forges a thing and another who merely sells a thing, who may sell it in ignorance that the mark upon his goods is forged; and I think it would be very hard, in any case, to make him guilty of a misdemeanor. The same difference is made in the offences of forgery and coining; the law does not visit the person who utters with the same degree of punishment as the man who coins; the punishment is different; and it seems to me to be wise to recognise a distinction between the one description of offence and the other. Clause 3 in Bill No. 1 relates to " selling goods with forged or false trade marks, with intent to defraud." In clause 4 of Bill No. 2, "every person knowingly selling articles with forged or false trade marks," after the date specified, would be liable only to a penalty. It requires knowledge that a fraud has been committed in putting a name on a piece of goods that he is about to sell; and if he sells it, he commits an offence, and ought to be punished in some way. I apprehend that a penalty is the best way of doing it. I would punish for knowingly selling without reference to "with intent to defraud," as far as regards the words of the enactment; but having knowledge of a forged mark being upon his goods would show a fraudulent intent in selling them so marked. In section 4 in Bill No. 1 there is a provision that "all penalties shall be paid to the prosecutor." There is a difference, I think, in Bill No. 2 in that respect. It appears to me to be an inexpedient course to pursue. There are many cases in which penalties are to be paid one-half to the Crown and one-half to the informer; and then the mischief is, that a man who is suing for a penalty gets the reputation of being an informer. It is said very often, and I believe truly, that actions of that description are brought by speculative attorneys for the sake of getting costs, and portions of the penalties, and the consequence is that, in a great many cases, parties do not succeed in such actions when they ought to do, and in some cases such actions are brought when they ought not to be brought. It is inexpedient in my opinion to give the penalty to the party who prosecutes, as provided in No. 1 Bill; I think it ought to go always entirely to the Crown. My view was, in framing many of these clauses, rather to improve the civil remedy which an injured person should have against a wrong-doer, than to induce him, by putting in force the penal clauses of the act, to punish the person who was doing the wrong; and I think that instead of the penalty going to the prosecutor it ought, in every case, to go entirely to the Crown. The proposal made that the penalty should go to any party aggrieved, I think unreasonable, because it would do him a great deal of harm. He would have all the disreputation of going for a penalty as an informer, when he might, if he pleased, avail himself of the improved civil remedies that are provided in the Bill No. 2; he could recover all the damage sustained by the false marks upon defendant's goods, and all his costs. Section 5 in No. 1 Bill raises a very important question. The section provides that the summary jurisdiction shall be before any two or more justices, under the 11th and 12th Victoria, chap. 43, for England, which is also in the other bill, to which I beg to call attention, it being very important to consider whether there ought to be any conviction before the justices. Then, in Bill No. 1, there are these words, "and as to Ireland, in the manner directed by the Petty Sessions (Ireland) Act, 1851." In framing section 15, in Bill No. 2, I have not inserted anything like a power for two justices in Ireland to proceed to convict for any offence, because I found that Lord Campbell, in framing his bill, did not put in any such provision, either with regard to Ireland or Scotland. Scotland, I think, he must be deemed to have been tolerably well acquainted with. I suppose it was because the magistrates in those two different parts of the country are not quite of the same class, or many of them, as the justices on the bench in this country, and that struck me as being a very good reason for leaving the provision out. I think it may be worthy of consideration whether it is expedient to allow it to stand even for England, and for this reason, that, although in a great many parts of the country, the justices are perfectly well aware of the nature of questions of this sort; yet, if you get into a remote part, where gentlemen may know nothing about them, they may be puzzled, and obliged to rely upon the advice of some country practitioner, who perhaps knows nothing more than himself; and they may be thus very prone to get wrong. Even in London, I have known cases under the Copyright of Designs Act, in which things done by justices were not as they ought to have been. It seemed to me, that it would be a very good thing to shorten the proof, and to simplify the allegations in pleadings in all matters relating to trade marks. Trade marks, I apprehend, would be treated, and I know that they are treated in all legal proceedings, in the same way as forged instruments in indictments and pleadings relating to forgery. There, you set forth a facsimile of a thing, and in many cases it would be utterly impossible to do it with trade marks. It is enough that the thing should be alleged to be a trade mark, and that the allegation that a man had forged a trade mark should be sufficient. It is a very similar clause to that which is in Lord Campbell's Bill, and I think it will be a very useful one; but the clause in the other bill stops short by only applying the enactment to proceedings under the Act. I think that it should be carried much further, and should apply to all suits and all proceedings whatsoever, and