files made there of very good quality; these are generally marked with the name of the maker, who always tries to push his name on a good article, and the common goods are marked with an English name. No goods can now be sent to the United States from Germany bearing English names.' Fraudulent Marking of Quantities.-Mr. Charles Brook, a manufacturer of thread, gave the following evidence on the marking of reels of cotton:On the subject of trade marks, I have merely to say, that the forging of trade marks affects the manufacturer chiefly, but the false indication of quantity affects the consumer; one is to a great extent within the operation of the law, at present the other is not. It is my intention to confine my evidence to trade frauds, feeling assured that that part referring to trade marks will have had sufficient evidence by others more able to give it. (The evidence respecting our action in France was given by Mr. Brook in his examination yesterday.) Our firm have been manufacturers of cotton about 60 years, from 40 to 50 years makers of sewing cotton. I have been upwards of 30 years in the business. Up to the year 1849, we sold principally in the hank or bundle to the first-class cotton winders in England. About this time we commenced winding our own manufacture for the American market. In the year 1852, after taking the only prize at the Exhibition of 1851, we commenced winding for the home market. Until then we were ignorant of the grossly dishonest practices in trade. Our first practical insight into them arose from a respectable shipper in Manchester sending us an order, but objecting to our prices, he not requiring full length. Instead of giving 300 yards as marked on the ticket, he wanted 230 yards of cotton; 200 yards to have 170 yards; and 100 yards, 70 yards. I was so greatly astonished at this, that I immediately replied, Surely, sir, you do not wish to make us into a set of rogues?" He replied, "There is no roguishness about it, as it is the universal custom of the trade, and you must do the same, or you cannot succeed in your new business as winders." I answered that we had never done business on such a dishonest principle. The consequence was, that we lost ground for the two or three years, and we then patented a new article termed "glacé cotton." The sale of our new manufacture, combined with honest lengths, soon made its way, and since then we have had a very satisfactory business. From an occurrence that took place in the year 1859, I wrote a letter to the Manchester Guardian, urging the formation of an association to suppress the practice of short lengths. I also obtained the co-operation of the respectable houses, Messrs. J. and P. Coats, Paisley, and Messrs. John Clark, junior, and Co., Mile End, Glasgow. They agreed with me to subscribe 500l. to form the said association. I was entrusted to look out for a secretary. Mr. Minchin, of Manchester, was selected. We first called upon the principal houses in Manchester. I found all to condemn the principle; but the difficulty was to meet it, and I was considered a bold man to attempt it; and, at their suggestion, we were recommended to see the wholesale houses first in London, and try and get them not to send orders for short lengths, as, they very truly said, we have no advantage in selling short lengths, "We are only paid for the quantity we give." We also called upon several merchants; one I shall never forget. The master took me up to the small-ware department, and the buyer astonished him when he told him that they had reels of cotton that only measured 25 yards, marked 100 yards. The fact was, that shippers had a list of prices drawn up, headed 100 yards, but you could buy any length from 30 to 100 yards,

at prices in accordance with the length on the reels, but all marked 100 yards. We first obtained the concurrence of the leading London houses, and met several times in committee, and drew up rules, of which a copy is enclosed. This sanction we thought a great step towards the mitigation of the evil. We continued agitating the question of trade frauds, but the leading London firms gradually became lukewarm. The fact was, they saw that the association was becoming too warm for them, and they urged that it was more a manufacturer's question than theirs. They said, "Let the manufacturers form an association, and get them not to sell us short lengths. My reply to this was, "True; but do not you force them to make such goods?" And what I want to see is, that certain manufacturers and merchants do not act together as conspirators. The law should be made to reach both. We persevered, and had the honour of an interview with Mr. Milner Gibson, who, on the part of the Government, promised to frame a bill. At that meeting we were accompanied by your chairman, Mr. Bazley, M.P.; Mr. Westhead, M.P.; and Mr. Schofield, M.P. Since then, seeing that Government had taken up the matter, we made an end of our association. I have called upon very many retail houses during the last few years, and I am glad to say that, almost universally, they are anxious for a law forbidding trade frauds. In illustration, in a small agricultural town in the North Riding of Yorkshire, a retail house said, it was high time something was done, for really he hardly knew whether he was obtaining a profit or not. He went on to say, that he complained to a large wholesale house in Manchester that they had sent him cloth much shorter than invoiced, and demanded a reduction in the amount; and what think you was the reply?-(this he showed me)-that they had sent what was the custom of the trade, and they could not make any reduction. Another, in the town of Doncaster, stated that the evil was unbearable. He said, "I have hardly an article in my shop that will measure out the quantity invoiced to me. Now, for instance, there is a quantity of pocket handkerchiefs lying on the opposite counter, they should all be square. (He measured them in my presence, and there was not one correct.) Again, I will measure silk ribbon rolls; they ought to contain 18 yards, as invoiced, and, upon an average, they will not measure more than from 16 to 17 yards." He did so, and such was the fact. "Such is the state of things," he continued, "that I am obliged to employ my young men to measure nearly every article that comes in, so that I may fix my price accordingly, or I should never know whether I made a profit or not. If I complain, I am answered it is the custom of the trade. (Evidence "on reels without length stated" was given by Mr. Brook yesterday.) It has been urged against us as winders, that we do not, on every individual reel, give correct length. This is quite true, and no winder can guarantee this. We are in the hands of our workpeople, who may purposely or carelessly give rather more or less length. What we have to do is, to detect and correct such work. In the bill now before the House, the clauses state that there must be proved an intent to defraud. Although we cannot guarantee in every case the quantity ticketed, we can guarantee the full lengths, taking the average of a number of reels; that is, if one reel has too little, another has too much. I hope that the few statements I have made will convince your honourable committee that a bill for remedying the gross evils in trade is urgently required. They are but one in a hundred that I could relate to you. Believe me, there is a demand for legislation in

