or if he admits sales of land so dissimilar in situation and circumstances and in the uses to which they may be appropriated, that the appellate court can see that such sales could afford no just measure of the value of the land in question, it is a matter of exception. 3 5

Personal Knowledge of Witness.—It is also necessary that the witness should have personal knowledge of the other sales to be competent to testify concerning them. 36 Hence mere hearsay or recitals in deeds of the consideration are not competent to prove the fact. 37

Limitation to Actual Sales. The rule admitting evidence of this character is confined to actual, voluntary, and bona fide sales. Thus, where a railroad and a land owner had agreed upon a price to be paid by the former for the land adjoining the track in question; and a bond for a deed had been given, but had run out and no deed had been taken, evidence of the price agreed upon was considered inadmissible. 3 8 Testimony should not be received to prove what offers have been made to sell, or what prices have been asked or refused,39 though declarations of the party to the suit concerning the land in question, including offers to sell, may be received when such statements are in the nature of admissions. 40

Compromise Sales. The rule which admits evidence of voluntary, bona fide sales only, eliminates proof of the price paid for similar property at forced sales or settle

Chandler v. Jamaica Pond Aqueduct Corporation, 122 Mass. 305; Boston & W. Railroad v. Old Colony Railroad, 3 Allen, 142; Presbrey v. Railroad Co., 103 Mass. 1.

36 Mayor, etc. of Baltimore v. Smith & Schwarz Brick Co., 80 Md. 458, 31 Atl. Rep. 423; Bailway Co. Gilchrist, 4 Wash. 509, 30 Pac. Rep. 738.

37 Jones, Ev. Sec. 166; O'Hare v. Railroad Co., 139 Ill. 151, 28 N. E. Rep. 923; Rose v. Taunton, 119 Mass. 99; Spaulding v. Knight, 116 Mass. 148; Seefeld v. Railroad Co., 67 Wis. 96; 29 N. W. Rep 904; Esch v. Railway Co., 72 Wis. 229, 39 N. W. Rep. 129.

38 Chapin v. Railroad Co., 6 Cush. 422.

39 Sherlock v. Railroad Co., 130 Ill. 403; Davis v. Railroad Co., 11 Cush. 506; Winnisimmet Co. v. Grueby, 111 Mass. 543; Lehmicke v. Railroad Co., 19 Minn. 464; Railway Co. v. Benson, 36 N. J. Law, 557; Leale v. Railway Co., 61 Hun, 613, 16 N. Y. Supp. 419; Sullivan v. Railway Co. 68 S. W. Rep. (Tex.) 745.

40 Power v. Railway Co., 56 Ga. 471; Railroad Co. v. Andrews, 37 Kan. 641; Springfield v. Schmook, 68 Mo. 394: Railway Co. v. Ranck, 78 Pa. St. 454. In re Thompson, 127 N. Y. 463, 28 N. E. Rep. 389; 14 L. R. A. 52; Langdon v. Mayor, etc., of New York, 133 N. Y. 628, 31 N. E. Rep. 98.

ments.

4 1

Accordingly, the value fixed by agreement between the owner and a corporation seeking to condemn his land by virtue of eminent domain cannot be taken as a criterion of the market of other land in the vicinity,1 nor is evidence to the amount awarded as damages by jury for land taken by the state competent in determining a like issue. 42 "Such sales are not a fair criterion of value, for the reason that they are in the nature of a compromise. The fear of one party or the other to take the risk of legal proceedings ordinarily results in the one party paying more, or the other taking less, than is considered to be the fair market value of the

property. For these For these reasons, such sales would not seem to be competent evidence of value in any case, whether in a proceeding by the same condemning party, or otherwise."'48 But such evidence has been held admissible in exceptional cases, and none the less so because the condemning party was itself the purchaser.44

CHARLES L. BARTLETT.

