the United States, as debts of like amount are now recovered in the courts of the United States. For every violation of the provisions hereof the person violating the same may be prosecuted in a criminal action for a misdemeanor, and on conviction thereof shall be punished by a fine of $1,000, or by imprisonment for a term of not less than six months nor more than two years; and under either the civil or the criminal procedure mentioned separate suits or prosecutions may be brought for each alien thus offered or promised employment as aforesaid. The Department of Justice, with the approval of the Department of Labor, may from any fines or penalties received pay rewards to persons other than Government employees who may furnish information leading to the recovery of any such penalties, or to the arrest and punishment of any person, as in this section provided.

SEC. 6. That it shall be unlawful and be deemed a violation of section five of this act to induce, assist, encourage, or solicit or attempt to induce, assist, encourage, or solicit any alien to come into the United States by promise of employment through advertisements printed, published, or distributed in any foreign country, whether such promise is true or false, and either the civil or criminal penalty or both imposed by said section shall be applicable to such a case.

SEC. 7. That it shall be unlawful for any person, association, society, company, partnership, corporation, or others engaged in the business of transporting aliens to or within the United States, including owners, masters, officers, and agents of vessels, directly or indirectly, by writing, printing, oral representation, payment of any commissions to an alien coming into the United States, allowance of any rebates to an alien coming into the United States, or otherwise to solicit, invite, or encourage or attempt to solicit, invite, or encourage any alien to come into the United States, and anyone violating any provision hereof shall be subject to either the civil or the criminal prosecution, or both, prescribed by section five of this act; or if it shall appear to the satisfaction of the Secretary of Labor that any owner, master, officer, or agent of a vessel has brought or caused to be brought to a port of the United States any alien so solicited, invited, or encouraged to come by such owner, master, officer, or agent, such owner, master, officer, or agent shall pay to the collector of customs of the customs district in which the port of arrival is located, or in which any vessel of the line may be found, the sum of $400 for each and every

such violation; and no vessel shall be granted clearance pending the determination of the question of the liability to the payment of such fine, or while the fine imposed remains unpaid, nor shall such fine be remitted or refunded: Provided, That clearance may be granted prior to the determination of such questions upon the deposit with the collector of customs of a sum sufficient to cover such fine. Provided further, That whenever it shall be shown to the satisfaction of the Secretary of Labor that the provisions of this section are persistently violated by or on behalf of any transportation company, it shall be the duty of said Secretary to deny to such company the privilege of landing alien immigrant passengers of any or all classes at United States ports for such a period as in his judgment may be necessary to insure an observance of such provisions: Provided further, That this section shall not be held to prevent transportation companies from issuing letters, circulars, or advertisements, confined strictly to stating the sailing of their vessels and terms and facilities of transportation therein: Provided further, That under sections five, six, and seven hereof it shall be presumed from the fact that any person, company, partnership, corporation, association, or society induces, assists, encourages, solicits or invites, or attempts to induce, assist, encourage, solicit or invite the importation, migration or coming of an alien from a country foreign to the United States, that the offender had knowledge of such person's alienage.

SEC. 8. That any person, including the master, agent, owner, or consignee, of any vessel, who shall bring into or land in the United States, by vessel or otherwise, or shall attempt, by himself or through another, to bring into or land in the United States, by vessel or otherwise, or shall conceal or harbor, or attempt to conceal or harbor, or assist or abet another to conceal or harbor in any place, including any building, vessel, railway car, conveyance, or vehicle, any alien not duly admitted by an immigrant inspector or not lawfully entitled to enter or to reside within the United States under the terms of this Act, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction thereof shall be punished by a fine not exceeding $2,000 and by imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years, for each and every alien so landed or brought in or attempted to be landed or brought in.

[These sections of the Act of 1917 were not affected by the Immigration Act of May 26, 1924, which established the quota system.]

QUESTIONS

1. An official of the X railway sends an employee to Canada to secure five workmen, giving him a pass to use for their transportation over the X lines from Canada into the United States. If men are solicited and brought into the country in this way, has the Immigration Act been violated?

2. A steamship company transfers a clerk from its Amsterdam office to its New York office, paying his passage and expenses, with the intention of using him in New York for some time and then sending him to the offices in Dutch Guiana. Has it violated the Immigration Act?

3. Mrs. P., an Englishwoman, wrote to the D Company in the United States, seeking employment. The company replied, giving the wage scale for women and saying: "If you were in the States and applied to us for a position, we could place you. We also need unskilled men." Mr. P. answered that his wife could not come then but he could if assured of employment. The company answered that his letter was satisfactory and they would keep a place open for Mrs. P., and asking when he would report for duty. Has the company violated the Immigration Act?

4. Nine Portuguese immigrants came to the United States because they had been told by various steamship company agents that they would have no trouble in getting good jobs here. Should they be excluded under the Act?

5. A, an Englishman, was a designer of marine steam turbines. A London representative of an American shipbuilding firm told him the firm needed men with his training and experience and paid his fare to this country. Is he liable to deportation as a contract laborer under the Act?