so I have framed it. There is no provision in Bill No. 2, corresponding with the sections 9 and 10 in Bill No. 1, as regard registration. With regard to No. 9, which states, "The person in whose name and behalf such trade mark stands registered shall be considered the proprietor thereof," of course I saw very early, when I began to consider the subject, that registration and proprietorship seemed to go hand in hand. When a person talks of registration in connection with a trade mark, he seems to think that he will register to acquire a proprietorship in the trade mark ; but that, it appears to me, would be a very inconvenient thing. For example, John Smith may use his own name as a trade mark, but he has no particular right to the name of John Smith,-any other man may be called John Smith and use his name as a trade mark; but, if there be one John Smith, and any other person writes his name in such a way as to appear to be his handwriting upon a bill of exchange, it is a forgery, and may be punished without reference to any sort of registration. There is nothing more requisite than this: you might say to the man whose name has been forged, "Your name is John Smith ?—Yes. Is that your handwriting?-No. Does that writing resemble it, or does it appear to you to be written in such a way as to resemble your writing?-Yes, it does, but it is not my handwriting." That would be a complete case for a conviction on the charge of forgery, and I cannot see why there should be any more necessity for registration in the one case than in the other. The words in section 9 are these: "And such trade mark shall be deemed the personal property of the proprietor, and shall be transmissible according to the ordinary rules of law affecting personal property." It seems to me that that is unnecessary to begin with, and I think it is fraught with mischief. I would not give a power to sell a trade mark, quite independently of the place in which the purchaser was to use it, or the manufactory in which he was to make the goods, and so on. To do so, would seem to import this, that a man might have a trade mark, although he never used it, and he might have the power to say nobody shall use this mark, it is mine, although I do not choose to use it. If it were transmissible according to the ordinary rules of law, there would be nothing to prevent a man selling it, and selling it to a person who should use it at a totally different place, and under different conditions. I think that it is not proper to create such a right by legislation, and that it would be creating a monopoly. By clause 6 in Bill No. 2, "any person who, after the 31st December, 1863, shall have sold an article having a false trade mark upon it." shall be bound to give information where he procured it, and shall be liable to a penalty of 51. for refusing it. There is no provision corresponding to that, in Bill No. 1; and I will explain to the committee how that occurred to me to be necessary; in discussing the difficulties in the way of putting down these frauds and forgeries, what almost every person urged upon me was this: "How are we to get at the fraudulent parties, and how are we to obtain the information?" You go into a shop and you buy an article, and you find that your trade mark is upon it, and if you go to the tradesman he will say "I do not know anything about it." You will say to him. "Where did you get it?" He is not obliged to tell you, and there you are stopped,-you can get no further. Then what are you to do? You may impose penalties, and by that you may do a great deal. If you catch the offender you may punish him, but how are you to get at him? After a great deal of reflection I devised this section, and I explained it to several manufacturers and several traders, and they all said at once that that would clear away the difficulty, and they said, "We can get back from one person to another, until we get to the real offender?" If a shopkeeper sells you an article with your trade mark upon it, you will say to him "This is a fraud. Tell me where you got this, or you will be liable to punishment for an offence, and, more than that, you will be deemed to have had a guilty knowledge." I think that no trader would ever refuse to give the requisite information; you would get then, perhaps, to the wholesale dealer, and from him to the manufacturer; and then, observe, there is the knowledge of all those persons that the law is such, and that they may be reached, and that will have a wonderful effect upon men's minds, and greatly prevent the use of fraudulent marks. The world has come to such a state, that I believe thieves and house-breakers are in the constant habit of considering what the law is, and how they can evade it. I believe that men very often take advice as to whether such and such acts will be within the meaning of a particular Act of Parliament. If they are not, then they will go on and commit them; but if they are, they will hold their hands. After great consideration, it appeared to me that the only way would be in the case of a person selling an article which had a trade mark upon it, that he should be bound to give information as to where he got it. Memorandum of some Cases in which an Act is Criminal apart from the Proof of Justification or (Delivered by Mr. John THE mere possession of Government stores, or any article bearing the mark of her Majesty's dockyards, without a certificate authorizing such possession, is an offence, though the sale of such stores by the Government is legal, 9 & 10 Will. 3, c. 41, s. 1; 53 Geo. 3, c. 126; 55 Geo. 3, c. 127; so are the possession of bank notes without lawful excuse, 11 Geo. 4, and 1 Will. 4, c. 66, s. 12, and without proof of any intention to issue them, or the possession