41 San Luis Obispo v. Brizzolara, 100 Cal. 434, 34 Pac. Rep. 1083.

42 Howe v. Howard, 158 Mass. 278, 33 N. E. Rep. 528. See also, Railroad Co. v. McLaren, 47 Ga. 546; Railroad Co. v. Lieuallen, 2 Idaho, 1101, 29 Pac. Rep. 854; Fall River Works v. Fall River, 110 Mass. 428; Bennett v. Railway Co., 110 Mass. 433; Cobb v. Boston, 112 Mass. 181. In re Thompson, 127 N. Y. 463, 28 N. E. Rep. 389, 14 L. R. A. 52; Springfield v. Schmook, 68 Mo. 394; Howard v. Providence, 6 R. I. 514.

43 Lewis, Eminent Domain, Sec. 448; see cases cited. 44 Wyman v. R. R. Co., 54 Mass. (13 Metc.) 316; Langdon v. Mayor, etc., of New York, 133 N. Y. 628, 31 N. E. Rep. 98.

CONTRACTS-VALIDITY OF CONTRACT TO PROCURE PROPERTY HOLDERS' CONSENTS TO CONSTRUCTION OF ELEVATED ROAD.

UNION EL. R. CO. v. NIXON.

Supreme Court of Illinois, October 25, 1902.

A contract to use personal influence to obtain the consent of property holders necessary to enable a city council to pass an ordinance authorizing the construction of an elevated railway is not opposed to public policy.

HAND, J.: This is an action of assumpsit, brought by the plaintiff in the circuit court of Cook county against the defendant to recover for services rendered the defendant in procuring consents to the erection of an elevated railroad loop on certain streets in the business center of the city of Chicago from the owners of real estate fronting upon said streets. The declaration consists of the common counts. The general issue was filed, a jury was waived, and a trial had before the court, which resulted in a finding and

judgment in favor of the plaintiff for $5,937.50, which was affirmed by the appellate court, and a further appeal has been prosecuted to this court. It appeared from the evidence that, the Union Elevated Railroad Company applied to the city council of the city of Chicago for an ordinance authorizing the construction by it of an elevated railroad loop within a certain district. It appeared, also, that the ordinance or ordinances necessary to authorize the construction of said elevated railroad loop could not be passed by the city council except upon the petitions signed by the owners of land representing the one-half of the frontage of the street or streets, or parts thereof, upon which the said elevated railroad loop was to be erected; and that, in order to obtain such consents, the defendant, the Union Elevated Railroad Company, in the month of December, 1894, entered into an agreement with the plaintiff to assist in procuring such consents, for which it agreed to pay him $500 per month for the time which he should devote to such service, and in case the defendant, the Union Elevated Railroad Company, was successful, and the efforts of the plaintiff had helped in securing the legal amount of frontage, to pay him the further sum of $5,000 within 30 days after the passage and acceptance of the ordinance. The plaintiff immediately entered upon such service, and remained in the employ of the defendant, the Union Elevated Railroad Company, for 11 months, during which time he procured the consents of numerous property owners along the line of the proposed elevated railroad loop, and was paid at the rate of $500 per month to November 30, 1895; and it is for the recovery of the additional $5,000, and interest from June 26, 1896, at 5 per cent. that this suit is brought.

The court was requested to hold that the contract sued on was opposed to public policy, and therefore invalid, by reason of the fact that the payment of the extra compensation to plaintiff was contingent on the passage of an ordinance permitting the construction of said elevated railroad loop. While, by the terms of the contract, as stated in the letter of Mr. Louderbeck, the extra compensation was not to be paid plaintiff until the ordinance permitting the use of the streets by the elevated railroad loop had been passed and accepted, it was not contemplated thereby that the plaintiff was to secure the passage of the ordinance. The ordinance could only be passed by the city council, based upon the necessary consents; and, while the plaintiff was employed to obtain consents, he was not employed to deal with the city council, but with the property owners. The obtaining of consents was legitimate, and the employment of the plaintiff legal; and we fail to see how the action of the plaintiff in obtaining consents can be said to be contrary to public policy by reason of the fact alone that he was to be paid extra compensation for such services after the ordinance permitting the improvement had been passed. While a con

