118. LIFE INSURANCE Beneficiary. — -The rights of a beneficiary under a life policy issued under Laws N. Y. 1877, ch. 321, § 1, relating to forfeitures for nonpayment of premiums, held not subject to a waiver by assured.Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Hill, U. S. C. C. of App., Ninth Circuit, 118 Fed. Rep. 708.

119. LIFE INSURANCE- Warranties.- False statements of insured that she had not been treated by a physician, except in childbirth, for 10 years, and had no disease of the liver, held warranties, and to void the policy, whether material or not. - Flippen v. State Life Ins. Co., Tex., 70 S. W. Rep. 787.

120. MANDAMUS-Producing Papers.-A stockholder in a corporation held not entitled to mandamus requiring it to produce its books and papers for his examination. -In re Latimer, 78 N. Y. Supp. 314.

121. MASTER AND SERVANT — Assumption of Risk. -An employee does not assume the risk created by the employer's negligence. Alabama G. S. R. Co. v. Brooks, Ala., 33 So. Rep. 181.

122. MASTER AND SERVANT- Assumption of Risk. -An employee in a switchyard held to assume the risk in attempting, while going to the vault provided for such employees, to climb over the couplings of cars in a train standing ready to start. -McKee v. Chicago, B. & O. R. Co., Mo., 70 S. W. Rep. 922.

123. MASTER AND SERVANT-Civil Liability.-Employing a laborer already employed by another person will not create a liability on the part of the one employing ing him, unless it is done with some degree of threat, fraud, falsehood, deception, or benefit.-Kline v. Eubanks, La., 33 So. Rep. 211.

124. MASTER AND SERVANT-Damages.-Punitive damages are not recoverable against the master for the wrongful act of his servant, unless he has ratified the misconduct, or it is committed after the unfitness of the servant is known to the master.-Kastner v. Long Island R. Co., 78 N. Y. Supp. 469.

125. MASTER AND SERVANT Employment of Infant.In an action for injuries to an infant employed in a factory, it was not error to permit the father to testify that he did not hire plaintiff to defendant.-Fitzger ld v. Alma Furniture Co., N. Car., 42 S. E. Rep. 946.

126. MECHANIC'S LIEN-Trustee in Bankruptcy.-Bankrupts held entitled to file mechanic's lien and assign same to trustee in bankruptcy. Davis v. Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Maryland, 78 N. Y. Supp. 336.

127. MORTGAGES-Foreclosure. A mortgage sale held to divest the mortgagee of all rights, including that to forclosure against one not made a party, and to vest them in the purchaser. Greene v. Mussey, 78 N. Y. Supp. 434.

128. MORTGAGES - Validity.- Delivery of a mortgage by a corporation to secure bonds held to have been sufficient to renderit valid under the laws of South Carolina. -In re Goldville Mfg. Co., U. S. D. C., D. S. Car., 118 Fed. Rep. 892.

129. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS -Billboards.- City of Buffalo, under its charter, held authorized to pass a city ordinance prohibiting the erection of billboards of more than a specified height without consent of the common council, etc.-Whitmier & Filbrick Co. v. City of Buffalo, U. S. C. C., W. D. N. Y., 118 Fed. Rep. 773.

132. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-Police.-A city charter providing conditions for discharge of a policeman, held not to prevent discharge because of lack of funds.-In re Lazenby, 78 N. Y. Supp. 302.

133. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS- Treasurer's Salary.When a city has provided for the handling of a large amount of money not contemplated when the treasurer's rate of compensation was fixed, it may, by ordinance, reduce such rate.-City of Grenada v. Wood, Miss., 33 So. Rep. 173.

134. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-Ultra Vires.-The acceptance by a city council of a bid for a franchise held ultra rires, and not to create a valid contract under the statute of California. -Pacific Electric Co. v. City of Los Angeles, U. S. D. C., S. D. Cal., 118 Fed. Rep. 746.

135. NEGLIGENCE-Licenses.-Precautions taken to exclude the public from an unfinished extension to a park held to have rendered children playing there but licensees at best. - Albert v. City of New York, 78 N. Y. Supp.

355.

136. NEW TRIAL - Absence of Witness. - One not protecting his rights at the trial because of surprise at absence of witness held not in a position to ask for new trial on account thereof. Erichson v. Sidlo, 78 N. Y. Supp. 487.

