legislative authority granted to Congress was reposed. This result is further demonstrated, as we have suggested, by considering how completely the purpose intended to be accomplished by the regulations which have been adopted in the past would be rendered unavailing or their enactment inexplicable if the power was not possessed to meet a situation like the one with which the statute dealt. .. We are of opinion that the reasons stated conclusively establish that, from the point of view of inherent power, the act which is before us was clearly within the legislative power of Congress to adopt, and that, in substance and effect, it amounted to an exertion of its authority under the circumstances disclosed to compulsorily arbitrate the dispute between the parties by establishing as to the subject-matter of that dispute a legislative standard of wages operative and binding as a matter of law upon the parties, a power none the less efficaciously exerted because exercised by direct legislative act instead of by the enactment of other and appropriate means providing for the bringing about of such result. If it be conceded that the power to enact the statute was in effect the exercise of the right to fix wages where, by reason of the dispute, there had been a failure to fix by agreement, it would simply serve to show the nature and character of the regulation essential to protect the public right and safeguard the movement of interstate commerce, not involving any denial of the authority to adopt it. And this leaves only to be generally considered whether the right to exercise such a power under the conditions which existed was limited or restrained by the private rights of the carriers or their employees. (a) As to the carrier.-As engaging in the business of interstate commerce carriage subjects the carrier to the lawful power of Congress to regulate irrespective of the source whence the carrier draws its existence, and as also, by engaging in a business charged with a public interest, all the vast property and every right of the carrier become subject to the authority to regulate possessed by Congress to the extent that regulation may be exerted, considering the subject regulated and what is appropriate and relevant thereto, it follows that the very absence of the scale of wages by agreement, and the impediment and destruction of interstate commerce which was threatened, called for the appropriate and relevant remedy, the creation of a standard by operation of law, binding upon the carrier. (b) As to the employee. Here again it is obvious that what we have previously said is applicable and decisive, since whatever would be the right of an employee engaged in a private business to demand such wages as he desires, to leave the employment if he does not get them, and, by concert of action, to agree with others to leave upon the same condition, such rights are necessarily subject to limitation when employment is accepted in a business charged with a public interest and as to which the power to regulate commerce possessed by Congress applied, and the resulting right to fix, in case of disagreement and dispute, a standard of wages, as we have seen, necessarily obtained. In other words, considering comprehensively the situation of the employer and the employee in the light of the obligations arising from the public interest and of the work in which they are engaged, and the degree of regulation which may be lawfully exerted by Congress as to that business, it must follow that the exercise of the lawful governmental right is controlling. This results from the considerations which we have previously pointed out and which we repeat, since, conceding that, from the point of view of the private right and private interest, as contradistinguished from the public interest, the power exists between the parties, the employers and employees, to agree as to a standard of wages free from legislative interference, that right in no way affects the lawmaking power to protect the public right and create a standard of wages resulting from a dispute as to wages and a failure therefore to establish by consent a standard. The capacity to exercise the private right free from legislative interference affords no ground for saying that legislative power does not exist to protect the public interest from the injury resulting from a failure to exercise the private right. In saying this, of course, it is always to be borne in mind that, as to both carrier and employee, the beneficent and ever-present safeguards of the Constitution are applicable, and therefore both are protected against confiscation and against every act of arbitrary power which, if given effect to, would amount to a denial of due process, or would be repugnant to any other constitutional right. And this emphasizes that there is no question here of purely private right, since the law is concerned only with those who are engaged in a business charged with a public interest, where the subject dealt with as to all the parties is one involved in that business, and which we have seen comes under the control of the right to regulate to the extent that the power to do so is appropriate or relevant to the business regulated. Having thus adversely disposed of the contentions as to the inherent want of power, we come to consider all the other propositions which group themselves under a common heading; that is: II. Such an abuse of the power, if possessed, as rendered its exercise unconstitutional. . . .... [The court decides there was no such abuse.] Being of the opinion that Congress had the power to adopt the act in question, whether it be viewed as a direct fixing of wages to meet the absence of a standard on that subject, resulting from the dispute between the parties or as the exertion by Congress of the power which it undoubtedly possessed to provide by appropriate legislation for compulsory arbitration, a power which inevitably resulted from its authority to protect interstate commerce in dealing with a situation like that which was before it, we conclude that the court below erred in holding the statute was not within the power of Congress to enact, and in restraining its enforcement, and its decree, therefore, must be and it is reversed and the cause remanded, with directions to dismiss the bill. And it is so ordered. [Day, Pitney, Van Devanter, and McReynolds, J.J., dissented.] QUESTIONS 1. Why was it not sufficient for the court to say, "This is obviously a regulation of interstate commerce, and so is valid under the commerce clause"? 