not in itself an unconstitutional discrimination. The work in factories is as different from that in mercantile houses as that in mines is from either: Freund, Police Power, § 313. It is conceded that the state by virtue of its police power may regulate the hours of labor of women and minors (Commonwealth v. Riley, 210 Mass. 387; State v. Shorey, 48 Or. 396), also of persons in underground mines, reduction plants, and smelters, and of men in the employ of common carriers. 6. All reasonable intendments will be made in favor of a law not obviously void upon its face: It will therefore be presumed that the legislature has acted within constitutional limitations. .... The legislature is the exclusive judge of the propriety and necessity of legislative interference within the scope of legislative power. If a state of facts could exist which would justify legislation, it would be presumed that it did exist: . . . . As a general rule statutes should be sustained unless their unconstitutionality is clear beyond a reasonable doubt. Such doubt should be solved in favor of a legislative enactment and the act sustained. . . 7. In order to render a statute invalid by reason of discriminations which are clearly unreasonable, arbitrary, oppressive, or partial, the vice of the law must be apparent upon its face. . . . The restriction as to the hours of labor is in the same category as safe and sanitary regulations. The need of the restriction arises out of the employment and because of it. There is a real substantial relation between the need and the particular employment. It is therefore a proper police regulation. The act in question is a human life, health, and welfare statute. While a penalty for a violation of its provisions is provided, it is remedial in its nature, and should be given an interpretation in the interest of the public good, so as to carry out the legislative intent: State v. City of Ottawa, 84 Kan. 100. Legislative regulation of the hours of labor of men and that of women differ only in the degree of necessity therefor. In the judgment of the legislature the interest of the public requires that no person be employed in any manufacturing establishment more than 10 hours in any one day, except watchmen, employees engaged in making repairs, or in case of emergency. Obvi ously, in addition to the reasons declared in the law, it was in the legislative mind that the regular employment of persons for longer hours in factories where different kinds of machinery and facilities are operated under the present day high-pressure power would tend to increase the danger of accidents, and to a greater extent jeopardize life and limb, thereby increasing the demand for compensation for such injuries, a portion of which, under certain circumstances, would ultimately be borne by the state: See Industrial Act, Chapter 112, Laws 1913, pp. 188, 198, § 20. It is worthy of note that in the latter act, filed in the office of the Secretary of State on the same date as the one in question, mills and factories in which machinery is used are classed as places of hazardous occupations: See § 13 of the act. Another consideration not without weight is that suggested in the preamble to the act, which discloses, among other things, that the working of any person more than 10 hours a day in any mill, factory, or manufacturing establishment "tends to prevent him from acquiring that degree of intelligence that is necessary to make him a useful and desirable citizen of the state." While labor is heaven's first law and a reasonable amount of physical exertion is salutary, it is an undeniable fact that prolonged and excessive physical labor is performed at the expense of the mental powers, and it requires no argument to show that a man who day in and day out labors more than 10 hours must not only deteriorate physically, but mentally. The safety of a country depends upon the intelligence of its citizens, and if our institutions are to be preserved the state must see it that the citizens shall have some leisure which he may employ in fitting himself for those duties which are the highest attributes of good citizenship. As a voter, a juror, and, in this state, as a legislator, the best results can only be attained by so limiting the hours of toil that they may not be unduly prolonged to the extent of causing that mental deterioration that is sure to accompany undue and long-continued physical exertion. In view of the well-known fact that the custom in our industries does not sanction a longer service than 10 hours per day, it cannot be held, as a matter of law, that the legislative requirement is unreasonable or arbitrary as to hours of labor. Statistics show that the average daily working time among workingmen in different countries is, in Australia, 8 hours; in Great Britain, 9; in the United States, 934; in Denmark, 934; in Norway, 10; Sweden, France, and Switzerland, 101⁄2; Germany, 104; Belgium, Italy, and Austria, 11; and in Russia, 12 hours: Lochner v. New York, 198 U. S. 45. In order to warrant declaring the act violative of the fundamental law, it should be shown that in the light of the world's experience and common knowledge the act under consideration is palpably and beyond reasonable doubt one that will not tend to protect or conserve the public peace, health, or welfare in its enforcement. It is by no means clear beyond a reasonable doubt that the law will not promote the peace, health, and general welfare of citizens of the state, or that longer hours of labor in factories would not be injurious to the health as declared by the act, or that the act is repugnant to the Constitution. The presumption, therefore, is in favor of the wisdom and the correctness of the legislative finding and determination that the law