137. OBSCENITY — Indictment. An indictment under Code, § 1218, which charges that defendant did "unlawfully and willfully" expose his person in a public place, but does not allege that it was "lewdly" done, is fatally defective.-Stark v. State, Miss., 33 So. Rep. 175.

138. PARTIES-Contract. -Action for breach of contract to deliver goods to two persons cannot be waived by one of them. Both are necessary parties.-Lemon v. Wheeler Mo., 70 S. W. Rep. 924.

139. PARTITION - Confirmation. Where plaintiff unsuccessfully applied for stay of a partition sale pending a suit by her, she could not maintain a bill to set aside the final judgment in partition after the successful prosecution of her suit. - Schwaman v. Truax, 7 N. Y Supp. 374.

140. PARTNERSHIP - Adverse Interest of Agent. -A member of a partnership has no interest in the specific proceeds of firm property sold by his partner, and no claim against a bank in which it was deposited by the seller to his own credit on account of such deposit.Bank of Overton v. Thompson, U. S. C. C. of App., Eighth Circuit, 118 Fed. Rep. 798

141. PARTNERSHIP-Sale of Stock.-A finding that a sale of the stock or merchandise was not absolute held conclusive on appeal. - Boon v. Turner, Mo., 70 S. W. Rep. 916.

142. PAYMENT - Accounting. Where a check, reciting that it is in full payment of a'specified demand, is received and cashed without objection, it is prima facie evidence of the payment and facts recited. - - Gregg v. Roaring Springs Land & Mining Co., Mo., 70 S. W. Rep. 920.

143. PAYMENT-Unsecured Claim -The application by a creditor of an unapplied payment to an unsecured rather than to a secured, debt, held not inequitable.Thatcher v. Tillory, Tex., 70 S. W. Rep. 782.

144. PERPETUITIES-Testamentary Trust.-A provision in a will forbidding the alienation of trust property. except for purposes of reinvestment, held not an illegal restraint on alienation. Dulin v. Moore, Tex., 70 S. W.

Rep. 742.

145. POST OFFICE - Date of Offense. -An indictment under Rev. St. U. S. § 5480, U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3696, charging a scheme to defraud by use of the mails and the mailing of letters in furtherance thereof, is suflicient, though the letters are not set out. - Hume v. United States, U. S. C. C. of App., Fifth Circuit, 118 Fed. Rep. 689.

146. PRINCIPAL AND AGENT - Apparent Authority. - A coachman held to have no implied or apparent authority

to have cost of transportation of team charged to the master.-Saugerties & N. Y. Steamboat Co. v. Miller, 78 N. Y. Supp. 451.

147. PUBLIC LANDS - Application to Purchase.-An applicant who files for the purchase of school land before the expiration of a lease thereof to another held entitlep thereto as against applicants filing after the award to him.-Smith v. Zesch, Tex., 70 S. W. Rep. 775.

148. PUBLIC LANDS

161. TAXATION - Time to File Complaint. Failure to file complaint at proper term held not to entitle defendant to an extension of the time, limited by statute, within which to file a petition for removal.-Lewis v. Clyd S. S. Co., N. Car., 42 S. E. Rep. 969. 162. TRIAL Indorsement of Credits. Where a jury allowed credits pleaded in a suit on notes, but failed to find the dates thereof, it was not error to direct them to Bond v. Wilson, N.

-

152. REFERENCE Partnership. In an action by a partner on a mortgage given to indemnify him against liability for firin debt's held, that the referee properly refused to consider accounts of the partners and the drawing of money from the firm.-Sternbach v. Friedman, 78 N. Y. Supp. 318.

153. REMOVAL OF CAUSES-Petition.-A petition for removal to a federal court, while filed in the state court, is transmitted as a part of the record, and is a pleading, on which the right of removal rests. - Randall v. New England Order of Protection, U. S. C. C., D. Ver., 118 Fed. Rep. 782.

154. REMOVAL OF CAUSES-Record.-Where the record on removal of a cause is insufficient to confer jurisdiction on the federal court, it has no power to grant an amend ment of the removal petition.-Dalton v. Germania Ins. Co., U. S. C. C., N. D. Iowa, 118 Fed. Rep. 936.