this vicious system of fraud, and which, in a professed Christian country, is a disgrace to us as a nation. I have heard many men, anxious to conduct their business honestly, say they are too often forced to resort to such tricks against their own conscience to meet such wicked competition, or they must close their business. This is not confined to one business, for I shall not be far wrong when I say it is common to all. In saying this, I hope it will not be construed that I am attacking individuals, but a system; as I rejoice to say we have many honourable men in trade who can more than verify every word I have stated. I believe great good has already been the result of the last few years' agitation on this question, particularly in the home trade. In the shipping trade, I fear matters are little better. There is a practice in this country by the very first-class vendors of the kind. Here is a cotton that I produce, which is a most expensive article; it is nine-cord cotton; they do not put any length upon the reels, but in their invoices they call it 300 yards, and in their list of prices they so call it. Now, I have measured these reels many times in my life, and I have never found more, upon the average, than 250 yards; and I think that in any bill there should be a clause to insist (referring now to articles difficult to measure, in order to ascertain the length) that all such articles should have the length guaranteed; I do not know that that is provided for in the bill, but certainly it is a very essential thing. I went into a shop, and said, "What length is there upon that reel?" The answer was, The answer was, " Three hundred yards." I said, "I know you are telling me an untruth.” I heard a gentleman praising his thread very much and abusing ours, and I said to him, "Is it better to sell a dishonest article, or an honest article?" He said, "You do not mean to say that I am selling a dishonest article?" I said, "I will give you 18. for every yard that there is above 230." He seemed amazed at such a thing; but I said, "Now, sir, you have abused my cotton, and I hope you will carry it out; there is 6d. for your bobbin, and 6d. for your trouble; measure it in my presence." He did so; and there were 235 yards only upon that reel of cotton. This is done by very respectable vendors indeed, and this is an instance (handing in a reel); but I have taken the name off it. I think that that is a very shameful reel; that reel had 240 yards on it, and the committee will at once see the difference. One is ours, and the other is a different maker; they are the same number of cotton identically, but see how much larger one reel is than the other; there are 300 yards guaranteed upon ours, and 240 upon the other, and the consumer is cheated of 50 yards.

Comparative Merits of the two Bills.-Mr. Hindmarsh said, I have compared Bill No. 1 with Bill No. 2 very carefully; and I had an opportunity of discussing Bill No. 1, or, at least, some of its provisions, with some of the gentlemen at Sheffield, some time ago, and they stated their views, and I heard what they had to allege in favour of registration. In Bill No. 2, there are several provisions to which there is nothing to correspond in No. 1.

But there are provisions in each Bill which are to some extent common to the two. There is no very great difference in the definition, except as to the word "persons." They are larger in extent; there is more provision made in the one than in the other, with respect to the significations of words.

In Bill No. 1, "person" is confined to the subjects of her Majesty. In Bill No. 2, it is " persons," whether subjects of her Majesty or not; and that

is to be considered, I think, in this way: suppose a manufacturer to be a foreigner residing abroad—a man living at Calais or Boulogne, a Frenchman, but carrying on business in England. It is a matter, of course, for the committee to consider; but I should think it would be but fair that he should have the same protection as other manufacturers.

By the present law he is put upon the same footing as an Englishman; and that was my chief intention in extending the signification of the word as you have done.