tract to obtain the passage of an ordinance, or an agreement to use personal influence upon the members of a city council to secure the passage of an ordinance, would be void, as against public policy, because, under our system of law and morals, influence to be exercised over a legislative body to secure the passage of a law or an ordinance cannot legally be made the subjectmatter of contract, a contract to obtain consents from the property owners abutting upon streets upon which improvements are to be made (payment for such services to be made after the ordinance permitting such improvement shall be passed) would not, when, as here, the persons obtaining such consents had nothing to do with the legislative body or the passage of the ordinance, make the obtaining of such consents contrary to public policy, so that the person obtaining such consents could not recover the compensation agreed to be paid him therefor. The contention of the defendant proves too much, as, carried to its logical conclusion, every contract made by the defendant prior to the passage of the ordinance or ordinances under which the elevated railroad loop was finally completed would be void, as all of such contracts were made in contemplation of the fact that an ordinance or ordinances would be passed by the city council permitting the use of the streets of the city for the construction of its loop. The cases relied upon by the defendant (Crichfield v. Paving Co., 174 Ill, 466, 51 N. E. Rep. 552, 42 L. R. A. 347, and Marshall v. Railroad Co., 16 How. 314, 14 L. Ed. 953, and other cases cited in its brief) are based upon agreements to render services in influencing legislation, and are distinguishable from the case at bar, and are not in point. We are therefore of the opinion that the court did not err in refusing the proposition submitted by the defendant.

--

NOTE. Validity of Contracts Entered into for the Purpose of Influencing Legislation. A contract to procure or endeavor to procure the passage of an act of the legislature by any sinister means, or by using personal influence even, with the members, is void, as being against public policy and the integrity of our political institutions. Frost v. Belmont, 88 Mass. 152; Burney v. Ladeling, 47 La. Ann. 73, 16 So. Rep. 507; Coquellard v. Bearss, 21 Ind. 479; Houlton v. Dunn, 60 Minn. 26, 61 N. W. Rep. 898; Mills v. Mills, 40 N. Y. 543, 100 Am. Dec. 535. The same rule applies with regard to prosecute a private claim with members of a legislative body. No action lies thereon for the services thus rendered. Sedgwick v. Stanton, 14 N. Y. 289; Bryan v. Reynolds, Wis. 200, 68 Am. Dec. 55; Trist v. Child, 88 U. S. 441.

Lobbying Contracts and Use of Personal Influence. -The political press is constantly setting forth in glaring hideousness what it calls the influence of "the lobby." Very few of the readers of these papers have any clear idea who are thus characterized as "the lobby" or what they are there for. The general feeling is that the lobby is some great monster having in view the obstruction of the people's will and the overthrow of government. That this characterization is very often overdrawn must be admitted

by every one. There are many persons at our state capitals who are there to "influence" legislation or to protect themselves or their principals from adverse legislation, who use as a means to attain the ends desired, only fair argument or perhaps their personal influence, who cannot be charged with the prosecution of an illegal business. And yet such persons would come within the general term of "lobbyists" and be subjected to all the odium that attaches thereto. It is such indiscriminate criticism and the failure to clearly distinguish between legitimate and pernicious influences that makes it so difficult to detect the real perpetrators of bribery and intimidation upon our legislative assemblies. In some states "lobbying" is defined, Thus in California, Art. 4, Sec. 35 of the constitution declares that "any person who seeks to influence the vote of a member of the legislature by bribery,promise of reward, intimidation, or other dishonest means, shall be guilty of lobbying." Under this section a case arose in California in which the evidence showed that a part of the services rendered by plaintiff as attorney consisted in personal solicitation of members of the legislature to act favorably on a bill she was seeking to have passed for defendant; but there was nothing to show that she used dishonest, secret or unfair means. The court held she was not a "lobbyist" within the meaning of the constitution. In the federal courts the rule is very strict. Thus in the case of Providence Tool Co. v. Norris, 69 U. S. 45, Mr. Justice Field said: "It is sufficient to observe generally, that all agreements for pecuniary consideration to control the business operation of the government, or the regular administration O justice," or the appointments to public offices, or the ordinary course of legislation, are void as against public policy, without reference to the question whether improper means are contemplated or used in their execution. The law looks to the general tendency of such agreements, and it closes the door to temptation, by refusing them recognition in any of the courts of the country." This principle is fully adopted in the case of Trist v. Child, 88 U. S. 441. In this case a contract was made with a claim agent to presenta private claim for favorable action by congress. It contemplated "personal solicitation" which, in the opinion of the court, was "lobbying" and the contract to payfor such services therefore void. This rule is also followed in some state courts. Thus, in Houlton v. Dunn, 60 Minn. 26, 61 N. W. Rep. 898, it was held that a contract by which one agreed to procure the passage of a bill by congress declaring certain railroad lands forfeited to the government, so that the other party to the contract might hold a part of such lands as a bona fide settler under the homestead laws, is void, as against public policy. The plaintiff in this case is charged with having used no influence outside of appearing before the committee having the matter in charge and talking personally to members. The argument of the court proceeds upon the theory that since the services of the plaintiff were not wholly in the interest of the public as for instance, the promotion of a great public charity, but wholly for the personal aggrandizement of a few persons, it was therefore tainted with illegality. The court admits, however, that there might be private claims, so just and meritorious that it "would not be improper to present them for allowance and payment and to do so by fair argument and legitimate evidence." The rule thus laid down does not commend itself to our approval. Either every effort at influencing legislation, whether by committees of citizens actuated by a great public purpose or in any other manner, should

