SAULLE BROWNE. 1874. Injunction to restrain Criminal transferring the Aldersgate-street business to No. 8, Worshipstreet, and that the latter business had been commenced and carried on by means of money improperly, and without the knowledge of the plaintiff, drawn out of the Aldersgate-street business, and by means of the appropriation of the goodwill of the Aldersgate-street business, and that the defendants Godfrey, Browne, and Findlay had traded with these assets, and had thereby realised large profits. The bill prayed for declaration that the goodwill of Proceedings. the Aldersgate-street business, and so much of the assets of that business as represented assets appropriated by Godfrey and Browne, and transferred to the Worship-street business, and all profits arising therefrom, constituted part of the estate of the testator, and for the necessary accounts and inquiries. On the 12th of November, 1874, issue was joined in the suit, and on the 13th of November the plaintiff obtained a summons from the magistrates of the Worship-street Police Court against the defendants Godfrey and Browne, alleging that the said defendants did unlawfully conspire to defraud the plaintiff of her just share of and in the partnership business of "Saull and Co." carried on at 15, Aldersgate-street, and to utterly destroy the said business, and to transfer the goodwill and the stock and assets thereof to No. 8, Worship-street for their own benefit. The summons was to be heard on the 19th of November, and on the 16th the defendants Godfrey and Browne applied to the Master of the Rolls for leave to serve the plaintiff with notice of motion to restrain her from proceeding on the summons until the hearing of the cause. The Master of the Rolls refused the application, intimating that he did so in order to enable the parties to carry the matter to a higher court, as if the motion came before him, he should refuse to interfere with the criminal proceedings, for want of jurisdiction. The two defendants thereupon applied to the full court, which granted leave to serve notice of motion. The motion to have the proceedings on the summons restrained, now came on for hearing. Fry, Q.C., and Ince, in support of the application, contended that the matters in respect of which criminal proceedings were instituted, were the same as those which formed the subject of the Chancery suit, and that this was merely an attempt under colour of a criminal charge to try an issue in the suit. They referred to Attorney General v. Cleaver (18 Ves. 210); Lord Montague v. Dudman (2 Ves. sen. 396); The Mayor and Corporation of York v. Pilkington (2 Atk. 302). Fischer, Q.C. and Locock Webb for the plaintiff were not called upon. The LORD CHANCELLOR (Cairns) said he had no doubt but there had been cases in which the object of criminal proceedings taken by a party to a suit in this court had been so identical with the civil remedy that this court had thought it right to order that the party should not pursue his remedy in both courts. He desired to express his opinion that there might be such cases. He SAULLE v. BROWNE. 1874. Criminal thought the authorities referred to came within this observation. But as regarded the present case, it appeared that the bill alleged that the defendants, acting in collusion together, arranged a scheme for appropriating the plaintiff's share in the partnership business, and prayed for the usual realization of the Injunction to restrain partnership assets. He made no observation as to the plausibility of the case set up by the bill, but he found that the same Proceedings. plaintiff took out a summons in the Police Court against the defendants, or some of them, alleging that they had unlawfully conspired to defraud the plaintiff of her share in the partnership business. The summons was based on the criminal jurisdiction of the Police Court, and the plaintiff sought thereby to put in force the law against the two defendants, and to obtain the punishment of the two defendants for a criminal conspiracy. That was a result different from anything which could be obtained in this court. It was true that the judge in the criminal court might have to consider the same question that would ultimately have to be determined by this court, but the object of the police court proceedings was not to obtain relief in respect of partnership property, but punishment for a criminal offence. It had been asked during the argument, whether a summons of this kind could not be taken out, and after the hearing in the Police Court a bill have been filed in the matter. There could be no doubt that it could be done. Neither could there be a doubt that, after relief had been obtained in this court for loss occasioned by a conspiracy, a summons could afterwards be taken out in a criminal court for the punishment of that conspiracy. And if this could be done afterwards, there