6. Why should actors, artists, and so forth, be excepted from the operation of the Act? Is a man employed as a chemist on a sugar plantation within the excepted classes? A Parisian milliner? An expert accountant? 7. Whence does Congress derive its power to exclude contract laborers from the United States?

2. RESIDENT ALIENS

TRUAX v. RAICH

United States Supreme Court. 1915. 239 U. S. 33.

[An Arizona statute, effective December 14, 1914, required any company, corporation, partnership, association, or individual who was an employer of more than five workers at any one time to employ not less than 80% qualified electors or native-born citizens of the United States or some subdivision thereof, made the violation of the act a misdemeanor and imposed penalties upon those convicted of such violation. Truax employed nine workers in his restaurant, seven of whom (including Raich) were not native-born citizens of the United States or qualified electors in any state. After the act was passed, he told

Raich that he would have to discharge him, solely because of the act. Raich then filed a bill in the Federal district court, asking for a decree that the act was unconstitutional and restraining action thereunder, either by Truax, the state's attorney or the county attorney.]

MR. JUSTICE HUGHES delivered the opinion of the court:

The question, then, is whether the act assailed is repugnant to the 14th Amendment. Upon the allegations of the bill, it must be assumed that the complainant, a native of Austria, has been admitted to the United States under the Federal law. He was thus admitted with the privilege of entering and abiding in the United States and hence of entering and abiding in any state in the Union. Being lawfully an inhabitant of Arizona, the complainant is entitled under the 14th Amendment to the equal protection of its laws. The description, "any person within its jurisdiction," as it has frequently been held, includes aliens. . . . . The discrimination defined by the act does not pertain to the regulation or distribution of the public domain, or of the common property or resources of the people of the state, the enjoyment of which may be limited to its citizens as against both aliens and the citizens of other states. [The court refers to McCready v. Virginia, 94 U. S. 391, and Patsone v. Pennsylvania, 232 U. S. 138.] The case now presented is not within these decisions, or within those relating to the devolution of real property. (Hauenstein v. Lynham, 100 U. S. 483; Blythe v. Hinckley, 180 U. S. 333); and it should be added that the act is not limited to persons who are engaged on public work or receive the benefit of public moneys. The discrimination here involved is imposed upon the conduct of ordinary private enterprise.

The act, it will be observed, provides that every employer (whether corporation, partnership, or individual) who employs more than five workers at any one time, "regardless of kind or class of work, or sex of workers," shall employ "not less than 80 per cent qualified electors or native-born citizens of the United States or some subdivision thereof." It thus covers the entire field of industry with the exception of enterprises that are relatively very small. Its application in the present case is to employment in a restaurant the business of which requires nine employees. The purpose of an act must be found in its natural operation and effect. (Henderson v. New York, 92 U. S. 259; Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U. S. 219), and the purpose of this act is not only plainly shown by its provisions, but it is frankly revealed in its title. It is there described as "an act to protect the citizens of the United

States in their employment against non-citizens of the United States, in Arizona." As the appellants rightly say, there has been no subterfuge. It is an act aimed at the employment of aliens, as such, in the businesses described. Literally, its terms might be taken to include with aliens those naturalized citizens who, by reason of change of residence, might not be at the time qualified electors in any subdivision of the United States; but we are dealing with the main purpose of the statute, definitely stated, in the execution of which the complainant is to be forced out of his employment as a cook in a restaurant, simply because he is an alien.

It is sought to justify this act as an exercise of the power of the state to make reasonable classifications in legislating to promote the health, safety, morals, and welfare of those within its jurisdiction. But this admitted authority, with the broad range of legislative discretion that it implies, does not go so far as to make it possible for the state to deny to lawful inhabitants, because of their race or nationality, the ordinary means of earning a livelihood. It requires no argument to show that the right to work for a living in the common occupations of the community is of the very essence of the personal freedom and opportunity that it was the purpose of the Amendment to secure. Butchers' Union S. H. & L. S. L. Co. v. Crescent City L. S. L. & S. H. Co. 111 U. S. 746; Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U. S. 27; Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356; Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U. S. 578; Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U. S. 1. If this could be refused solely upon the ground of race or nationality, the prohibition of the denial to any person of the equal protection of the laws would be a barren form of words. It is no answer to say, as it is argued, that the act proceeds upon the assumption that "the employment of aliens, unless restrained, was a peril to the public welfare." The discrimination against aliens in the wide range of employments to which the act relates is made an end in itself, and thus the authority to deny to aliens, upon the mere fact of their alienage, the right to obtain support in the ordinary fields of labor, is necessarily involved. It must also be said that reasonable classification implies action consistent with the legitimate interests of the state, and it will not be disputed that these cannot be so broadly conceived as to bring them into hostility to exclusive Federal power. The authority to control immigration-to admit or exclude aliens is vested solely in the Federal government. Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U. S. 698. The assertion of an authority to deny to aliens the opportunity of earning a livelihood when lawfully admitted to the