be prohibited, or else, the rule which, for lawful and legitimate purposes, would recognize the right of any person interested to appear before the legislature and present arguments for or against certain legislation, should not be arbitrarily or unreasonably limited to claims of a certain class or of a certain merit. It is the means used rather than the purpose of the contract to influence legislation which is the real test by which to distinguish between contracts which are perfectly legitimate and those those which are void as against public policy. Brown v. Brown,34 Barb. N. Y. 533. The United States Supreme Court has plainly admitted this distinction and undoubtedly states the correct rule when in speaking of contracts for influencing legislation it says: "We entertain no doubt that an agreement for purely professional services is valid. Within this category are included drafting the petition to set forth the claim, attending to the taking of testimony, collecting facts, preparing arguments, and submitting them orally or in writing to a committee or other proper authority, and other services of like character. All these things are intended to reach only the reason of those sought to be influenced. They rest on the same principle of ethics as professional services rendered in a court of justice, and are no more exceptionable. But such services are separated by a broad line of demarcation from personal solicitation and other means and appliances, such as the correspondence shows were resorted to in this case." Trist v. Child, 88 U. S., 4 Wall., 441. This case, however, holds that personal solicitation and many other secret means which cannot be said to involve anything corrupt, are only unlawful when there is an agreement to pay for them. Thus the court says, speaking of such methods: "Services of the latter character, gratuitously rendered, are not unlawful. The absence of motive to wrong is the foundation of the sanction. The tendency to mischief, if not wanting, is greatly lessened. The taint lies in the stipulation for pay. Where that exists it affects fatally, in all its parts, the entire body of the contract." Of course methods of bribery and intimidation, which are wrong in themselves, cannot be done either gratuitously or for compensation.

Such being the reasons and principles underlying the rules of law on this subject, let us classify the authorities in accordance therewith. The majority of authorities hold that a contract for a consideration to use personal influence or other secret methods, not necessarily wrong in themselves, is contrary to public policy and void. Trist v. Child, 88 U. S. 441; McBratney v. Chandler, 22 Kan. 692, 31 Am. Rep. 213; Houlton v. Dunn, 60 Minn. 26, 61 N. W. Rep. 898; Rose v. Truax, 21 Barb. (N. Y.), 361; Sweeney v. McLeod, 15 Oreg. 330, 15 Pac. Rep. 275; Mills v. Mills, 36 Barb. 474; Powers v. Skinner, 34 Vt. 274, 80 Am. Dec. 677; Wilbur v. Electric Co., 12 N. Y. Supp. 456; Spalding v. Ewing, 149 Pa. St. 375, 24 Atl. Rep. 219. In all cases, where services of this character are on a contingent compensation, they are void irrespective of the means employed. Marshall v. Railroad, 57 U. S. 314; Coquellard v. Bearss, 21 Ind. 479; Bermudez Asphalt Co. v. Critchfield, 62 Ill. App. 221; Mills v. Mills, 40 N. Y. 543; Wood v. McCann, 36 Ky. 366; Chippewa Valley, etc., R. R. v. Railroad, 75 Wis. 224, 44 N. W. Rep. 17. In the last case cited it was held that a contract between two railroads by which one of them, in consideration of a contingent compensation, agrees to refrain from applying to the legislature for a land grant, and to assist the other in getting it, is void as against public policy, though it stipulates that the means to be used in securing the grant shall be rea