155. SHIPPING-Breach of Contract.-That a barge had become disabled by loss of a mast, and that lumber contracted to be carried, consisting partly of strips and partly of boards, held no defense to a breach of contract of attreightment.-Edward Hines Lumber Co. v. Chamberlain, U. S. C. C. of App., Seventh Circuit, 118 Fed. Rep. 716.

.

156 STREET RAILROADS - Control of Cars. In the operation of its cars at street intersections, it is the duty of a street railway company to have its cars under control, so as to protect the rights of pedestrians.-Sesselmann v. Metropolitan St. Ry. Co., 78 N. Y. Supp. 482.

157. TAXATION-Additional Taxes.-Under Rev. St. 1889, § 7537, the board of equalization of taxes had authority to assess additional taxes on property not given in by relator.-State v. Baker, Mo., 70 S. W. Rep. 872.

158. TAXATION Illegal Assessment. The remedy given by Rev. St. Ohio, § 5848, expressly authorizing suits to enjoin the illegal levy of taxes or assessments, or the collection thereof, may be enforced on the equity side of the federal courts. - Lander v. Mercantile Nat. Bank, U. S. C. C. of App., Sixth Circuit, 118 Fed. Rep. 785.

159. TAXATION-Interstate Bridge.-It will be presumed that the value of an interstate bridge is in proportion to the length of the bridge. - Commonwealth v. Covington & C. Bridge, Co., Ky., 70 S. W. Rep. 849.

163. TRIAL Instructions.-The refusal of the court to have a correct special instruction which is covered by general charge is not erroneous.-St. Louis S. W. Ry. Co. of Texas v. Smith, Tex., 70 S. W. Rep. 789.

164. TRIAL-Witnesses.-Refusal to permit a witness to testify, because he was present in court after the other witnesses had been put under the rule, held not error.Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Taylor, Ky., 70 S. W. Rep. 825.

165. TROVER AND CONVERSION-Pleading. - In an action for conversion of mine tailings, an allegation that plaintiff's decedent was "lawfully possessed" of the tailings and land on which they were located held a sufficient allegation of ownership.-Stanley v. Sierra Nevada Silver Min. Co., U. S. C. C., D. Nev., 118 Fed. Rep. 931.

166. TRUSTS-Limitations. The statute of limitations begin to run against the right of an heir to enforce a constructive trust growing out of a trust existing in favor of his ancestor at the same time that it begins to run against the ancestor.-Lide v. Park, Ala., 33 So. Rep.

175.

167. TRUSTS- Payment of Income. Insufficiency of the income of a trust fund to pay the regular monthly installments and leave enough to pay taxes, which were fixed liability, but not due, held not to justify a cessation of payment of income, where the taxes could be met when due. In re Chesterman's Estate, 78 N. Y. Supp.

345.

170. VENDOR AND PURCHASER- Sale of Land. Where one sells land from a fixed boundary to another fixed boundary, the purchaser takes all the land between such bounds.-Leonard v. Forbing, La., 33 So. Rep. 203.

171. WILLS-Construction. - Beneficiary under a will held not entitled to bring a suit in equity for the con struction of the will, because having an inadequate remedy at law. - McKinlay v. Van Dusen, 78 N. Y. Supp. 377.

172. WITNESSES-Cross-Examination.- Counsel of ac cused, in cross-exam ning impeaching witnesses, held not entitled to have answers detrimental to accused excluded from the jury.-Barnes v. Commonwealth, Ky., 70 S. W. Rep. 827.

173. WITNESSES-Evidence. Where letters were used by a witness on direct examination, their production should have been compelled for the use of opposing counsel on cross-examination. - Schwickert v. Levin, 78 N. Y. Supp. 394.

174. WORK AND LABOR - Interference with Work.-A contractor, prevented by the owner from completing a building, held entitled to recover on quantum meruit for work done.-Day v. Eisele, 78 N. Y. 396.

175. WORK AND LABOR-Quantum Meruit.-A contractor under an express contract held entitled to recover on a quantum meruit, if the work and materials are of value and accepted by defendant. Roskilly v. Steigers, Mo. 70 S. W. Rep. 909.

-

Central Law Journal.

ST. LOUIS, MO., APRIL 10, 1903.

AUTOMOBILES UPON THE PUBLIC HIGHWAY.