could be no reason why it should not be done at the same time, especially as the conviction would not be received as evidence in the suit. course it was for the discretion of the magistrates to consider whether he would entertain this summons, but with that their Lordships had nothing to do. He was of opinion that the motion must be dismissed with costs. Of Lord Justice JAMES was of the same opinion. He was quite aware that in former times the Court of Chancery had been asked to interfere, and had interfered when officers of the court were harassed and disturbed by criminal proceedings, and when they had no other protection. Some of the cases of interference by the court which were contained in Mr. Swanston's Reports were of this description. He observed, however, that during all the centuries during which the Court of Chancery had been in existence, only one precedent for making such an order as the court was asked to make in the present case was to be found, for the authorities cited were merely comments on Lord Hardwick's decision in the Mayor and Corporation of York v. Pilkington. Lord Justice MELLISH Concurred. Solicitors, Howard and Co.; Miller and Miller. COURT OF QUEEN'S BENCH. Saturday, Jan. 16, 1875. (Before COCKBURN, C.J., MELLOR, J., and QUAin, J.) REG. v. THE JUSTICES OF SUSSEX. Insane prisoner-Inquiry concerning settlement-Prison contract -Justices of contracting and receiving authority-3 & 4 Vict, c. 54-27 & 28 Vict. c. 29-28 & 29 Vict. c. 126. By sect. I of the Insane Prisoners' Act 1840, two justices of the peace of the county, city, borough, or place where an insane prisoner is imprisoned, may inquire, with the aid of two physicians or surgeons, as to the insanity of such person. By sect. 2 such two justices, or any other two justices of the peace of the county, city, borough, or place where such person is imprisoned, may inquire into and ascertain such person's legal settlement, with the object of ordering payment of the costs of his maintenance. Sect. 1 of this Act is repealed by the Insane Prisoners' Act Amendment Act, 1864, and other provisions are made for inquiry into a prisoner's insanity by visiting or other justices with physicians or surgeons, and in certain cases by physicians or surgeons only. The Prison Act, 1865, provides for contracts between prison authorities for the detention of prisoners, and enacts (sect. 57) that every prison, wheresoever situate, shall for all purposes be deemed to be within the limits of the place for which it is used as a prison; and also (sect. 66) that the prison of the receiving authority shall for all the purposes of and incidental to the commitment, trial, detention, and punishment of the prisoners of the contracting authority or any of such purposes, according to the tenor of the contract, be deemed to be the prison of the contracting authority: Held (upon demurrer to return to a mandamus, directing the justices of a county, in the prison of which an insane prisoner had been detained under a contract with a borough, to ascertain the settlement under sect. 2 of the said Act of 1840), that there is nothing in the said two later Acts of 1864 and 1865 to alter the duty of making this inquiry from the justices of the county in which the prisoner was actually in prison to the justices of the borough which contracted for the prisoner's detention; and that any expense to the county in consequence should be provided for in its contract with the borough. REG. v. THE JUSTICES 1875. Insane Prisoner. THIS HIS was a demurrer to the return to a writ of mandamus, which had been granted on the prosecution of Her Majesty's OF SUSSEX. Secretary of State for the Home Department. The writ was directed to the visiting justices of the county prison of Lewes, in the county of Sussex. It recited that by warrant under the royal sign manual, bearing date the 23rd day of June, 1861, that the Broadmoor Criminal Lunatic Asylum, in the county of Berks, was appointed to be an asylum for criminal lunatics, under 23 & 24 Vict. c. 75; that by a charter of incorporation, dated 1st day of April, 1854, the powers and provisions of 5 & 6 Will. 4, c. 76, were extended to the inhabitants of Brighton, in the county of Sussex aforesaid, and by letters patent, dated the 16th day of December, 1854, Her Majesty granted a separate Court of Quarter Sessions to the borough of Brighton, pursuant to the provisions of the said Act; that on the 16th day of January, 1872, at the Central Criminal Court, one Christiana Edmunds was found guilty of murder committed within the limits of the said borough of Brighton, and was sentenced to death; that while under sentence of death the said Christiana Edmunds was received into and imprisoned and maintained in the said county prison at Lewes, in the said county of Sussex, being a prison to which visiting justices are appointed, under a contract entered