is a paramount lien on the building, as against a prior deed of trust on the land on which the building is situ. ated.-Holland v. Cunliff, Mo., 69 S. W. Rep. 737.

115. MORTGAGES-Claim Secured. - Money paid by the mortgagee, between the date of the judgment for foreelosure sale and the sale, to protect the property from tax liens, cannot be satisfied through the foreclosure, but only through a lien. Sands v. Kaukauna Water Power Co., Wis., 91 N. W. Rep. 679.

116. MORTGAGES-Executory Contract.-An agreement, in an executory contract for the purchase of land, that payments should be applied on a mortgage until it was reduced to a specified sum, was not an assumption by the vendee of the mortgage debt. - Ayers v. Makoly, N. Car., 42 S. E. Rep. 454.

119. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS Defective Streets. Two or three weeks may be sufficient to charge a munici pal corporation with notice of defects in a much-traveled street. Sweet v. City of Poughkeepsie, 78 N. Y. Supp. 60. 120. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS - Defects in Public Way.-A municipal corporation owes no duty to see that a path made on private property by the public is safe from an obstruction existing on private land. Sweet V. City of Poughkeepsie, 78 N. Y. Supp. 60.

121. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-Driven Wells.-A city, having authority to secure a water supply, does not exceed its authority by using driven wells, instead of those sunk in some other manner. - Westphal v. City of New York, 78 N. Y. Supp. 56.

122. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS - Escape of Smoke.Aetion cannot be maintained for allowing smoke to escape from chimneys, under Greater New York Charter, § 1222, without proof that it injured anybody. — Department of Health of City of New York v. Philip & William Ebling Brewing Co., 78 N. Y. Supp. 13.

126. NAVIGABLE WATERS - Riparian Owners.-Though the title to the bed of a stream which is navigable, not in the legal, but only in the ordinary, sense, is in the riparian owners, yet the public have a right to the free use and enjoyment of such a stream.-Webster v. Harris, Tenn., 69 S. W. Rep. 782.

127. NUISANCES-Offensive Odors.-The fact that odors, carried a great distance by the wind, are "unpleasant and objectionable," is not sufficient ground for interference by the court with the establishment from which they arise. Duffy v. E. H. & J. A. Meadows Co., N. Car., 42 S. E. Rep. 460.

128. PATENTS - Prior Public Use. The fact alone that the use of an invention more than two years prior to the application for a patent therefor was by the patentee himself, and without any element of profit involved, does not prevent it from being a bar to a patent, where such use was known to the public and was not experimental.— Thomas-Houston Electric Co. v. Lorain Steel Co., U. S. C. C. of App., Second Circuit, 117 Fed. Rep. 249. 129. PERPETUITIES Restraint of Alienation. As a limited restriction upon alienation is valid, a provision in a will that the land devised thereby shall not be sold or conveyed by the devisees until they have been in possession of it for 20 years will be enforced. Call v. Shewmaker, Ky., 69 S. W. Rep. 749.

130. PLEADING - Action on Contract.-When the objec tion that the complaint does not state a cause of action is not taken until the trial, a greater latitude of presumption will be indulged to sustain it than when the objection is taken by demurrer. - Holtz v. Hanson, Wis., 91 N. W. Rep. 663.

131. PLEADING — Judgment. The record showing no answer to an amended complaint, which states a good cause of action, but only to the original complaint, it is error to render judgment for defendants.-Thompson v. Morgan, Ind. Ter., 69 S. W. Rep. 920.

132. PLEADING-Objection Waived.- Objection that the declaration was not filed in the time required by the statute cannot be raised for the first time after plea, trial, and verdict.-Piche v. Robbins, R. I., 53 Atl. Rep. 92.

133. PLEDGES-Equity. - A creditor, seeking in equity to subject property of a third person pledged to him for his debt, is not required to make his debtor a party defendant; the latter being beyond the jurisdiction of the court, not amenable to its process, and no relief being asked against him. Springfield Co. v. Ely, Fla., 32 So. Rep. 897.

134. PRINCIPAL AND AGENT- Authority of Agent. - A general power as managing agent of a corporation does not clothe the agent with authority to mortgage the principal's property.-First Nat. Bank v. Kirby, Fla., 32 So. Rep. 881.

