tained both in France and here, could never be cured by a repetition of the prejudices originally entertained. Neither had his majefty always made a clear manifeftation of fuch a difpofition. The declaration of the allies gave the French reason to believe we meditated the restoration of the old government. The great error of those who argued against negotiation, was the forgetting that we had only a choice of evils. Such a peace as could be made with the prefent government of France, was a lefs evil than continuing the war on the principles by which it had been directed, and far lefs than fsuch a peace as we might ultimately be obliged to accept. He recommended peace, in order to prevent difcontents at home; and thought a counter-revolution in France more likely to be effected by it, as the armies would then be at leifure to attend to and interfere in the internal affairs of the country. The picture drawn of their internal fituation proved the probability of their uniting to demolish a government, to which, in peace, they muft impure all their fufferings. The pains taken to exterminate religious fentiments, would render them lefs fubmiffive to fufferings. However much their affignats were depreciated, they might and would continue to iffue them as long as they were worth any thing. The circulation of these, and the fale of confifcated property, would augment the number of perfons interested in maintaining a fyftem upon which the value of both depended. Thefe were powerful reafons why the refiftance of the prefent government would be great in proportion to the preffure of external force. There were, he stated, various means by which nations might treat without humiliation on either fide. The characteristic of this nation was, he obferved from Hume, too great a propensity to go to war, and too great obftinacy in continuing it. The terms obtained by the peace of Ryfwick in 1697, had been refufed in 1692; and the terms obtained by the peace of Aix-la-Chapelle in 1748, were rejected in 1743. The tergiverfation of the minifter, who, when the motion was first mentioned, had agreed to the terms in which it was worded, yet afterwards had propofed an ameudment, was pointedly noticed by Mr. Fox, who inferred from it a defign to evade the queftion, and to delude the houfe by a little temporary conceffion which meant nothing. He approved of the amendment, in fo far as it stated that there was nothing in the prefent form of government in France that prevented a negotiation. For two fuccellive years, the oppofition had moved a fimilar amendment; and for this they had been called the advocates of France, jacobins, republicans, enemies of their king and country, &c. Aftonishing to tell, however, all this time they were fpeaking the fentiments of minifters. But the minifter had, in fact, found it neceflary to alter his conduct, had found that the abfurd, impolitic, and he might fay diabolical, fpeech he had put into the mouth of his majefty at the opening of the feffion, had made a ferious impreffion on the public mind, which must be done away. So far from the fuccefs of our arms being of fervice to the internal tranquillity of France, Mr. Fox, from a review of the different revolutions there, infifted that, in proportion as had been difcomfited and driven we from the French territory, the French had exerted themselves for their own deliverance from internal tyranny. The motion, fo far from binding the hands of minifters, would remove an obftacle to peace; and it could not prevent them from ftipulating the terms. Without this declaration, perfons holding the government of France knew that it had been uniformly declared by our minifters that they could not treat with them. But the confiftency of the houfe of commons was faid to ftand in the way. He thought there might now be an end of this declamatory nonfenfe. In all queftions of policy, nations muft yield to imperious neceffity-it would be obftinacy, and not honour, to perfevere in an opinion known to be wrong. In the cafe of Oczakoff, the minifter had not hesitated to retract without a blufh, when he found the public opinion against him. He then declared our means not equal to the object: why not now compare the object with the means? Upon the principle of not treating becaufe we were unfuccefsful, he thought we might never treat; for it was not to be expected that the French government would be the first to negotiate, after the declarations made against them by minifters. What, he asked, would have been the feelings of Englishmen, if the convention had determined never to treat with them till there was a reform in the English government? We must do away all our arrogant expreffions against France; and then, even though we fhould not obtain peace, yet we fhould take from them the caufe of their enthufiafm, that which roufed every national feeling, and had carried them to unparalleled exertions. They would not then feel that they were to fight to extremity for daring to give to their own country the government they liked. He wifhed us not to diminish our force; but furely we could fight juft as well, if neceffary, after declaring we had no intention to reduce a people to flavery. He ridiculed the idea of danger from the influx of French principles, and obferved that the conftitution of this country had been endeared to us from the fatal experiments made in France. He called to the recollection of Mr. Pitt the declaration of his father, "that they fhould die on the last breach, before they granted the independence of Ame rica;" yet the fift aft of his political life had been to fign the very independence which his father had deprecated. Neceffity dictated that act; and he must now, on the fame account, retra&t his declaration refpecting France. The motion was oppofed by Mr. Dundas, on the ground that it would fetter the executive government in their negotiations for peace; and he thought we had the utmoft reafon to expect fuccefs from the profecution of the war: at leaft it was a fair prefumption that our fituation would not be worfe, if we continued the war. Mr. Grey, in his reply to the fpeakers on the fide of adminiftration, complained of the manner in which his motion had been treated by minifters, who had, when he gave notice of it, declared their readinefs to meet the question, the very words of which he had flated. One minifter had, he observed, faid the queftion at iffue was, whether our prefent fituation was fuch as to render it prudent to propofe a negotiation for peace. Another had maintained we could not be in a worfe ftate for negotiation. Either of thefe fuppofitions would answer his