of any instrument for making them, and the possession of any instrument for coining, or the making of coin-these are felonies, 2 Will. 4, c. 34, ss. 3 and 10. The mere knowingly having in possession, without lawful excuse (the proof whereof shall be on the person accused), any counterfeit die, plate, or other instrument for imitating postage stamps or envelopes, or stamping, uttering or having in possession any paper marked therewith, knowing the same to be counterfeit, are felonies, 3 & 4 Vict. c. 96, s. 22. Counterfeiting any instrument of any of the various Companies of Goldsmiths, for marking gold or silver, or imitating the marks, or knowingly uttering wares of base metal so marked, 7 & 8 Vict. c. 22, s. 2; counterfeiting any such mark, even if on gold or silver, or removing any such mark from one article to another, even if that other be itself gold or silver, whether with or without proof of intent to defraud, and without permitting of excuse, are all felonies, 7 & 8 Vict. c. 22, s. 2. The knowingly having in possession, without lawful excuse (the proof whereof shall lie on the party accused), any counterfeited instrument, or gold, silver, or base metal, with counterfeited mark or removed mark, or removing a mark with intent to affix same to any other ware, whether of gold, silver, or base metal, are likewise felonies. So the imitating the mark of the Birmingham Proof House for gun barrels, or knowingly selling any barrel bearing an imitation of such mark without intent to defraud, is a misdemeanor, 53 Geo. 3, c. 115, s. 9; or the marking of a hammer on cutlery not made of hammered steel, or the mere having in possession, for the purpose of sale, articles so marked, or marking or possession for sale of cutlery with a false indication of quality, or with the words "London" or "London made" thereon, unless manufactured in the City of London, or within 20 miles thereof, are all misdemeanors, 59 Geo. 3, c. 7, s. 3; ib. s. 4; ib. s. 5. A prisoner is compelled in various cases to set up and prove his defence to a criminal charge, instead of the entire onus of proof lying on the pro secution. This is by common law wherever "the act is not indifferent, but in itself unlawful, the proof of justification or excuse in such case lying on the defendant, and on failure thereof, the law implying a criminal intent," per Lord Mansfield, Rex v. Woodfall, 5 Burr. 2667. In many cases, this is so by statute. The simple possession of goods suspected to have been unlawfully obtained, where criminality is assumed, unless a satisfactory account be given by the accused, as distinguished from the possession, knowing them to be unlawfully obtained, a less punishment being awarded in the former case, 2 & 3 Vict. c. 71, s. 24; 7 & 8 Geo. 4, c. 29, ss. 54, 55. The being found with house-breaking implements, or even common keys (which could be used for housebreaking), without lawful excuse, without proof of use, or of intention to use, is a misdemeanor, 14 & 15 Vict. c. 19, s. 1. A person charged simply with wandering abroad, and having no visible means of subsistence or fixed abode, and not giving a good account of himself, is liable to imprisonment with or without hard labour, Reg. v. Oldham, 2 Den. C. C. 472; Reg. v. Bailey, Dears, C. C. 244; 5 Geo. 4, c. 83. SUGAR DUTIES. Report of the Committee appointed to Inquire into the Operation of the present Scale of Sugar Duties, with special reference to their Assessment upon a Classification according to the Quality of the Sugar. THIS Committee was appointed on the 29th April, 1862; and on the 1st May it was nominated as follows:-Mr. Crawford, Mr. Cardwell, Sir John Packington, Mr. Thos. Baring, Mr. Cave, Mr. Dunlop, Mr. Crum Ewing, Mr. Gregson, Mr. Hankey, Mr. Moffatt, Mr. Potter, Mr. John Tollemache, Mr. Charles Turner, and Mr. Vance. On the 2nd May, Mr. Allen Bathurst was added to the committee, and Mr. Cardwell was elected chairman. The committee sat sixteen times. The following were the witnesses examined :-Sir Thomas Francis Freemantle and Mr. R. A. Ogilvie, of the Customs; Mr. Archibald Travers, of Messrs. Joseph Travers and Sons, wholesale grocers; Mr. Henry Nelson, of Messrs. Crawford, Colvin, and Co., East India merchants; Mr. J. A. Guthrie, of Messrs. Chalmers, Guthrie, and Co., Mauritius merchants; Mr. J. Gustave Adam, Mauritius planter; Mr. J. T. White, Mr. Duncan Macdonald, British Guiana; Mr. John Binney Key, Madras merchant; Mr. Leon Arnaud, planter, Mauritius; Mr. Charles Wright, grocer; Mr. John Mackenzie, Madras trader; Mr. John Arbuthnot, of Arbuthnot, Latham, and Co., East India traders; Mr. Crawford D. Ken, Demerara planter; Mr. Frederick Stokes, Mr. Henry Taylor, Mr. Francis Reed, colonial brokers; Mr. Thomas Close, wholesale grocer; Mr. Thomas Young, colonial broker; Mr. Samuel Howell, colonial broker; Mr. Thos. G. Kirkpatrick, Mr. John Davis, Mr. John Fainie, Mr. A. W. Gadesden, Mr. Alfred Fryer, Mr. Peter Martineau, Mr. David Richardson, sugar refiners; Mr. William Rennie, of Messrs. Cavan, Lubbock, and Co.; Mr. Thomas Porter, Mr. James Colquhoun, Mr. G. H. Chambers, West India merchants; Mr. Thos. Nachten, of Messrs. Bosanquet and Naghten, Colonial Bank; and Mr. F. St. John, surveyor-general of Customs. On the 7th June, the following resolutions, to be proposed by the chairman, were read as follows: -: "That it is the opinion of this committee "1. That the evidence does not justify the committee in recommending the adoption of refining in bond. "2. That the amount of revenue now derived from sugar could not, with justice to the consumers of the lower classes of sugar, be raised by any uniform duty applicable to all classes. "3. That it is not possible to charge sugars with duties varying exactly with the quality or value. |