135. PRINCIPAL AND AGENT—Authority of Agent.-Where the authority of special agent is limited, his principal is not bound by a secret agreement between such agent and the party, not contained in a written proposal of the party. Inman v. Crawford, Ga., 42 S. E. Rep. 473.

136. PROHIBITION-Jurisdiction of Trial Court.-Where the trial court had jurisdiction, its ruling on a demurrer to the answer cannot be reviewed by a writ of prohibi tion.-State v. Superior Court of King County, Wash., 70 Pac. Rep. 230.

137. PUBLIC LANDS-Entry on Land. — One who makes settlement on a tract of land while it is covered by the homestead entry of another is a mere intruder, a naked and unlawful trespasser, and no right either in law or equity can be founded on such settlement. McMichael

v. Murphy, Okla., 70 Pac. Rep. 189.

138. PUBLIC LANDS-Extent of Possession. While a setttlement under a junior patent will not give posession, as against au older patent, where the settlement is without the lap, this principal has no application to strangers to the title. Bush v. Coomer, Ky., 69 S. W Rep. 793.

139. RAILROADS Accident at Crossing. -A traveler about to cross a railroad track, who is warned of the approach of the train in time to escape injury, cannot complain of a failure to give signals. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Judah, Kan., 70 Pac. Rep. 346. 140. RAILROADS-Duty to Look and Listen. The pos session of a passenger's rights as to protection, and the fact that one was taking the only way open to her destination, afford no excuse for the contributory negligence of one killed by stepping in front of an engine approaching in plain sight and hearing. Steber v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co., Wis., 91 N. W. Rep. 654.

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its cars of one rightfully there will not relieve the com. pany of liability for damage by its negligence, of Georgia Ry. Co. v. Duffy, Ga., 42 S. E. Rep. 510. 142. RAILROADS- Injury to Person on Track. A railway company held liable for running over a pedestrian on its track by a train, though he was intoxicated and guilty of contributory negligence.- Kroeger v. Texas & P. Ry. Co., Tex., 69 S. W. Rep. 809.

143. RAILROADS-Rights at Crossings.- A railroad company may properly leave its ears standing in the highway at a crossing for short periods, but to leave such cars longer than is needful is negligence. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Roberts, Neb., 91 N. W. Rep. 707.

144. REPLEVIN-Res Judicata. - In replevin, the right of possession of the property is not res judicata, unless that question is tried and passed upon with such certainty as that the issue is removed from the domain of doubt and uncertainty, and has become distinct and certain.-Geiser v. Mfg. Co. v. Berry, Okla., 70 Pac. Rep. 202. 145. SALES-Short Weights. - Party buying linseed oil on the basis of 7.50 pounds to the gallon held not entitled to recover overpayments as for short weight on afterwards discovering that a statutory gallon of linseed oil weighed 7.761 pounds. Heath & Milligan Mfg. Co. v. National Linseed Oil Co., Ill., 64 N. E. Rep. 732.

146. SALES-Tender of Price.- Evidence merely that a purchaser of goods deposited the price in a bank to the creditof the seller does not show a tender.- Robinson v. Thoma, Wash., 70 Pac. Rep. 240.

147. SHIPPING-"Voyage" Defined.-A"voyage," within the meaning of the statute authorizing proceedings by a shipowner for limitation of liability to his interest in the vessel "and her freight for the voyage," is asingle trip between terminal ports, and not a round trip. - In re Bourgogne, U. S. D. C., S. D. N. Y., 117 Fed. Rep. 201.

148. SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE-Enforcement.- Specific enforcement of a contract for the sale of land may be had, as against the vendes, by collection of the money from any of his property or by order of sale as on execution.-Anderson v. Wallace Lumber & Mfg. Co., Wash., 70 Pac. Rep. 247.

149. SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE-Prayer for Reformation. -Where a contract of sale is roquired to be reformed before it can be enforced, a bill for specific performance thereof, brought by vendor, should pray for reformation.-Glos v. Wilson, Ill., 64 N. E. Rep. 734.

150. STATES-Convicts.-The state cannot be bound by a contract made in its behalf by a public officer not having actual authority to make such contract, even though he has so conducted himself with reference thereto as to estop himself from denying its validity.-Camp v. McLin, Fla., 32 So. Rep. 927.

