naval genius which has produced such striking results-invulnerable ships being only the latest product of it. Nor can we conceal from ourselves that it is France who has taken the lead in these improvements, which have completely changed the nature of naval war. We are accustomed to admit the superiority of French genius in certain arts, but in maritime affairs we should not have been prepared to accept France as our teacher, our institutrice,' as M. Raymond calls it. Let us hear him on this point:

In 1815, after so many glorious victories, England seemed to be justified in regarding herself as the instructress of all other Powers in naval matters. Now, since 1815 she has in that respect received everything from others, and given them almost nothing in return. The improvements in sailing ships, in the first place, improvements which she has been forced to copy, and which include every part of a ship of war, are all of French origin... At a later time, when the application of the screw allowed of building real steam ships of war, it was from France again that the model came which England had to copy-the "Napoleon." And still later, when the experiment made at Kinburn by France upon her own idea proved the value of iron armour as means of defence, it was France again which produced the first type of fighting ship and cruiser which ever appeared upon the waters cased in iron; and that model still maintains its superiority both as a sea-boat and as a weapon of war over all the copies that have been designed. The English begin by depreciating and questioning her good qualities, but the lesson given by the "Merrimac" having come, the "Times" exclaims suddenly, "We must not deceive ourselves, our whole navy is reduced to two ships, the "Warrior" and "Black "Prince!" Then the same paper, and very soon many others both in America and England, adopt the phrase of M. Dupuy de Lôme, in the Council of State; when asking for the funds to build the "Gloire," he exclaimed, "One ship of the kind pushed into the middle of a whole "fleet of your old wooden ships would there with her 36 guns be like "a lion among a flock of sheep."

'If the art of defence produced such results, the means of attack and destruction make equal progress on their side. Rifled cannon appear; France, which had already furnished the Paixhans's gun against wooden walls, is the first to employ the rifled gun as an ordinary weapon.' (Pp. 22–4.)

The merit of originality no one will deny to the masterpiece of M. Dupuy de Lôme, but we may have something to say as to the continued superiority of that undoubtedly great effort of genius.

Nor was it only by inventive enterprise that France signalised the reviving spirit of her navy. M. Raymond recounts a long list of very considerable warlike achievements, either wholly due to the French navy or shared by it.

'In 1823, the year which may be considered the date of its regeneration, the French navy blockaded Cadiz and the Guadalquivir, and reduced the fortress of Santi Petri. In 1828, it carried an army to the Morea, and commenced that long and trying blockade which was to terminate, in 1831, by the capture of Algiers. In 1831, it took possession of Ancona, and forced the entrance of the Tagus. In the following years it had many engagements on the coast of Africa. In 1834, it went to Carthagena and St. Domingo. In 1839, it reduced the fort of St. Jean d'Ulloa, after a brilliant action. In 1841, it took possession of the Comoro Islands, the Marquesas, and Tahiti. In 1844, it destroyed the batteries of Tangiers and Mogador. In 1849, it transported the army to Civita Vecchia. In 1859, it supported at Genoa and Venice the operations of the army of Italy, and at the same time commenced in Cochin China the operations which were to afford Admiral Charner further opportunities of victories. All these enterprises succeeded: in none of them did we sustain a single reverse.'

Besides these operations of a force solely French, M. Raymond (p. 82.) recounts those in combination with England, always yielding to France an equal share of honour except 'when her flag obtained special distinction.'

This recapitulation of naval achievements is worthy of attention, as showing how much French writers identify the last startling productions of their naval power with its general and steady advance in efficiency. A brief sketch of the English navy during the same period (which we need not quote here) contrasts unfavourably with that which has been given of the French, yet the comparison is not drawn in an offensive spirit. M. Raymond traces the greater relative progress of his countrymen to the better constitution of their naval administration; and if he be right in his view, the same cause may continue to produce the same effects. But in most respects the naval history of the past may indeed be compared to an old 'almanack.' We have entered upon a new career in naval construction, an unlimited field for ingenuity is before us, and the prize of success awaits the most 'judicious innovator.' As a consequence of the change in the material of naval war, there must be an equally great change in the mode of fighting and the training of the combatants-in short, there must be a new 'personnel' for a new materiel.'

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It might be interesting though useless to speculate on the effects of such a change upon our maritime supremacy. The British sailor, our ancient boast, and the article of which we had most (and could get least when wanted), will have lost much of his value, and so far the change may seem unfavourable to us. But M. Raymond, who has studied the question with

much acuteness, thinks that England has nothing to fear from the naval revolution. In a very practical chapter on the conditions of naval power, he argues that, under the new as under the old order of things, we have all the elements of strengthwealth, mechanical skill, vast manufacturing and ship-building establishments, great commercial enterprise, a numerous and hardy seafaring population, and, above all, the unity and patriotism that liberty produces.