into in pursuance of sect. 31 of the Prison Act 1865 (28 & 29 Vict. c. 128) between William Kirby Johnson Langridge, being the clerk of the peace of the county of Sussex for and on behalf of the justices of the peace acting in and for the eastern division of the county of Sussex in quarter sessions assembled of the one part, and the mayor, aldermen, and burgesses of the town of Brighton aforesaid by their council of the other part: that while so confined and imprisoned in such prison under such sentence as aforesaid, it was made to appear to the Right Honourable Henry Austin Bruce, then Secretary of State for the Home Department, and one of the principal Secretaries of State, that there was good reason to believe that the said Christiana Edmunds, then in confinement under such sentence as aforesaid, was then insane; and, thereupon, the said Henry Austin Bruce, under and in pursuance of the provisions of 27 & 28 Vict. c. 29, s. 2, did appoint to physicians duly registered as such under the provisions of 21 & 22 Vict. c. 90, to inquire into the insanity of the said Christiana Edmunds; that upon such inquiry the said Christiana Edmunds was found to be then insane, and the fact was duly certified in writing by the said physicians to the said Right Honourable Henry Austin Bruce, then Secretary of State as aforesaid; that on receipt of the said certificate, the said Right Honourable Henry Austin Bruce, then Secretary of State as aforesaid, in pursuance of the statute in that case made and provided, directed, by warrant under his hand, that the said Christiana Edmunds should be removed, and the said Christiana Edmunds has accordingly been removed to the said Broadmoor Criminal Lunatic Asylum, and has thenceforward been, and now is, insane, and confined and maintained as insane therein; that the said Right Hon. Henry Austin Bruce, being such Secretary of State as aforesaid, no one of the principal Secretaries of State having otherwise directed, did by a requisition dated the 22nd day of February, 1873, require the said justices or any two of them to inquire into and ascertain, by the best evidence or information that could be obtained under the circumstances of the personal legal disability of the said Christiana Edmunds, the place of the last legal settlement, and the pecuniary circumstances of the said C. Edmunds; and if it should not appear that she was possessed of sufficient property which could be applied to her maintenance, by order under their hands, or the hands of any two of them, to direct the overseers of the parish where the said justices or any two of them should adjudge the said C. Edmunds to be lawfully settled, or in case such parish should be comprised in a union declared by the Poor Law Commissioners, or should be under the management of a board of guardians established by the Poor Law Commissioners, then the guardians of such union, or of such parish, as the case might be, to pay on behalf of such parish in the case of the said Christiana Edmunds so removed as aforesaid, all reasonable charges for inquiring into her insanity and for conveying her to Broadmoor Criminal Lunatic Asylum aforesaid, and to pay such weekly sum as the said justices or any two of them, or any two justices, should by writing under their hands as aforesaid, or from time to time, direct for her maintenance in the asylum in which she is confined; and if the place of settlement of the said C. Edmunds could not be ascertained, to make such order as is in that case made and provided by the 2nd section of 3 & 4 Vict. c. 54; but if it should appear upon inquiry that the said C. Edmunds was possessed of property, to make such further or other order, and to take all such lawful steps as are in that case directed by the statute in that case made and provided; and that the said visiting justices had wholly refused, and still refuse to comply with the said requisition, and had not, nor had any of them inquired, nor ascertained nor directed nor adjudged nor made order as aforesaid, nor taken any such such steps as aforesaid, contrary to the statute in such case made and provided, and in contempt of Her Majesty and her officers, and to the great damage and grievance of the said criminal lunatic asylum and the superintendent thereof. Therefore, as the writ proceeded to state, Her Majesty being willing that due and speedy justice should be done in this behalf, as it is reasonable, commanded the said visiting justices of the county of Sussex, firmly enjoining them that immediately after the receipt by them of this writ of mandamus they should without delay inquire into and ascertain the place of the last legal settlement and the pecuniary circumstances of the said Christiana Edmunds, and make all such orders and give all such directions, and take all such lawful steps for the payment of all reasonable charges for inquiring into her insanity, |