Mr. DANIELS. Well, Dr. Selikoff's study of this situation of course did alert a good many people and did show findings that really are of great concern to not only workers there but also to Congress. I was just wondering if any biological monitoring studies had taken place or were required to take place at these two smelters.

Dr. CORN. In the case of both of these plants the employers agreed to institute such a program after discussions with our area director. If the employer had answered we would not have had the authority under the existing standard, as opposed to the proposed standard, to require such studies.

Mr. DANIELS. Well, the reason I asked you that question is because if such studies had been made, you probably would have discovered this situation long before it really came to this point.

Dr. CORN. I am not sure we would have. That is a question I asked, Congressman Daniels. As I understand what was happening here, at 80 micrograms per hundred grams of whole blood the clinician is alerted to the fact that there may be a problem. That is, can he respond to that level in the blood? It was at that level that the plant. manager was triggered to send the employee to the physician, so the goal of any therapeutic program that we are focusing on here was to keep it below a level where an outsider might think by looking at the blood that there was a problem, because it was never allowed to get above 80.

Now that is my understanding of the way this proceeded. If it got to about 80, the men went to the physician. The next time the man came back and his blood was checked, it should not have been above 80. The whole program was geared to keeping the blood lead level in that range by continuing medical treatment.

Mr. DANIELS. Thank you, Dr. Corn, for your testimony. I want to thank the others that appeared with you as well.

This concludes today's hearing. The subcommittee will reconvene on March 24.

(Whereupon, at 12:02 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned, to reconvene on Wednesday, March 24, 1976.)

OVERSIGHT HEARINGS ON THE OCCUPATIONAL

SAFETY AND HEALTH ACT

Occupational Health Hazards

(Part 2)

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 24, 1976

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON MANPOWER, COMPENSATION,

AND HEALTH AND SAFETY

OF THE COMMITTEE ON EDUCATION AND LABOR,

Washington, D.C. The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:15 a.m., in room 2257, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Dominick V. Daniels (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Present: Representatives Daniels, Gaydos, and Sarasin.

Staff members present: Daniel Krivit, majority counsel; Edith Baum, minority counsel; Sue Nelson, legislative associate; and Denniese Medlin, clerk.

Mr. DANIELS. The Subcommittee on Manpower, Compensation, and Health and Safety will come to order.

This morning we continue our hearings regarding lead poisoning of workers at smeltering operations and battery plants.

Recently it has been brought to the attention of the committee that there has been widespread exposure of our working men and women at secondary lead smelters and battery plants and this committee, having oversight jurisdiction on matters pertaining to occupational safety and health, is investigating this problem.

This morning our first witnesses will be from the United Steelworkers of America.

I recognize Mr. Sheehan. Will you be kind enough to introduce the members who are with you and will testify.

GEORGE BECKER, SAFETY AND HEALTH REPRESENTATIVE; FRANK VALENTA, STAFF REPRESENTATIVE, DISTRICT 30, INDIANAPOLIS; AND JAMES ENGLISH, COUNSEL, UNITED STEELWORKERS OF AMERICA, ACCOMPANIED BY JOHN J. SHEEHAN, LEGISLATIVE DIRECTOR, UNITED STEELWORKERS OF AMERICA, AFL-CIO-A PANEL OF THE UNITED STEELWORKERS OF AMERICA, AFL-CIO

Mr. SHEEHAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

My name is Jack Sheehan, legislative director of the United Steelworkers of America, and I am accompanied by James English,

the assistant counsel of the United Steelworkers of America, and George Becker, international staff representative from the Safety and Health Department of the Steelworkers Union.

Mr. DANIELS. Which gentleman is Mr. English?

Mr. SHEEHAN. Mr. English is on my extreme left.

Exposure of workers to high lead levels, Mr. Chairman, has had a very long history, and the unfortunate current events are only just parts of that history. I think we will try to speak to you today that this is not something new and that the conditions existing at these particular plants are not just unique there but are certainly prevalent throughout the industry.

We are happy to respond to your invitation to speak, however, to just the particulars at these plants, and we are hopeful, incidentally, Mr. Chairman, and that probably is one of the main reasons why we are here today is that these hearings will have some kind of a salutary impact upon correcting conditions at the lead plants. Otherwise, these hearings will have no value unless we can do something about the conditions at these plants.