151. SUBROGATION-Principal and Surety. A surety who pays the debt of his principal is subrogated to the rights of the holder of the claim which he pays, subject to its disqualification and limitations.- Swarts v. Seigel, U. S. C. C. of App., Eighth Circuit, 117 Fed. Rep. 13. 152. TAXATION Assessment Notice. - Failure to give statutory notice of a place of meeting of assessors to hear grievances held to render an assessment of tax thereunder invalid.-Loomis v. Semper, 78 N. Y. Supp. 74.

153. TAXATION-Stocks and Bonds. — - The market value of the stocks and bonds of a railroad corporation is an important factor, with other pertinent information, by which to determine the fair cash value of the property assessed which is represented by such stocks and bonds. -State v. Savage, Neb., 91 N. W. Rep. 716.

154. TRIAL-Instructions.-The reiterating, in instructions, the law applicable to the issue of contributory negligence, held erroneous, as giving it undue prominence.-Kroeger v. Texas & P. Ry. Co., Tex., 69 S. W. Rep.

809.

155. TRIAL-Instructions.-Complaint of the refusal of the trial court to require counsel for plaintiff to read the whole of an instruction to the jury, instead of a part is of no merit; it not appearing counsel went outside the record.-Ward v. Bass,Ind. Ter., 69 S. W. Rep. 879.

156. TRIAL-Mortality Tables. It is not error for the trial judge, in an action for personal injuries, in illustrating to the jury the method of using the mortality and annuity tables, to use for example a figure approximating that shown to be the plaintiff's age. — Central of Georgia Ry. Co. v. Duffy, Ga., 42 S. E. Rep. 510.

157. TROVER AND CONVERSION-Damages.-In trover for timber cut by a trespasser in good faith under a belief of title, the measure of damages is the value at the time of conversion, less the amount added to its value.— Anderson v. Besser, Mich., 91 N. W. Rep. 737.

158. TRUSTS-Powers of Trustee.-A trustee may do without a decree or order of court, that which the court would order or decree him to do on a showing made.Stitzer v. Whittaker, Neb., 91 N. W. Rep. 713.

159. USURY-Short Loans-Taking interest at the highest legal rate in advance by way of discount on short loans in the ordinary course of business is not ųsurious. -McCall v. Herring, Ga., 42 S. E. Rep. 468.

160. WATERS AND WATER COURSES- Interference with Flow. The natural flow of water may not be interfered with, so as to back it onto an upper estate. - Carley v. Jennings, Mich., 91 N. W. Rep. 34.

162. WATERS AND WATER COURSES · Rights and Easements of Public.-One riparian proprietor has a right against the wishes of another to drain the stream or reduce it below its natural level.-Webster v. Harris, Tenn., 69 S. W. Rep. 782.

163. WATERS AND WATER COURSES - Village corporation. The legislature may grant to any municipal corpo ration power to construct, or to purchase and maintain, a system of waterworks.-Mayo v. Dover & Foxcroft Village Fire Co., Me., 53 Atl. Rep. 62.

164. WILLS-Attestation.-Where the attestation clause of the witnesses is not attached to the will, it can be shown by competent evidence that the will was attested as required by law. Ward v. Board of Comrs. of Logan County, Okla., 70 Pac. Rep. 378.

165. WILLS Codicil. The mere fact that a sheet of paper, executed as a codicil, was one of the same bundle of papers as a will, is not sufficient, in the absence of all other evidence, to show that it related to or changed such will.-In re Dake's Will, 78 N. Y. Supp. 29.

166. WILLS-Cost of Appeal. - On appeal by a legatee from a judgment construing a will, the cost in the supreme court are payable out of the estate.-In re Stuart's Will, Wis., 91 N. W. Rep. 688.

167. WITNESSES-Book of Account. - Original books of account, showing transactions with a deceased person, must, to be admissible, to appear to the court to be fairly kept and free from erasures and interlineations.Chapin v. Mitchell, Fla., 32 So. Rep. 875.

168. WITNESSES-Defendant.-Where, on a prosecution for murder, defendant testifies in his own behalf, it is proper on cross-examination to permit him to be asked how many times he has been arrested, and what for.Williams v. United States, Ind. Ter., 69 S. W. Rep. 871. 169. WITNESSES-Privilege. Where a defendant appeared before a grand jury and claimed his privilege, and thereafter answered questions or not as he desired, his constitutional privilege to refuse to testify was not Infringed.-United States v. Kimball, U. S. C. C., S. D. N. Y., 117 Fed. Rep. 156.