Clause No. 2 relates to "forging or imitating a trade mark with intent to defraud," which is to be made a misdemeanor; and there is a provision in Bill No. 2, as to forging or imitating a trade mark, but I think that is fuller. It is more full and explicit, and there are several things that are important which are comprised in section 2 in No. 2 Bill, which are not in No. 1. I apprehend that in every case of this sort there are two objects which a person may have in forging, or two interests, which he may have injured in forging-he defrauds the manufacturer who would have sold, and he deceives the purchaser who buys, the article upon which he forges a trade mark. The committee will observe that the word used is "defraud," and not "fraud." Perhaps, the general meaning of the term "fraud” would include deceit, but "defraud" seems rather to imply the taking of something from a person that he has a right to, and I think it is more applicable to the case of an injury done to a manufacturer or vendor. The other word is "deceive," and certainly a purchaser is deceived if he is induced to buy an article which is not the manufacture of the person he supposes it to be. I cannot imagine any deceit of that description that could be deemed to be innocent, and not such as ought to be put down. One object always would be to deceive a purchaser, and he would be deceived, even though the article so passed should turn out to be as good, even better. Supposing, in thought, he was buying Rodger's razors, and they turned out to be Thompson's, which he did not intend to buy; and, therefore, I thought, in looking over Lord Campbell's Bill of last year, that there was an omission, or it was supposed that the word "defraud” included every description of fraud, which I apprehend it does not. A person, in order to be successful in a prosecution upon a charge of deceit, that is, the person who purchased the goods, would have to swear that he would not have parted with his money for those goods unless he had believed that they had been made by the person whose trade mark was borne by the goods. I apprehend that it would not be quite necessary to do it in that way, but it would be necessary to say this" I purchased that article, believing that it was the article of another person," and that, I apprehend, would make out the charge.

There are two branches of clause 2 in the first bill. The one applies to the marks put on the articles themselves, and the other applies to the trade marks or false trade marks put on "cases, covers, wrappers, casks, and so on." It seemed to me to be very inconvenient to include all those in one section, and I divided it into two, more particularly as it seemed necessary to carry the provisions, as to the latter part of the subject, very much further than I found them in Bill No. 1.

In section 2 of No. 2, provision is made for applying a forged mark to the commodities themselves, and in section 3 you provide against applying false or forged marks to wrappers and labels. In section 3, there is provision made as to a trade mark being applied to "any cask, bottle, stopper,

vessel, case, cover, wrapper, band, reel, ticket, label, or other thing, in, on, or with which any chattel or article shall be intended to be sold." That is one description of mode in which a fraud may be perpetrated. but then there comes another, which is provided for by the next clause in the same section.

The second branch of clause No. 2, Bill No. 1, at line 13, runs thus, "or to any case, cover, wrapper, cask, bottle, reel, stopper, or other thing, in, on, or with which any chattel or article shall be intended to be or shall be sold." That seemed to me to be incomplete, and that the provision ought to be carried very much further.

The difference between section 3 of No. 1 Bill and section 4 of No. 2 is, firstly, it is provided in section 4 of No. 2, that the enactment shall begin, or rather take effect, on the 31st of December, 1863. It seemed to us that that was important, because traders, having stocks of goods, and presuming that the law would remain as it is, ought to have an opportunity of getting rid of that stock before a penal enactment came into force. As to manufacturers, it does not seem to be necessary to do that, for the moment a man knows that the law makes a thing penal he should hold his hand ; but in the case of a man who has a stock that he cannot get rid of for some time, it would be hard to make the enactment apply to him, unless he had an opportunity to get rid of his goods.

The character of the offence, I observe, differs in section 3 of No. 1, from section 4 No. 2, the offence being made a misdemeanor by Bill No. 1; but to be visited only with a penalty by Bill No. 2. It seemed to me to be very inexpedient to visit the offence of selling with the same degree of punishment as the offence of making and counterfeiting. No doubt, the man who makes and counterfeits a trade mark is the author of all the wrong: the moral turpitude in him is much greater, although it may be possibly going a little too far to relieve the seller from the punishment of misdemeanor; for, as it has been said, if there were no receivers of goods, there would be no thieves; but the moral turpitude in the one case is clearly less than in the other. I think that the public would rebel against making such an enactment. I do not think that you could put it in force; and I think it is, therefore, inexpedient, and much better to have a penalty. The words "author of all the wrong" being used in the bill, Mr. Hindmarsh was asked to explain those words to the committee; and he said,—When I say, author of all the wrong, I mean that he is the first of a series of persons who commit wrong; he makes the thing with the fraudulent or false trade mark. But it must be borne in mind that the maker is often a man without money, or, as it is called, a man of straw, while the person who orders the goods, and induces the maker to mark them falsely, is frequently a man of capital and position, as I know, sorry to say, from my experience, and from facts which have come to my knowledge professionally, and therefore I cannot mention names. Indeed, I have known firms of very high reputation in the country who have induced manufacturers to put forged trade marks on goods, more particularly in Manchester. Accordingly, the author of all the wrong is the manufacturer, because, in the case put as showing the beginning of the fraud, he would be the person who set the other to work.

I am

The offence is different in section 3 of Bill No. 1, and in section 4 of Bill No. 2; in one case it is made a misdemeanor, and in the other it is not. It seems to me to be very essential to make a distinction between a man who