The most interesting part of the law is its application to new inventions or new conditions of civilization; this furnishes also much of the difficulty which confronts courts of last resort in most of the litigation of the present day. A very pertinent illustration of this is to be found in the attitude which the law is attempting to assume toward automobiles and other motor vehicles.

Away back in an early case, Judge Cooley, that most far-sighted of American jurists, said: "When the highway is not restricted in its dedication to some particular mode of use, it is open to all suitable methods; and it cannot be assumed that these will be the same from age to age, or that new means of making the way useful must be excluded merely because their introduction may tend to the inconvenience, or even the injury, of those who continue to use the road after the same manner as formerly." It is on this principle that the law has made way for every advance in science, seeking rather to encourage progress in such things than to put any obstacles in their way, at the same time, however, throwing around them proper restrictions for the safety and convenience of the public.

The authorities on the question of the right of automobiles to use the highway and the liability of their owners for injuring pedestrians or frightening horses are not numerous. Of course, under the principle announced by Justice Cooley, the automobile has a perfect right to run upon the highway. The horse has no exclusive right to the road. It is also well settled that a bicycle is a proper conveyance to run upon the thoroughfare. Why not therefore the automobile. Mr. Elliott in the second edition of his work on Roads and Streets, § 861, while he cites no cases involving the use of the automobile, evidently had them in mind when he said: "It is a matter of considerable difficulty to determine to just what extent travelers may avail themselves of new means of locomotion, and new motor-power, such as steam and electricity, but we suppose, in the absence of anything to the contrary, that new and im

proved means of locomotion must be deemed to have been contemplated when our highways were laid out or dedicated, provided they are such as do not unreasonably endanger or unduly interfere with travel upon foot or by horses in the ordinary manner.”

Of course, the operator of an automobile, like any one else, is liable for his negligence, as, for instance, where he runs over a child in the street. The same questions of negligence and contributory negligence arise here as in other accident cases. One peculiarity, however, distinguishing this class of cases from others, is the effect of the fright generally caused by the machine on the question of contributory negligence. Thus, if an automobile comes upon a boy under circumstances calculated to produce fright or terror, and such fright causes an error of judgment, by which he runs in front of the automobile, is he guilty of contributory negligence? The only authority on this particular phase of the question which we could find, holds that he is not. Thies v. Thomas, 77 N. Y. Supp. 276.

Another interesting question discussed by the case we have just cited is the question of speed. The defendant in this case denied plaintiff's allegation that he was running at an illegal rate of speed. The court, however, held that this point was immaterial, because the operator of no vehicle, whether the driver of a horse and wagon or the motorman of a street car, can escape responsibility for a collision by simply showing that at the time of the accident, he did not exceed the limit of speed fixed by law. On the question of speed, the court said: "No owner or operator of an automobile is, therefore, exempt from liability for a collision in a public street, by simply showing that at the time of the accident he did not run at a rate of speed exceeding the limit allowed by law, or the ordinances. the contrary, no matter how great the rate of speed may be which the law and the ordinances permit, as a general rule he still remains bound to anticipate that he may meet persons at any point in a public street, and he must keep his machine under such control as will enable him to avoid a collision with another person also using proper care and caution."

On

On the question of liability of automobile operators for injuries caused by frightening horses on the highway, the authorities are not

uniform. Mason v. West, 70 N. Y. Supp. 478, holds that they are so liable under the circumstances in that case. In that case, plaintiff's horse was frightened by defendant's automobile, and ran away, and the horse and wagon were injured. In justifying a verdict for the plaintiff, the court said: "The testimony of the plaintiff tended to show that the carriage gave forth a loud, puffing noise, and could be heard for two blocks; that the odor was pronounced; that, as the carriage ran along, there was a humming sound from its engine; that steam or smoke issued from the exhaust, and that teams had been frightened by it; that, at the time of this accident it was passing the plaintiff's horse at the speed of ten or twelve miles an hour, and did not slacken until the horse became frightened. We do not mean to suggest that an automobile or any other means of conveyance is an unlawful or improper user of the streets, but in this particular case that there was evidence to support the judgment of the municipal court."