170 WITNESSES-Scope of Objections. — Objections to testimony do not raise the question of the competency of the witness to give the testimony objected to.-United States Leather Co. v. Aldrich, 78 N. Y. Supp. 3.

171. WORK AND LABOR- Implied Contract.-In an action on "tokens" or checks issued to berry pickers, defendant would only be liable for the price agreed on, if there were any such, and otherwise for the reasonable value of the work.-Bryan v. Brown, Dela., 53 Atl. Rep.

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Central Law Journal.

ST. LOUIS, MO., FEBRUARY 6, 1903.

WHETHER A MAN MAY RESIST A PUBLIC HORSE-WHIPPING BY KILLING HIS AN

TAGONIST.

The sacredness of human life has been often commented upon and the earlier authorities put it above all other rights and privileges of the citizen. And thus the older authorities made it a duty of one assaulted, for instance, to retreat to the wall before he would be justified in taking his assailant's life. This rule, however, has been abolished by the majority of American authorities, which uphold the doctrine that when a person, being without fault and in a place where he has a right to be, is violently assaulted, he may, without retreating, repel force by force, and if, in the reasonable exercise of his right of self-defense, his assailant is killed, he is justifiable. Runyan v. State, 57 Ind. 80, 26 Am. Rep. 52; Beard v. United States, 158 U. S. 550, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 962.

But can a man resist a public horse-whipping by killing his antagonist? This might depend on the further question whether personal liberty is as sacred as life. The Supreme Court of Missouri affirms that it is. In the recent case of State v. Bartlett, 71 S. W. Rep. 148, Justice Sherwood, speaking for the court, says: "It is true, human life is sacred, but so is human liberty. One is as dear in the eye of the law as the other, and neither is to give way and surrender its legal status in order that the other may exclusively exist, supposing for a moment such an anomaly to be possible. In other words, the wrongful and violent act of one man shall not abolish or even temporarily suspend the lawful and constitutional right of his neighbor."

This was a case where the deceased attempted to publicly horse-whip the defendant for circulating slanders about his brother. The defendant, after warning decedent not to attempt to horse-whip him, deliberately shot his antagonist who persisted in his purpose. The jury under instructions of the trial court convicted defendant of murder in the first degree. In reversing the judgment and discharging the defendant, the court takes a very advanced

position and gives expression to some vigorous and quite unusual sentiments. Speaking again through Justice Sherwood, the court says: "No man, because he is the physical inferior of another, from whatever cause such inferiority may arise, is, because of such inferiority, bound to submit to a public horsewhipping. We hold it a necessary self-defense to resist, resent, and prevent such humiliating indignity, such a violation of the sacredness of one's person,—and that, if nature has not provided the means for such resistence, art may; in short, a weapon may be used to effect the unavoidable necessity. Human liberty is an inseparable attendant on the sacredness of a man's person, and will not last long if the latter can be ruthlessly invaded without peril and without punishment, save the mere imposition of a nominal fine, or the recovery of civil damages." CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY OF A SERVANT WHO QUITS WORK AT A TIME WHEN GREAT DANGER TO THE PUBLIC WILL PROBABLY RESULT FROM SUCH RELINQUISHMENT OF HIS DUTIES.

In England they have a statute the purpose and result of which is quite salutary, and which gives suggestion of a much-needed reform of the unsatisfactory conditions existing between capital and labor in this country. The statute referred to is in regulation of the correllative duties and responsibilities of master and servant to the public, and is known technically as the Conspiracy and Protection of Property Act passed in 1875. This act provides that where an employee in any gas or waterworks wilfully and maliciously breaks a contract of service knowing, or having reasonable cause to believe, that the probable consequences of his doing so, either alone or in combination with others. will be to deprive a town or place, wholly or to a great extent, of their supply of gas or water; and where any person wilfully or maliciously breaks a contract of service knowing, or having reasonable cause to believe, that the probable consequences of his doing so, either alone or in combination with others, will be to endanger human life, or cause serious bodily injury, or expose valuable property to destruction or serious injury, such person shall be guilty of a criminal act, and be liable to imprisonment. It is well known that the law has always recognized certain relations of master and

servant in which the latter for a certain time, at least, is not at liberty to leave his employment. The most familiar instance of this is that of seamen, and the reason assigned for the rule in this particular case is that it would too seriously endanger human life to permit a seaman, in the middle of a voyage or at any other point than the home port, to throw up his employment and desert the ship. This may be considered a species of involuntary servitude, but one which is perfectly legitimate, if not under the police power, at least on principle that a man may use his liberty only to the extent that, in the exercise of such liberty, he does not injure others.

