in the civil service of the United States, either individually or collectively, to petition Congress, or any Member thereof, or to furnish information to either House of Congress, or to any committee or member thereof, shall not be denied or interfered with. QUESTIONS 1. Is the object of the federal statute to permit collective bargaining by postal employees? 2. How effective might organizations that conform to the statute be? 3. What objections can be made to permitting government employees to strike? 4. Can a law effectively prohibit strikes by government employees? 5. What action has been taken by governmental bodies when their employees have gone on strike? B. RIGHTS, POWERS AND LIABILITIES OF LABOR UNIONS AND THEIR MEMBERS I. LIABILITY OF MEMBERS FOR ACTS OF LABOR UNIONS LAWLOR v. LOEWE United States Supreme Court. 1915. 235 U. S. 522. In error to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit to review a judgment which affirmed a judgment of the District Court for the District of Connecticut in favor of plaintiffs in a suit to recover treble damages under the Sherman anti-trust act. Affirmed. MR. JUSTICE HOLMES delivered the opinion of the court: This is an action under the act of July 2, 1890, chap. 647, section 7, 26, Stat. at L. 209, 210, Comp. Stat. 1913, sections 8820, 8829, for a combination and conspiracy in restraint of commerce among the states, specifically directed against the plaintiffs (defendants in error), among others, and effectively carried out with the infliction of great damage. . . . . The substance of the charge is that the plaintiffs were hat manufacturers who employed nonunion labor; that the defendants were members of the United Hatters of North America and also of the American Federation of Labor; that in pursuance of a general scheme to unionize the labor employed by manufacturers of fur hats (a purpose previously made effective against all but a few manufacturers), the defendants and other members of the United Hatters caused the American Federation of Labor to declare a boycott against the plaintiffs and against all hats sold by the plaintiffs to dealers in other states, and against dealers who should deal in them; and that they carried out their plan with such success that they have restrained or destroyed the plaintiff's commerce with other states. The case now has been tried, the plaintiffs have got a verdict, and the judgment of the district court has been affirmed by the circuit court of appeals. It requires more than the blindness of justice not to see that many branches of the United Hatters and the Federation of Labor, to both of which the defendants belonged, in pursuance of a plan emanating from headquarters, made use of such lists and of the primary and secondary boycott in their effort to subdue the plaintiffs to their demands. The union label was used and a strike of the plaintiffs' employees was ordered and carried out to the same end, and the purpose to break up the plaintiffs' commerce affected the quality of the acts. Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U. S. 274, 299. We agree with the circuit court of appeals that a combination and conspiracy forbidden by the statute were proved, and that the question is narrowed to the responsibility of the defendants for what was done by the sanction and procurement of the societies above named. The court in substance instructed the jury that if these members paid their dues and continued to delegate authority to their officers unlawfully to interfere with the plaintiffs' interstate commerce in such circumstances that they knew or ought to have known, and such officers were warranted in the belief that they were acting in the matters within their delegated authority, then such members were jointly liable, and no others. It seems to us that this instruction sufficiently guarded the defendants' rights, and that the defendants got all that they were entitled to ask in not being held chargeable with knowledge as matter of law. It is a tax on credulity to ask anyone to believe that members of labor unions at that time did not know that the primary and secondary boycott and the use of the "We don't patronize" or "Unfair" list were means expected to be employed in the effort to unionize shops. Very possibly they were thought to be lawful. . . . . By the Constitution of the United Hatters the directors are to use "all means in their power" to bring shops "not under our jurisdiction" "into the trade." The by-laws provide a separate fund to be kept for strikes, lockouts, and agitation for the union label. Members are forbidden to sell nonunion hats. The Federation of Labor, with which the Hatters were affiliated, had organization of labor for one of its objects, helped affili ated unions in trade disputes, and to that end, before the present trouble, had provided in its constitution for prosecuting and had prosecuted many what it called legal boycotts. Their conduct in this and former cases was made public, especially among the members, in every possible way. If the words of the documents, on their face and without explanation, did not authorize what was done, the evidence of what was done publicly and habitually showed their meaning and how they were interpreted. The jury could not but find that by the usage of the unions the acts complained of were authorized, and authorized without regard to their interference with commerce among the states. We think it unnecessary to repeat the evidence of the publicity of this particular struggle in the common newspapers and union prints, evidence that made it almost inconceivable that the defendants, all living in the neighborhood of the plaintiffs, did not know what was done in the specific case. If they did not know that, they were bound to know the constitution of their societies, and at least well might be found to have known how the words of those constitutions had been construed in act. .... We shall not discuss the objections to evidence separately and in detail, as we find no error requiring it. The introduction of newspapers, etc., was proper in large part to show publicity in places and directions where the facts were likely to be brought home to the defendants, and also to prove an intended and detrimental consequence of the principal acts, not to speak of other grounds. The reasons given by customers for ceasing to deal with sellers of the Loewe hats, including letters from dealers to Loewe & Co., were admissible. ... We need not repeat or add to what was said by the circuit court of appeals with regard to evidence of the payment of dues after this suit was begun. And, in short, neither the argument nor the perusal of the voluminous brief for the plaintiffs in error shows that they suffered any injustice, or that there was any error requiring the judgment to be reversed. Judgment affirmed. QUESTIONS 1. What is the basis of liability in the case of an association, such as a partnership, formed for the purpose of making profits? 