In another case from the same state of New York, which apparently is the only state in which this question has so far arisen, the court held that the use, on a narrow city street even of a motor carriage of crude construction, though not differing materially from steam automobiles in common use, will not subject the person, operating such vehicle in a careful manner, to liability for damages ensuing from a horse becoming frightened at such conveyance, and running away. Nason v. West, 65 N. Y. Supp. 651. The motor carriage in this case differed from the ordinary automobile by having a smokestack extending to the top of the canopy in the rear and having sinuations through which escaping vapor and exhaust steam passed. The court expresses itself quite strongly in behalf of the right of the automobile use the highway free from liability for injuries caused by frightened horses. Sutherland, J., speaking for the court says: "If the defendant's motor carriage is pradticable for the purpose of travel, and the noise and vapor caused by its use are kept within reasonable limitations, and are greater than are fairly incident to the use of motor carriages which are found adapted to the needs of the general public, then I cannot see how the defendant can be held liable

to

no

in the absence of evidence that, at the particular time complained of, the carriage wa S operated carelessly. If one should find i desirable to go back to primitive methods, and trek along a city street with a four-ox team and wagon of the prairie schooner variety, it would possibly cause some uneasiness to horses unused to such sights. Horses may take fright at conveyances that have become obsolete as well as at those which are novel; but this is one of the dangers incident to the driving of horses, and the fact cannot be interposed as a barrier to retrogression or progress in the method of locomotion."

IN

NOTES OF IMPORTANT DECISIONS. EVIDENCE-EVIDENCE OF CHARACTER CIVIL SUITS.-Is evidence of character admissible in a civil action? Suppose for instance, as in a recent case, an employer sues to recover from a clerk moneys alleged to have been embezzled by him, is evidence as to the good character of the clerk admissible in evidence. Adams v. Elseffer, 92 N. W. Rep. 772. In this case, the Supreme Court of Michigan, in denying that such evidence is admissible, discusses the question in quite an interesting manner. The court said:

"The question is presented as to whether evidence of character is admissible in a civil case, wherever the nature of the action is such that the evidence to sustain it involves the imputation of moral turpitude to the defendant. The general rule undoubtedly is, as stated in Whart. Ev. § 47, that in civil actions the character of either party is, as a rule, irrelevant. See, also, 5 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law (2d Ed.) p. 861. The correct rule, according to the great weight of authority, is that in civil actions the character of the party to the action may become the subject of proof in case it is involved in the issue. And we think the character is involved in the issue only in the cases in which either the right of recovery or the extent of recovery is affected by the character of either the plaintiff or the defendant. Anderson's Ex'rs v. Long, 10 Serg. & R. 55. It is true that there are cases which extend the rule farther. And Mr. Greenleaf, in paragraph 54, vol. 1, states the rule more broadly, as follows: And generally, in actions of tort, whenever the defendant is charged with fraud from mere circumstances, evidence of his general good character is admissible to repel it. This text is criticised by Mr. Wharton, and it is shown that it rests upon Ruan v. Perry, 3 Caines, 120, the doctrine of which was later repudiated in Gough v. St. John, 16 Wend. 646: Platt v. Andrews, 4 Comst. 493; Porter v. Seiler, 23 Pa. 424, 62 Am. Dec. 341. Referring to Ruan v. Perry, Mr. Justice Champlin, in Fahey v. Crotty, 63 Mich. 383, 29 N. W. Rep. 876, 6 Am. St. Rep. 305, said: 'In the state of New York such evidence was at one time received in civil

suits [citing Ruan v. Perry], but that case has been reviewed and overruled in later cases, and the English rule adhered to, as stated by the textwriters on Evidence. In the same case of Fahey v. Crotty, Mr. Justice Champlin also said: 'In civil actions, with the exception of those cases where by the pleadings the character of the party is put in issue, the weight of authority is against the admissibility of such testimony to rebut imputations of misconduct or fraud. We have met with no clearer exposition of the law upon the subject than is found in Simpson v. Westenberger, 28 Kan. 756, 42 Am. Rep. 195. See, also, Lander v. Seaver, 32 Vt. 114, 76 Am. Dec. 156; Wright v. McKee, 37 Vt. 161; Lumber Co. v. Hartman, 45 Mo. App. 647: Vawter v. Hultz, 112 Mo. 633, 20 S. W. Rep. 689; Gebhart v. Burkett, 57 Ind. 378, 26 Am. Rep. 61; Norris v. Stewart's Heirs, 105 N. Car. 455. 10 S. E. Rep. 912, 18 Am. St. Rep. 917. See, also, article by Elisha Greenhood in 16 Cent. L. J. 202, where the authorities are collated. In our view, the testimony offered was inadmissible."