2. If the extent of regulation under the interstate commerce clause "depends on the nature and character of the subject," by what principles may it be determined how far a given subject may be regulated under that clause and what is "appropriate to its regulation"? 3. What is a business affected with a public interest, for the purpose of the present discussion? 4. Who decides whether a business is one affected with a public interest? 5. Formulate a rule defining the special liability of a business affected with a public interest to governmental regulation. 6. Do you know of other cases where federal legislation under the commerce clause has been upheld because it dealt wth a business affected with a public interest? 7. Are the principles which determine the extent of regulation of such a business by Congress under the commerce clause the same as those which apply to its regulation by a state under the police power? 8. Is the Act an hours of service act or wage act? 9. Would the court uphold an act of Congress fixing a minimum rate of wages generally for all employees engaged in interstate commerce, apart from any particular dispute or threatened cessation of work? 10. Would the Act have been valid if § 2 had been omitted and the provisions of § 3 had been made applicable for three years? 11. If your answer to one or both of the last two questions is negative, would the invalidity be due to overstepping the commerce clause or to the prohibitions of other clauses of the Constitution? 12. It is contended that the previous legislation relating to interstate commerce, referred to by the court, had a direct and substantial relation to commerce itself that does not exist in the case of the Adamson Act. Is this sound? 13. It is argued that the law deprives the railroads of property without due process, since by the operation of § § 2 and 3, they alone must bear, without compensation, "the cost of the experiment" with an eight-hour day, namely, an increase of wages for from seven to eleven months. Is this sound? 14. If, instead of the Adamson Act at issue in the principal case, Congress had passed an act providing for compulsory arbitration of the dispute and forbidding any change in the status quo pending the arbitral award (to be given within six months), would it have been constitutional? 15. Does the reasoning of the court indicate that it would uphold a general compulsory arbitration law applying to employers and employees engaged in interstate commerce? 16. Is the decision consistent with Adair v. United States? 17. Is it consistent with Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Industrial Relations? 18. Would a law be constitutional which required railroads to pay 25% more for locomotives and coal? 19. Could Congress regulate hours, wages, or conditions of labor in mills producing flour for interstate commerce (a) under ordinary conditions, (b) in case of a threatened cessation of production? 20. Is it possible that a law unlimited as to duration would be unconstitutional, while the same law with a time limit upon its operation would be good? 21. Could Congress constitutionally confer upon a commission the power to fix the wages of employees of interstate railroads? "Laws which directly fix the flat minimum rate are found only in certain of the Australian states, and in Arizona, Arkansas, and Utah. In Australia, in addition to the system of wage boards, laws sometimes establish very low flat-rate minima, frequently of not more than 48 or 72 cents a week, intended principally to protect children, learners, and apprentices from being put to work without wages and dismissed Reprinted from The Principles of Labor Legislation by Commons and Andrews by permission of the publishers, Harper & Bros., 1920 Ed, pp. 205-206. when they ask for pay. In America, only the Arizona law, with a $10 weekly minimum, and the Utah statute, which requires a daily wage of 75 cents for females under eighteen, 90 cents for inexperienced women, and $1.25 for experienced women over that age, fix universal flat rates. In Arkansas a flat rate of $1.25 a day for experienced workers and $1 a day for females having less than six months' experience is fixed by the law, but the commission may, after investigation and public hearing, either raise or lower these rates. This it has done in a limited number of instances. This method of fixing uniform flat rates prevents the more careful adjustment for various industries and localities which is elsewhere undertaken by wage boards, it fails to secure the active interest of the employers and employees concerned, and it makes revisions difficult during a period of rapidly changing prices such as occurred between 1916 and 1919. For women laundry workers in Little Rock, Ark., the National War Labor Board made an increase of $3.50 a week above the legal minimum, saying that "This law was passed a number of years ago under other conditions and cannot therefore be taken as a fair standard under the war conditions now existing." The flat-rate method is held by most students of the problem to be disadvantageous. QUESTIONS 1. What is the economic justification for a law establishing a minimum wage? 2. Compare the economic arguments for the minimum wage in private industry with those for a minimum wage for government work. 3. "Are minimum wage laws a legitimate extension" of the police power? 4. Congress passes a pension law which provides that any attorney who prosecutes a claim under the act shall not contract for, demand, or receive more than $10 for his services. Is this provision valid under Amendment XIV? (b) The Wage Board Law (1) DISCRETIONARY HOLCOMBE v. CREAMER Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts. 1918. 231 Mass. 99. RUGG, C. J. The question presented by this record is the constitutionality of St. 1912, c. 706, as amended by St. 1913, cc. 330, and 673, 7 Arizona, Laws 1917, c. 38. The law fails to specify any enforcing authority. Utah, Laws 1913, c. 63. Enforcement is placed with the Commissioner of Labor 8 Arkansas, Laws 1915, No. 291. |