sonable and proper. So also, with even greater reason, is such a contract void where the person soliciting such legislation, conceals his interest. Marshall v. Railroad, Fed. Cas. No. 9124; Wildey v. Collier, 7 Md. 273, 61 Am. Dec. 346. But the mere fact that the criminal code says that an attempt to influence legislation without disclosing interest is a crime, does not by implication validate all agreements for exerting such influence by simply making such disclosure as the statute requires. Sweeney v. McLeod, 15 Oreg. 330, 15 Pac. Rep. 275. But not only is it against public policy to seek to influence legislation, but a contract is equally invalid where the consideration is the withdrawal of opposition to certain legislation. Martin v. Railroad, 3 Phila. 316; Pingry v. Washburn, 1 Aiken (Vt.), 264, 15 Am. Dec. 676. So also an agreement not to procure the repeal of a law. Reed v. Warehouse Co., 2 Mo. App. 82.

What contracts to influence legislation are valid? Certainly all professional contracts for merely preparing and arguing a case before a legislative body or its committee are valid. Strathman v. Gorla, 14 Mo. App. 1; Brown v. Brown.34 Barb. (N. Y.), 533; Bryan v. Reynolds, 5 Wis. 200; Trist v. Child, 88 U. S. 441; Weed v. Black, 2 MacArthur 268, 29 Am. Rep. 618; Yates v. Robertson, 80 Va. 475; Miles v. Thorne, 38 Cal. 335; Coquellard v. Bearss, 21 Ind. 479; Barber Asphalt Co.v.Botoford,56 Kans.532,44 Pac. Rep 3; Wood v. McCann, 36 Ky. 366; Wildey v. Collier, 7 Md. 273, 61 Am. Dec. 346; Russell v. Burton, 66 Barb. (N. Y.) 539; Chesebrough v. Conover, 140, N. Y. 382, 35 N. E. Rep. 633. Cases like the principal case, which contemplate not the direct influencing of the legislature so much as meeting the condition of legislative action, are not with the rule invalidating contracts for services in influencing legislation. Thus, where one with large knowledge and experience in regard to federal public lands is employed to instruct and advise as to the manner of procuring certain land where the department erroneously believed were not open for entry, such contract was not invalid, even if entered into on a contingent compensation. Houlton v. Nichol, 93 Wis. 393, 67 N. W. Rep. 715. So also where a municipal assembly agreed to pass a certain measure on the consent of a certain number of taxpayers, a contract by which the mayor of the city was employed to get the number of consents necessary was not invalid. Bridgford v. City of Tuscumbia, 16 Fed. Rep. 910. So also the distribution of circulars for the purpose of influencing legislation is a valid consideration for a contract. Kansas, etc., R. R. v. McCoy, 8 Kan. 359. A contract to use influence to prevent the establishment of a conflicting ferry franchise was held valid. Costar v. Brush, 25 Wend. 628. This contract, however, was a part of a covenant in the purchase of the ferry. See also Hunt v. Test, 8 Ala., 713 and Denison v. County, 48 Iowa, 211, for other contracts influencing legislation which have been held legiti

mate.

JETSAM AND FLOTSAM.

MARRIAGE PROPOSALS SHOULD BE MADE BY WIRE.

Lawyer Abe Hummel is authority for the statement that if bachelors who wish to avoid breach of promise suits will use telegraph blanks in doing their proposing, they will always keep on the safe side. He bases this assertion on an incident in a Westchester county breach of promise case in which Mr. Hummel appeared for the defendant. The plaintiff's lawyer began to read the alleged proposal of the defendant to

the jury, as it appeared on a message blank. He began with "My dearest Louisa."