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How far this rule may be carried in this direction is a question of great delicacy. In England and other countries in which the legislative branch of the government is untrammeled by constitutional limitations, question but that of expediency arises; but in a country like ours, where the rights of the individual are so jealously guarded by inviolable bulwarks, questions of involuntary servitude and the right to individual liberty confront the legislator with their unanswerable severity, and make him to doubt his ability to enact legislation which will escape the reach of their resisting influence.

Nevertheless, recent events in relation to a late unpleasantness, known as the "coal strike," would seem calculated to furnish fuel for renewed enthusiasm in behalf of the interests of the whole people as opposed to the individual rights of a class, who think they have a right at any time they please to conspire to stop work, in an occupation the object of which is the production of one of the necessities of life. In such cases the life and health of the whole people is superior to the right of any workmen, under such circumstances, to stop work at their pleasure.

Suppose that in the midst of a great conflagration threatening the life and property of a whole city, the workmen of the waterworks should conspire for an increase of wages, or, in support of any other demand, should announce to their superior that in case their demands were not complied with in six hours they would all quit their places, and their demand being refused, the city should, because of their refusal to perform their accustomed duties, be left at the mercy of the flames, 1esulting in great loss of life and property, in

such a case would it be violating any provision of the constitution to impose upon the constitutent members of such a damnable conspiracy, the severest penalties of the criminal law? This is only one instance, but to the mind alert and resourceful, will come many instances similar to the one mentioned, resulting equally as disastrous to the people at large, in which not only the conspiracy of many workmen, but the refusal of one only, who happens to be in a particularly responsible position, to perform his duties at a particular time, would occasion great loss of life or property. In such cases the rights of the people should be paramount and, if loss of life or destruction of property would probably result from the exercise by a servant at a certain time of his right to quit his master's service, his relinquishment of his duties at that time should constitute a criminal act for which he should be severely punished.

NOTES OF IMPORTANT DECISIONS.

EVIDENCE-IDENTITY OF OBJECTS INTRODUCED IN EVIDENCE. One of the serious difficulties of a lawyer in the trial of a case is to prove the identity of objects he desires to introduce in evidence. In thus failing to exercise proper care in making proof in such cases much evidence is thrown out which might otherwise have been available. Thus, in the recent case of State v. Phillips, 92 N. W. Rep. 876, the Supreme Court of Iowa held that it was improper to admit certain objective evidence because it was not sufficiently identified. In this case an officer with a posse while arresting three persons suspected of burglary was killed. At the time of their arrest a bottle supposed to contain nitroglycerine was taken from them. On their trial for the murder a bottle supposed to be the one so taken was received in evidence, with testimony that the contents was nitroglycerine. After the bottle was taken it passed into the possession of a person not a witness, and was retained for an indefinite period by him. The court held that the admission of such evidence was error, giving its reasons as follows: "A serious question is raised as to the use in testimony of a bottle supposed to contain nitroglycerine, and said to have been found on the person of one of the defendants. It was shown that among the articles so found was a bottle of this general description. On the trial a bottle was produced in the presence of the jury by the state as the one thus obtained. and Gallium was permitted to testify that he thought or believed it to contain nitroglycerine. Objection was made that there was no sufficient showing of the identity of the exhibit. This objection was overruled. It should have been

sustained. It is shown without dispute, so far as we can find in the record, that after the bottle had been taken from the defendants it went into the possession of one England, who kept it for a period not definitely shown. England was not a witness on the trial, and there is an entire absence of testimony as to the manner in which the exhibit and its contents were kept or preserved in his hands. Under such a condition of the proof, the overruling of the objection was error to defendant's preju dice."