purpose. If our danger was not great, we might hope to make peace with more advantage; if it was, the fooner we negotiated the better. The terms on which he would make peace, were "thofe which, at the time of negotiation, would appear the most honourable and advantageous." The amendment, he contended, excluded the poffibility of peace till the present government of France was overthrown. For the fecurity for peace which we had to expect, he called the attention of the houfe to the other countries with which the French had made peace. The motion was negatived by a majority of 183, and Mr. Pitt's amendment agreed to by a majority of 164. Mr. Sheridan then propofed another amendment, "that the house are not of opinion that there are circumftances in the prefent government of France which preclude all negotiation, or render it incapable of maintaining the accuftomed relations of peace and amity." This amendment was, however, negatived, and the house adjourned at five o'clock in the morning. On the following day the duke of Bedford moved in the house of lords, "that no form of government, which may prevail in France, fhould preclude a negotiation with that country, or prevent a peace whenever it could be made confift ently with the intereft, honour, and fecurity of this nation." His grace urged the neceffity of an explicit declaration of the real object of the war. This motion, he obferved, obviated former objections. It did not confine minifters, or oblige them to accept whatever terms were offered by the enemy; the time was alfo left to the difcretion 1795. -- of the minifter; nor did it require us to fue for peace. Minifters faid negotiation was difhonourable, as the French were the aggreffors. Admitting this, what fcenes of blood muft Europe have exhibited, had it been adopted as a general principle that no party fhould manifeft a wifh for peace which had not been the aggreffor in the war. We had often offered to treat when our arms were fuccessful; and in the American war, when they were not fo, we had fufpended offenfive operations as a preliminary to negotiation. That the French, however, were not the aggreffors, his grace contended, from the retraction of the offenfive declaration,-from the explanation offered by their minifter, from different fpeeches in the convention, and the decree that they would not interfere in the govern. ment of other countries. As to a permanent peace, where could fuch a thing be found in the abfolute fense of the word? An equitable peace was the only one likely to be permanent; and arguing on relative permanency, he fhould think peace with a republic more likely to be permanent than with a monarchy. In the former, the queftion of peace and war must be examined and debated by many; in the latter, one must decide. One motive was urged for continuing the war, refulting from the danger of jacobinical principles, jacobinical emiffaries, and jacobinical mo. ney. His grace ridiculed the idea, that whatever could be urged by fuch meffengers would be well received by the people of this country, and asked where they were to get money? If the fituation of France was fuch as minifters defcribed, the government itself could not afford to fend money out of the country. His grace contended carrying war to their frontiers, and The ufual reafons for com- 1 had been laid by his majesty's fpeech; and he cenfured the amendment as uncandid, and calculated only to preclude any matter of importance from being difcuffed, which did not originate with mihifters. His grace pointedly ridiculed the conclufion, that the prefent government of France could not continue, because the author of an obnoxious pamphlet had been threatened with punishment. He faw nothing extraordinary in this circumftance:-the author had rafh ly offended againft the laws of his country, and inuft abide their juftice. Were any perfon, in 1745, to have agitated the queftion, whether the king fhould be fent back to Hanover, and the Stuarts placed upon the throne, would he not have been tried for high treafon? His grace confidered the amendment as dangerous and equivocal, and its effect, with regard to this country, as nugatory: the motion was fimple and explicit. queftion of peace and war, but objected to it as a fpecific declaration applying to the particular occafion, and he therefore moved an amendment exactly fimilar to that introduced by Mr. Pitt in the houfe of commons the preceding evening. In fupport of this amendment, his lordship argued the declared hoftility of men of every party in France' against this country, and the inftability of the party now in power. A perfon had been threatened with the terrors of the revolutionary tribunal, merely for publishing a dialogue which contained a doubt whether the majority of the people were moft inclined to a monarchy or a republic. How did this prove an unanimous with for a republic? Paris was, he obferved, till distracted with violent factions; and the difficulty with which the monfter Le Bon was punished, proved that the moderates had a very powerful party to oppofe, which was no fymptom of their permanency. His lordship entered into a detail of the fhocking impieties of the French, and infifted upon the failure of their refources, and the difaffection of a confiderable number towards the prefent ruling party, who had peremptorily refufed to the lawful heirs the restoration of that wealth of which their fathers had been unjustly deprived. He allow ed, that, by the new fyftem in France, we were in a fituation lefs remote from that in which we might treat with a rational profpect of fecurity. Till that period, how. ever, arrived, which he thought far diftant, he conceived that a vigorous profecution of the war was far preferable to any attempt to negotiate. The original motion was approved of by the duke of Norfolk, as removing the bar to peace, which The earl of Darnley fupported the amendment, which was oppofed in a fpeech of uncommon energy and glowing eloquence by the bifhop of Llandaff. His lordship obferved, that, though war was not directly prohibited by the facred writings, yet few were the wars which could be confcientioufly defcribed as allowable. Adverting to what had been faid of the juftice and neceffity of the war, he remarked that this propofition involved two diftinct queftions,-a war might be juft without being neceflary, though no war could be neceffary which was not juft. Previous to the commencement of war, every expedient fhould be tried to continue peace. Whether thefe means had been tried with France, he knew not. He thought that, at the end of the first campaign, when E 2 Auftria |