Mr. Hummel interrupted. "If the court please, this document is partly printed and partly written. By all the rules of evidence the plaintiff cannot offer parts of instrument. He must read it all."

The opposing lawyer protested that the printed matter had nothing to do with the case, and that the fact that the proposal was written on a telegraph blank was all accident. The court ruled that everything on the blank should be read. Reluctantly the plaintiff's counsel read:

"There is no liability on account of this messsage, unless the same is repeated and then only on condition that the claim is made within thirty days in writing." And then, after the signature, "Yours lovingly, John," followed: "N. B.-Read carefully the couditions at the top."

It didn't take the jury long to render a verdict.—

BOOK REVIEWS.

JUDSON ON TAXATION.

Since Cooley gave to the profession his excellent treatise on taxation, the law on that subject has undergone rapid changes, and many new questions of of serious difficulty have arisen to perplex the practitioner. While, for the purpose of the student, this treatise by reason of its clear exposition of fundamental principle, is still, without a peer, yet for the practitioner it has been superseded. It might be said to be unfortunate that Mr. Cooley should have passed away without giving to the profession his views of the great modern questions of taxation now confronting the nation, such as the income tax, the collateral inheritance tax, the right to tax merchandise to foreign territories of the United States, the right of municipalities to tax for purposes of public ownership, etc., together with many new phases of general questions now arising on every hand. Our regrets in this direction, however, have turned largely been into congratulation by the appearance of a new and very competent author who has volunteered to interrupt a very lucrative practice in order to give to the profession a thoroughly exhaustive and authoritative treatise on this very important subject of the law. Indeed, if we were selected to choose the one man most qualified by study and experience to undertake the treatment of the subject of taxation, there would be no temptation to hesitate; our choice would be the name of the Hon. Frederick N. Judson, of the St. Louis har. As professor of Constitutional Law in Washington University, as a resourceful and constructive statesman on all questions of legislative policy having to do with questions of taxation, and as one of the greatest leaders of the St. Louis bar, Mr. Judson is eminently fitted for such a task. Words of praise and commendation, however fulsome, would not be half so eloquent as a glance through the pages of this completed work itself, which has just come from the press. The first fact that stands out prominently in this treatise is its exact and logical analysis into chapters and sections. The first chapter treats of "Limitation Upou State Taxation Growing Out of the Relations of the State and Federal Governments." Under this head there are thirtyeight sections treating of every possible phase of the question stated as the title of the chapter. For instance, under this head are discussed the concurrent powers of state and federal governments as to internal taxation, the taxation of United States securities, and