SALES-UNFAVORABLE REPORT BY COMMERCIAL AGENCY OF PURCHASER'S FINANCIAL STANDING AS JUSTIFYING SELLER'S FAILURE TO PERFORM.-If A and B make a contract and B afterward meet C upon the street, and C says to B, "A intends to beat you in that contract," would this excuse B from performance? This in effect was the startling proposition affirmed by the trial court and denied by the appellate court in the recent case of Kavanaugh Manufacturing Co. v. Rosen, 92 N. W. Rep. 788. In this case a seller extended a term of credit to a purchaser of his goods, but afterwards, receiving an unfavorable report of the purchaser's financial standing from a commercial agency, decided to rescind the sale and refused to deliver the goods.

It is not surprising that the trial court in this case felt inclined to justify the merchant in attempting thus to protect himself and escape a threatened financial loss, especially, since he relied upon reports coming through channels recognized and acted upon by business men generally as reliable and trustworthy. Many a merchant would be astounded to know that the law attaches no more sanctity or conclusiveness to the report of a commercial agency than it does to the saying of the merest busybody or talebearer. As yet these agencies are not the subject of judicial notice, and the law, therefore, knows nothing about them and confers upon them no superior privileges or advantages.

The trial court, however, assumed the standpoint of the merchant, and not that of the law, and charged the jury as follows: "I charge you, as a matter of law, that if you find, as a matter of fact, that the plaintiff received a report from the commercial agency, which report gave defendants a rating that was not satisfactory, the test is not whether it was actually true or not, but did the sellers in good faith honestly believe that they were in danger. If they believed it, they had a right to act upon it. It is what they believed,— just like a man in self-defense strikes over a man, even in no danger.”

The appellate court expressed surprise at the statement of such a proposition of law, and in reversing the case because of the gross error in the instructions, said: "We have made some investigation, and have found no authority to sustain such proposition. It was open to the plaintiff to investigate the financial condition of defendants before making the contract. Failing to do this,

nothing short of a breach of contract upon defendant's part, or actual insolvency, would excuse the plaintiff from fulfilling the contract on its part. Any other rule would leave a purchaser at the mercy of the seller, and could not afford a safe rule for the transaction of business."'

PUBLIC POLICY CONTRACT TO SUPPORT CANDIDATES FOR POLITICAL PREFERMENT. The Supreme Court of Vermont has held in Livingston v. Page, 52 Atl. Rep. 965, that a contract between a Democrat publishing a Democratic paper of independent proclivities, and a Republican seeking a nomination to congress through a Republican convention, by which the publisher of the newspaper was to place his paper and his services as editor at the command of the candidate for congress during the campaign, the services to be settled for at the close, and the editor to do all he could to influence the choice of delegates to secure the candidate's nomination by writing editorials, he also concealing his relations with the candidate from the party, with an understanding that such candidate was attempting to do the same, in order that his course would be more effectual in influencing voters, was void, as against public policy.

The case of Nichols v. Mudgett, 32 Vt. 546, decided by this same court in 1860, is one of the few cases bearing upon this subject. The plaintiff in that case was a candidate for the office of town representative, and a creditor of the defendant. The defendant's party affiliations were such as would naturally lead him to vote for the opposing candidate. Conversations were had which resulted in a mutual understanding that the defendant should use his influence in favor of the plaintiff's election, and that, if the plaintiff was successful, the defendant's indebtedness should be treated as paid. Induced by this agreement, the defendant supported the plaintiff's candidacy until his election was declared. There was no agreement that defendant should vote for the plaintiff unless it was implied in the above understanding. He voted for the plaintiff, however, and did so because of the understanding. The suit was for the recovery of the indebtedness referred to, and the defendant claimed that it had been satisfied. The court considered that there was a sale of the defendant's influence and vote, held the agreement void, and gave judgment for the plaintiff. The agreement in that case involved both the defendant's vote and his influence upon the votes of others, but the court's discussion of the subject does not leave much doubt as to what its conclusion would have been if the undertaking had been confined to the latter service.

See, also, Linness v. Hesing, 44 Ill. 113, 92 Am. Dec. 153; Strasburger v. Burk, 13 Am. Law Reg. (U.S.) 607; Fitch v. De Young, 66 Cal. 339, 5 Pac. Rep. 364. In the last case it was held that an article charging a publisher with selling the political support and advocacy of his paper for money was libelous.