2. How does this differ from the principle on which the liability in the Danbury Hatters case rested? 3. What justification is there for such a difference between the liabilities of the two sorts of organizations? 4. Explain some of the difficulties that may arise in the enforcement of liability similar to that found to exist in the Danbury Hatters case. 5. A manufacturer makes a contract with the business agent of a labor union for the use of the union label. The contract is broken. The manufacturer sues four individual members of the union. Decide. 6. In the course of a strike approved by the members of the D union damage is done to P's property. P sues the individual members. Decide. 7. P is discharged from a position as foreman as the result of unlawful action taken by the D branch of the Quarry Workers' International Union. What recourse has P? 8. The officers of a labor union attempt to unionize P's plant in an illegal manner. Action for damages is brought by P against the officers and members of the union. Decide. 9. The members of a bricklayers' union agree with a brick manufacturers' association and a builders' association that they will only use bricks manufactured by certain persons. The agreement is declared illegal. Who is liable for damages? 10. The members of a union call a strike. Its officers order members to refrain from illegal acts. Damage is caused by illegal acts connected with the strike. Is it possible to hold any one liable for damages? II. A local union calls a strike. Damage is done by unlawful means. Suit is brought against the officers of the national union with which the local is affiliated. Decide. 2. LABOR UNIONS AS PARTIES TO AN ACTION UNITED MINE WORKERS v. CORONADO COAL CO. Statement by MR. CHIEF JUSTICE TAFT: The plaintiffs in the district court were the receivers of the Bache-Denman Coal Company, and eight other corporations, in each of which the first-named company owned a controlling amount of stock. They were closely inter-related in corporate organization and in the physical location of their coal mines. . . . . ... The defendants in the court below were the United Mine Workers of America and its officers, District 21 of the United Mine Workers of America and its officers, twenty-seven local unions in District Number 21 and their officers and sixty-five individuals, mostly members of one union or another, but including some persons not members, all of whom were charged in the complaint with having entered into a conspiracy to restrain and monopolize interstate commerce, in violation of the first and second sections of the Anti-trust Act, and with having, in the course of that conspiracy, and for the purpose of consummating it, destroyed the plaintiffs' properties. Treble damages for this and an attorney's fee were asked under the 7th section of the act. The trial resulted in a verdict of $200,000 for the plaintiffs, which was trebled by the court, and to which was added a counsel fee of $25,000 and interest to the amount of $120,600 from July 17, 1914, the date of the destruction of the property, to November 22, 1917, the date upon which judgment was entered. MR. CHIEF JUSTICE TAFT, after stating the case, delivered the opinion of the court: There are five principal questions pressed by the plaintiffs in error here, the defendants below. The first is that there was a misjoinder of parties plaintiff. The second is that the United Mine Workers of America, District No. 21, United Mine Workers of America, and the local unions made defendants, are unincorporated associations and not subject to suit, and therefore should have been dismissed from the case on motions seasonably made. The third is that there is no evidence to show any agency by the United Mine Workers of America in the conspiracy charged or in the actual destruction of the property, and no liability therefor. The fourth is that there is no evidence to show that the conspiracy alleged against District No. 21 and the other defendants was a conspiracy to restrain or monopolize interstate commerce. The fifth is that the court erred in a supplemental charge to the jury, which so stated the court's view of the evidence as to amount to a mandatory direction coercing the jury into finding the verdict which was recorded. [Only that part of the opinion which deals with the second question is given here.] Second. Were the unincorporated associations, the International Union, District No. 21, and the local unions, suable in their names? The United Mine Workers of America is a national organization. Indeed, because it embraces Canada, it is called the International Union. Under its constitution, it is intended to be the union of all workmen employed in and around coal mines, coal washers, and coke ovens on the American continent. Its declared purpose is to increase wages and improve conditions of employment of its members by legislation, conciliation, joint agreements, and strikes. It demands not more than eight hours a day of labor. The union is composed of workmen eligible to membership, and is divided into districts, sub-districts, and local unions. The ultimate authority is a general convention to which delegates selected by the members in their local organizations are elected. The body governing the union in the interval between con |