plausible at first view, has been advocated only by theorists, and is utterly unsupported, either by experience or reason. It has been considered by the most profound, and erudite philosophers, not only as impracticable, but productive of the very evils which are intended to be avoided, by a general separation. Montesquieu, in a treatise on the English Constitution, says, "When the legislative and executive are united in the same person, or in the same body of magistrates, then there can be no liberty; because apprehensions may arise, lest the same monarch, or senate, should enact tyrannical laws, to execute them in a tyrannical manner. Again, there is no liberty, if the judiciary power be not separated from the legislative and executive. Were it joined to the legislative, the life and liberty of the subject would be exposed to arbitrary control; for the judge would be the legislator. Were it joined to the executive power, the judge might behave with violence and oppression. There would be an end of every thing, were the same man, or the same body, whether of the nobles, or of the people, to exercise these three powers-that of enacting laws, that of executing the public resolutions, and of trying the causes of individuals." But this language must not be construed in favor of an entire, but of a general separation, for it is used in approbation of a constitution, which recognizes, in each department of its government, some power appertaining to the others. It is used to show the tendency of absolute governments, and that all of these powers should not be exercised by the same man, or body of men. must be regarded in this limited sense, when applied to

It

the Constitution of the United States, for it, also, establishes an occasional mixture of these powers. This partial connection of them was formerly urged as a chief objection to our Constitution, and strange to tell, even in our enlightened times, since experience has demonstrated its propriety, it is still considered a prominent defect-but such objections are wild, speculative, and unfounded, and more frequently urged by visionary and ingenious theorists, than by practical men. Certainly, no one professing much knowledge of human nature, will deny that there exists in republican forms of government, a tendency to aggrandize the legislature. Philosophy, with arguments the most conclusive, in accordance wtih common sense, and harmonizing with the sure and sound teachings of experience, has fortified this truth beyond the attacks of subtle ingenuity, and established it as one, the most certain and indubitable. It is because in such governments the executive and judiciary powers are limited, and embraced within a small compass, while on the other hand the legislative is a numerous department, and invested with powers far more important and extensive, and consequently possessing greater influence. It is liable to be influenced and actuated by those inordinate excitements which sometimes, yet seldom, inflame the populace, and derange the public mind. Submissive to the voice of interest, and regardless of mere constitutional limits-they seek to do the will of a majority, and though it be but the effect of blind passion, and temporary delusion, they obey without reluctance the dictates of the multitude. Whether actuated by motives good or bad, by that noble incentive-the

will of the people, or by a selfish desire to secure their re-election-whether urged on by reason or passion, directed by judgment, or allured by the beauty of visionary schemes-whether persuaded by the voice of experience, or deceived by ingenious sophistry— whether led by the demands of justice, or misled by partizans, and fired with the wild declamation of designing demagogues, under all circumstances, it is regarded as the representative will of the people. Swelled with its influence, and the pomp and power of numbers-it is swayed by popular excitement, and liable to be agitated, till, like a torrent that has burst its natural limits, it may overleap the bounds assigned it, and probably made more impetuous by the strong current of public favor, it may sweep in its destructive course, over the ruins of the executive and judiciary. Let those who doubt these remarks hearken to the warnings of history-let them but revert to the history of these states, for it is unnecessary for this object to search the musty records of antiquity, let them but look back to the former history of Virginia, and there learn that this power is encroaching. Consider

ing then the vast power of our legislature, and its tendency to aggrandizement, is it wise that it should be without check? Its trusts are delicate, and of the most important nature, those which it is most difficult to exercise with moderation and prudence; to impose taxes, duties, imposts and excises, to regulate commerce, to borrow, coin and appropriate money, to raise and sup

* In December, 1776, and again in June, 1781, a proposition was made in the Virginia House of Delegates to appoint a dictator, invested with supreme power, civil and military.—See Jefferson's Notes on Virginia, page 134.

port armies, and a navy, and to determine the means of carrying into effect all its powers, &c.

Can it be safe to entrust such powers to a numerous and unchecked assembly, whose immediate interest it is to conform its actions to the sometimes delusive opinions of a majority, or will a mere constitutional limit-mere writing on parchments-form a sufficient barrier to the excesses of political excitement? Will it cool the fury of parties, or save us from its ill effects-will it shield us against usurpation, or thwart the designs of the traitor-will it curb ambitious longings, or palsy the tongue that would with honeyed words allure to ruin? Will it wither the hand that grasps a kingly diadem, or unnerve the arm that seeks to sway a Cæsar's sceptre? Never without some power, actual and available, to guard it, and see that it be not passed. But even admitting a mere written prohibition to be sufficient, who shall tell the magic words with which to form the mighty sentence? Never yet have human hands inscribed them, or human lips pronounced them, and mocking echo only can reply, till poor humanity has doffed its depravity, and glows in its original splendor of god-like perfection. Upon the hardened heart of man the words of God himself fall powerless, unless enforced by the power of his might. Can the words of his creatures be supposed to possess a greater influence? Religion, wisdom, and experience combine to prove the contrary, and so thought the sages of the federal and state conventions, who, by the will and power of the people, constituted the executive a component of the legislature, and impowered the judiciary to decide the constitutionality of their acts.

DIVISION OF THE LEGISLATURE.

THE first section of the first article of the Constitu tion confides the legislative power to "a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives," thereby dividing the legislature into two separate and independent branches. Whereas, under the confederation, this power was vested in a single body of men, we are naturally led to inquire the reason for its division. The propriety of it has been much doubted by a few of great erudition and profound judgment. But its utility has been so well determined by a long experience, it is generally admitted, and in the present day there are not many, who have respect for their judgment, who would undertake to question it. The important object to be attained by it was to form a barrier to measures for personal interest, and carried by the force of great personal popularity, and to guard against the evil consequences of excitement, and speedy and precipitate legislation, prompted by the passion and party intrigue, which it seems has ever governed single legislative assemblies. In a great measure this object is attained; for though it is possible, it is not probable, that a law will be adopted with haste, without sufficient reasons, or without due examination, when submitted to the deliberate investigation and discussion of two distinct assemblies, separated from each other, chosen for different periods, and in different modes, and to a certain extent jealous of each other's proceedings. The history of many governments teaches us to shun the scheme of a single legislative body; for in the past, we find many and melancholy fruits of the unsoundness and instability of