IS IT ERROR TO REFUSE TO GIVE A CHARGE BECAUSE HANDED UP TOO LATE. Some men are always late. Their train always leaves a few minutes before they arrive at the depot or a street car will invariably go by when they are within fifty feet of the corner. So also it is with some lawyers. They file their petitions right after the last filing day has gone by; they are compelled on every occasion to rush into court only to find that the motion hour has just ended; and they always think of the proper instructions to be suggested right after the presiding judge has given his charge to the jury and the latter are ready to retire. The latter observation especially is pertinently illustrated by the recent case of State v. Barry, 92 N. W. Rep. 809, where the Supreme Court of South Dakota was asked to reverse a judgment on the ground that the trial court refused an instruction because handed up too late.

The facts upon which this assignment of error rested were as follows: The trial court had concluded the reading of its charge to the jury, and the jury were about to retire for deliberation upon their verdict, whereupon counsel for the defendant, before the jury retired, requested the court to give a certain instruction to the jury which counsel had written, and which was then delivered to the presiding judge by counsel. This request was in the following language: "If you find that the defendant was not conscious of the act which resulted in the death of Andrew Mallem, you must acquit the defendant." This request was refused, and the court indorsed on the request its reasons for such refusal as follows: "Refused. Handed ine too late."

In holding that the trial court erred in refusing to give the instruction requested the court explained its position as follows: "In this case the record discloses no rule of the district court, and we know of none, forbidding counsel to ask re

quests after the charge has been delivered to the jury, and before the jury retires: but, in the absence of any written rule regulating the practice, it is quite clear, in the nature of the case, that counsel are under an obligation to the court to frame and present their requests for instructions at some period prior to the delivery of the charge to the jury. To spring a request at the conclusion of the charge is often a source of embarrassment to the court, and, if this should be done by counsel purposely, and with a view to any such result, the act would be one involving a gross discourtesy to the court, for which counsel would be justly censurable. Nevertheless, under the rule established by the decisions, it may be prejudicial error to refuse to give an instruction asked for by counsel, even when the request comes too late under a rule of court. It may happen in exceptional cases that a charge, as given to the jury, is erroneous for the reason that the law applicable to a feature of the case has been wholly omitted from the charge, or it may be erroneous by reason of a misconception or mistaken view of the law as applicable to the case. In either of the instances supposed the parties to the litigation would be deprived of a highly important. legal right, viz., the right to have the law of the case stated from the bench for the guidance of the jury. The duty of declaring the law of the case devolves upon the presiding judge, and this duty should be discharged before the jury retires for deliberation. Nor should any mere rule of court, adopted only to facilitate the administration of the law, be allowed to stand in the way of the performance of this very important duty." The principal case is well supported by the authorities. People v. Sears, 18 Cal. 635; People v. Demastors, 105 Cal. 669, 39 Pac. Rep. 35; Chapman v. McCormick, 86 N. Y. 479; Pfeffelo v. Railroad Co., 34 Hun, 497; Leydecker v. Brintnall, 158 Mass. 292, 33 N. E. Rep. 399; Brick v. Bosworth, 162 Mass. 334, 39 N. E. Rep. 36; Crippen v. Hope, 38 Mich. 344; Carey v. Railway Co., 61 Wis. 71, 20 N. W. Rep. 648; Allen v. Perry, 56 Wis. 178, 14 N. W. Rep. 3.

STREET RAILROADS-RIGHT OF PASSENGER TO TRAVEL ON TRANSFER NOT PROPERLY PUNCHED. -A passenger on a street car line in the city of Tacoma, which issued transfers to its various connecting lines, received from the conductor a transfer to a line other than the one to which he had requested one. Not noticing the mistake, he presented it to the conductor on the line to which he had requested a transfer, who refused to accept it. The passenger declined to pay further fare. and was ejected. The Supreme Court of Washington held in the recent case of Lawshe v. Tacoma Railway Co., 70 Pac. Rep. 118, that since the passenger was under no obligation to make a technical examination of the transfer slip, and since the company was responsible for the mistake of its agent, it was liable in substantial damages