is a necessity for the protection of the health, well-being, and general welfare of the public; that the regulation prescribed by the enactment will tend to correct the evil at which it is aimed. The courts cannot set aside the legislative decree without intrenching upon the prerogatives of a coordinate branch of the state government, and usurping the powers of the legislature. The law does not prevent the laborer from working as many hours per day as he sees fit, and does not violate his right to labor as long as he may desire, but only prohibits his being employed in any mill, factory, or manufacturing establishment more than a certain number of hours in any one day: Commonwealth v. Hamilton Mfg. Co., 120 Mass. 383, and cases there cited. . . . The act applies to all the people of the state who employ labor in mills, factories or manufacturing establishments. In the very nature of things the occupations affected by the law furnish a reasonable basis for the statutory regulation. . . 8. It is contended by counsel for defendant that the provision for employees to work overtime not to exceed three hours in any one day, conditioned that payment be made for said overtime at the rate of time and one half the regular wage, renders the whole act void. It is clear that the intent of the law is to make 10 hours a regular day's labor in the occupations to which reference is made. Apparently the provisions permitting labor for the overtime on express conditions were made in order to facilitate the enforcement of the law, and in the nature of a mild penalty for employing one not more than three hours overtime. It might be regarded as more difficult to detect violations of the law by an employment for a shorter time than for a longer time. This penalty also goes to the employee in case the employer avails himself of the overtime clause. Reasonable modes of enforcing a statute should be upheld. . . . The aim of the statute is to fix the maximum hours of service in certain industries. The act makes no attempt to fix the standard of wages. No maximum or minimum wage is named. That is left wholly to the contracting parties. The statute under which the complaint is made in this case is not violative of the Constitution of the United States or of this state. As a consequence, the judgment of the lower court is affirmed. Affirmed. Rehearing Denied. [Affirmed by the United States Supreme Court in Bunting v. Oregon; 243 U. S. 426.] QUESTIONS 1. How does the court answer the argument that the statute is a violation of the due process clause of Amendment XIV? 2. Does this case go farther than Holden v. Hardy in its recognition of the legislature's power to regulate hours of labor? 3. Under the criteria set by the court, would the same law, enacted in Massachusetts in 1825, have been upheld against a due process clause like that of Amendment XIV? 4. Would the court have sustained the law if it had fixed a day's labor at eight hours instead of ten? 5. If the legislature had omitted all reference to the usefulness of the laborer as a citizen, would the decision have been different? 6. If the validity of a law regulating hours of labor depends on the reasonableness of the regulation as tested by the standard of comfort in the contemporary civilization, why should the judgment of the legislature as to its reasonableness not be final? 7. What is the "reasonable basis" for the classification in this law? 8. Is there any constitutional objection to a city ordinance which requires a cessation of work in all laundries between 6 p.m. and 7 a.m.? 9. Would a 10-hour law applicable to employees in bakeries be constitutional? 10. A state law makes it a misdemeanor to compel stationary firemen, in cities of 50,000 or over, to work more than 8 consecutive hours a day. Is it constitutional? II. A state law requires all mercantile and commercial houses in cities of 10,000 or over, except those dealing exclusively or for the most part in perishable provisions and drug stores, to close at 6 p. m. every business day of the year except the 6 business days before Christmas. Does it violate Amendment XIV? 12. Would a 10-hour law applicable to all labor, except in cases of emergency or when life or property is in danger, be constitutional? 13. Is the domain of occupations subject to such regulation a varying one? If so, at whose discretion does it vary, that of the legislature or that of the judiciary? 14. What criteria can you suggest for determining what occupations may be subjected to regulation as to hours of labor? 15. Could Congress constitutionally require that seamen of merchant vessels of the United States be divided into two watches while at sea (except in cases of emergency) and that nine hours should constitute a day's work for them when the vessel is in a safe harbor? 16. Has your state any statute regulating hours of labor generally for men? If so, has it been sustained by the courts? B. REST PERIODS PEOPLE v. KLINCK PACKING COMPANY Court of Appeals of the State of New York. 1915. 214 N. Y. 121. HISCOCK, J. This appeal presents as its underlying question the important one whether the legislature may require that in certain occupations employees shall have twenty-four consecutive hours of rest in every seven days. The statute which requires this has popularly come to be known as the "One day of rest in seven" law, and with certain exceptions and subject to certain qualifications it provides with appropriate penalties that every employer "carrying on any factory or mercantile establishment . . . . shall allow every person ployed in such factory or mercantile establishment at least twenty-four consecutive hours of rest in every seven consecutive days." ... em It is undisputed that this defendant was conducting a factory within |