the salaries of United States officials. There is, also, discussed the interesting question as to when lands granted by the United States for railroad, mineral or private purposes may be taxed; the taxation of Indian Reservations or of cattle or property thereon; the taxation of the property of railroads incorporated by the United States; the taxation of letters, patents and copyrights, or of capital invested therein; and whether United States securities are exempt from collateral inheritance taxation. The chapter closes with a discussion of an exceeding important question -the evasion of taxation through investments in United States securities. Chapter II. treats of Contracts of Exemptions from Taxation. Uuder this title many interesting questions are discussed, not found in any other one treatise; legislative grants of exemption as inviolable contracts; Virginia Coupon Cases under Act of 1882; taxation of foreign held securities; taxation by state or municipality of its own securities; when a right of tax exemption may be lost; property of corporations and shareholders distinguished in contracts of exemption; and many other interesting phases of this question. Chapters III., IV., V. and VI. treat of taxation as a regulation of commerce. In these chapters are discussed many important questions such as the rights of a state to tax importations in original packages; to impose an inheritance tax on aliens; to tax peddlers or drummers; to tax foreign corporations for the right to do business; to tax corporations engaged in federal business or interstate commerce; to tax steamboats and vessels navigating public waters; and many other interesting questions of a similar nature. Chapter VII. undertakes to discuss the Right to Tax Interstate Commerce. This is, of course, plainly distinguishable from taxation as a "regulation" of commerce. Under this head is discussed the right of the state to tax interstate telegraph messages; to impose a privilege tax on sleeping cars; to exact compensation for the erection of telegraph poles on the street or highway to tax gross receipts of interstate railways; and other kindred subjects. Chapter VIII. treats of the "Valuation of Interstate Properties for Taxation," discussing such questions as the application of the unit and mileage rule to interstate railroads and telegraphs, and the stock market quotations as evidence of value. Chapter IX. deals with the "Taxation of National Banks." Every phase of this often litigated and important branch of the law of taxation is thoroughly laid open and explained. Chapters X., XI., XII., XIII. and XIV. have to do with that most important of all the questions of taxation, "Due Process of Law in Tax Procedure." The discussion of this question is opened by a clear analysis of the "SlaughterHouse Cases." Among the many interesting phases of taxation discussed in these chapters, might be mentioned the following: Plenary power of state making assessments and re-assessments, and imposing penalties on delinquents; conclusiveness of tax-deeds and tax-sales; power of municipality to levy special assessments for local improvements; taxation of property in the hands of resident agents; and taxation for purposes of public ownership. Chapters XV. and XVI. treat of "Equal Protection of the Laws," as applicable to taxation. The most interesting question here discussed is the law as to inequality of taxation through inequality of valuation. Chapter XVII. deals with the "Taxing Power of Congress,” which brings up for discussion the "Insular Tariff Cases" and all the new questions of taxation brought about by the extension of our dominion over Porto

Rico, the Philippines and other isles of the sea. Chapter XVIII. treats of the "Enforcement of Federal Limits Upon the Taxing Power." Here are discussed the judicial remedies for illegal taxation; the determination of what constitutes a federal question in taxation; the right to injunction in federal courts against state taxation; procedure in the Income Tax Cases; habeas corpus as a remedy for illegal taxation; collection of taxes on property in possession of receiver of federal court; local tax laws administered in federal courts.

From the foregoing outline view of this new and monumental work on taxation, it is evident that the attention of the profession will not have to be directed to its exceedingly practical character. It is essentially a practitioner's treatise, and one that will in time prove itself indispensable to every lawyer having to do with questions of taxation. We know Mr. Judson, we know his ability; we are aware of the time, labor and thought which he has expended on this subject; we have examined the pages of this treatise, and basing our judgment on these sources of knowledge, we commend this new work, Judson on Taxation, as the highest authority on any phase of the subject of which it treats. Bound in one volume of 868 pages, and published by F. H. Thomas Law Book Co., St. Louis, Mo.

BOOKS RECEIVED.

Shepard's Citations of all cases in the United States Supreme Court Reports, which have had a subsequent citation.

Shepard's Citations of all cases in the Federal Reporter, which have had a subsequent citation. Shepard's Citations of all cases in the Missouri Court of Appeals Reports, which have had a subsequent citation.

Mines and Mining. A Commentary on the Law of Mines and Mining Rights, both Common-Law and Statutory, with Appendices Containing the Federal Statute and the Statutes of the Western States and Territories Relating to Mining for Precious Metals on the Public Domain, and Forms for use in Appilcation for Patent and Adverse Suits. By Wilson L. Snyder of the Utah Bar. In two volumes. Chicago; T. H. Flood and Company, 1902. Sheep, pp. 1290. Price $12.60. Review will follow.

HUMORS OF THE LAW.

Judge Breckenridge whilst trying a man on some criminal charge called him a scoundrel. The man replied, "1 am not as great a scoundrei as your honor -takes me to be." "Put your words closer together, sir," observed the Judge.

A youth was engaged as junor clerk by a firm of lawyers, and by way of filling in his time and testing his worth on his first day he was told to write a letter demanding payment of a debt from a client who was long in arrears. To the great surprise of his employers a check for the amount arrived the next day. They sent for the young clerk and asked him to produce a copy of the letter which had had such an astonishing result. The letter ran as follows: "Dear Sir If you do not at once remit payment of the amount which you owe us we will takes steps that will amaze you."