In M. Raymond's chapter upon the conditions of naval power, though there may be nothing new to those who have thought much upon the subject, there is a breadth and justness of view, which will strike the English reader forcibly. Had Mr. Cobden written upon the same subject, he would have treated it probably in the same manner, though not exactly in the same spirit. Having told us (p. 369.) that the three elements of naval power are:

"Wealth, flourishing manufactures, and a population of sailors, which is itself, again, a result proportioned to the merchant navy of each people,' M. Raymond adds, Money, it has been said, is the sinews of war, and we need not go far to prove that this is as true of a naval force as of any other. There are, however, some data of the proposition which it may be well to lay before the reader, to convince him that at sea still less than elsewhere, could the place of money be supplied by individual energy or popular enthusiasm; nor would such revolutionary proceedings as some people believe in, be of more avail. The serious expenses of the improved engines of a modern navy, the cost of what we now consider its commonest operations, will serve to show the distance at which the very nature of things has placed the different flags, and the chance which any one Power has of changing that order of procedure in its own favour. Thus, at the commencement of this century, in Nelson's days, the English, by dividing the total expense of a fleet by the number of its guns, calculated that each gun, which may be considered to represent the military strength of ships, cost 1,000l. For steam line-of-battle ships the estimate varied from 5,000l. to 6,000l.; it is now above 10,000l. per broadside gun in the ironcased frigate "Warrior," which ship, according to the statement made by Lord Clarence Paget, secretary to the Admiralty, in the House of Commons, cost 367,000l.* In many countries the total expenditure upon the navy is less than the sum required for a single one of these ships. Add to this, that the least estimate for redemption of capital, maintenance, repairs, &c., is 20 per cent. on the cost; consider, again, that the "Warrior cannot steam even in fine weather at a less expense than 27s. to 30s. for each league

The 'Gloire' cost only 188,0007.; but it is right to add that she carries 36 guns instead of 40, and the engines are of 900 horse power instead of 1,250.

run.

Now these armour-plated ships, having entered into our line of battle, how many second-rate navies which once played an honourable, even glorious, part now find themselves distanced by the mere question of finance? Treating the question from the other side, we arrive at a similar but more unfavourable result for the secondary Powers. At the commencement of this century England had to fit out a great fleet to reduce Copenhagen. How many armour-plated frigates would be required now-a-days to produce fully as much effect as the great fleet of Nelson and Sir Hyde Parker? Would not two be enough, and three perhaps too many? And let it not be thought that, by devoting all the money spent upon her navy to building ironcased frigates, Denmark could at least retain her ancient position; it would not be so: the fortifications which contributed to her defence in 1801 have lost nearly all their value against iron-cased ships.' (Pp. 370-3.)

M. Raymond observes, that while without a large budget there cannot be a naval Power, yet, though money be an essential point, it is not the only one: there cannot be a naval Power without extensive trade.' Formerly, he observes, the strength of a naval Power consisted in the supplies which had been accumulated in the naval arsenals, and this partly because the insufficient means of transport rendered such previous accumulations necessary. Of this difficulty M. Raymond gives some striking instances, but railways have altered matters. It would be cheaper and easier, now that there is a continuous line of railway from St. Petersburgh to Toulon, Rochefort and Cherbourg, to draw timber for masts from Russia, than it was under the empire to draw them from the Vosges or from Switzerland; but, further, it was only in the naval arsenals formerly that any of the larger articles used in the navy could be made.

'Now, the largest anchors, the most powerful engines, and iron armour plates are made in the private establishments of France, and still more in those of England. These foundries which make the large cylinders, the ponderous shafts for engines of 1,000 horse power, would make light work of cannon of the largest calibres, of anchors,' &c.

The increased consumption of iron, M. Raymond truly says, adds another tie between the navy and the manufacturer, of which Russia had a proof when her army, in spite of numbers and valour, was overwhelmed by the immense material which the workshops of England and France vomited forth from so far and so fast against her. It must, M. Raymond says, have embittered the last moments of the emperor Nicholas, who disliked the commercial classes for their liberalism, and was fond of calling them those perruquiers,' to know how large a share they had in his humiliation.

M. Raymond expects that the chief characteristic of every future contest will be the inexhaustible supply of all the material of war which private industry will furnish to the belligerents, and the strength and suddenness of the blows which with such aid may be struck. The supplies sent to the Allies in the Crimean war, contrasted with the supplies so painfully drawn by Russia, give some notion of this, and the campaign of Italy in 1859 no less so. In all the military operations of the Second Empire, the French navy has taken a distinguished part and in none more than in the present campaign in Mexico, in which 50,000 men have been thrown across the Atlantic and supported in a hostile country by French ships of war. Steam, he considers upon these grounds, has added to the naval strength of England; and although her line-of-battle ships, which lately outnumbered the combined navies of the world, have been superseded by iron-clads, of which France, having got the start, now possesses an equal number, who can doubt that the same causes which had pro'duced so great a disproportion in the number of line-of-battle 'ships, will operate with equal strength in very shortly bringing ' about the same results in armour-cased ships?' (P. 389.)

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As to steam-power, then, M. Raymond differs altogether from those who say it will re-establish an equality at sea; and ' though as to armour-cased ships, which, having, so to speak, no 'masts, will present themselves in battle as bare as pontoons, it is ' undeniable that we do not require as much as our predecessors did those picked men, those topmen, who were the type of the 'sailor in former days,' still, M. Raymond thinks a special class of seamen will not the less be required, and that the improved engines both of locomotion and destruction, the rapidity and power of evolution in modern ships, demand no less skill, experience, discipline, and courage than was needed of old. It may be observed here that the great extension of French commerce is assumed to have given France the second place among maritime Powers.

Two incidental remarks of M. Raymond, while treating upon this subject, will strike the naval reader. In reference to the enormous range of modern artillery, he speaks of 1,200 metres (1,312 yards) as the 'normal regulation distance' for engaging in former times. If there had been any regulation upon the subject in our navy, a nearer approach than three quarters of a mile would certainly have been commanded. Upon the power of evolution possessed by steam fleets, it is said by M. Raymond that even Admiral Hugon, who had a special repu'tation for his daring and able evolutions, when he directed the

VOL. CXVIII. NO. CCXLI.

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