Dr. DANIELS. Will the gentleman yield at this point.

I am happy to report to you, on Monday of this week, we had testimony before this committee by Dr. Morton Corn, who is in charge of the Occupational Health and Safety Administration in his capacity as Assistant Secretary of Labor. He reported to this committee that he was taking affirmative steps in this field of occupational health; steps which I think will be of benefit to all workers, not only those employed in lead smeltering plants but also workers exposed to toxic substances and harmful physical agents in many other industries throughout the Nation. If Dr. Corn is successful in that endeavor, I think we will be making impressive and important moves forward in the area of occupational diseases.

Mr. SHEEHAN. I agree with you, Mr. Chairman, and I think the committee should be complimented because this has been the early returns we are getting from only, I guess 2 days or 3 days of hearings so far.

Mr. DANIELS. You know as well as I do that in the past about 90 percent of the activity in the Department of Labor has been in the field of safety and their activities have been particularly negligible in the area of health.

Mr. SHEEHAN. We need protection at these plants; we need it throughout the industry, as you are indicating, and we need the protective influence of a well-administered OSHA, which is the other point you are making.

Before I begin this morning, I regret to inform you that Mr. William Caldwell, who was also going to be testifying here today. is unable to be present this morning. He is a steelworker retired fro the National Lead Plant in Indianapolis. He is currently on the use of a dialysis machine, and I have been given to understand that yesterday he received a treatment and has been rather ill as a result of that and was unable to travel out of Indianapolis last night.

Any questions you might have with that regard, of course, George Becker will be able to respond to those questions. At this time, I would like to introduce you to George Becker from the Safety Department of the Steel Workers.

Mr. DANIELS. You may proceed, Mr. Becker.

STATEMENT OF GEORGE BECKER, SAFETY AND HEALTH REPRESENTATIVE, UNITED STEELWORKERS OF AMERICA

Mr. BECKER. Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, for the record, my name is George Becker, safety and health representative of the United Steelworkers of America, located in Pittsburgh, Pa. For a 10-year period, prior to January 1, 1975, I was the union's field staff representative in Granite City, Ill. In that capacity, I represented members of our union with employers concerning wages, hours of work and other conditions of employment.

I welcome this opportunity to appear before your committee today and relate a sampling of the many frustrations I have experienced since my first exposure to the crippling effects of lead in 1965.

One of the plants I serviced in 1965 was the National Lead Company's Hoyt Plant in Granite City, Ill.-this is the United Steelworkers of America, Local Union 6496. The Hoyt Plant is a secondary smelter, employing approximately 150 leadworkers. In addition to a smelter, the company manufactured finished lead products. They also had a "battery-wrecker" that smashed and then reclaimed the lead plates from old automobile batteries.

It was an accepted fact that everyone who worked in the Granite City smelter would eventually suffer some degree of lead poisoning. It was also a fact that the majority of the workers were required to take an oral chelating drug called versenate.

A daily course of the drug usually consisted of six white pillstwo pills with each meal. Many employees had taken versenate in this manner for years on end-it was an accepted way of life for the leadworkers and no end was in sight.

Symptoms of lead poisoning among the workers in this plant were very apparent. They suffered fatigue, weakness, pains in the joints, muscle and stomach cramps or commonly referred to as colic. As a condition of employment, management required their workers to submit to urine and blood lead testing.

Under the pretext of confidentiality, the company doctor refused to tell the individual workers, or the union, any of the test results. The union's request for the State of Illinois to conduct factory inspections at the Hoyt Plant were a complete waste of time and effort. We were subsequently informed by the single State hygienist that no rules or regulations to control and employee's exposure to lead had ever been promulgated under the existing State safety and health laws.

In 1969, the Steelworkers Union appeared before this subcommittee to offer testimony in favor of a national safety and health law. At that time, I set out the same frustrations I am relating to you gentlemen today, and that is, the inability of our union to secure from the National Lead Co. or the State of Illinois even the most basic health protection for our members who worked in the lead industry.

The need for the enactment of OSHA, if just on lead problems alone, is well justified, and I compliment the committee for its enactment of OSHA. Without the enactment of OSHA, I would probably not be here today in my continuing effort to speak on behalf of leadworkers.

75-111 O 7629

In 1970, the Steelworkers Union petitioned the Illinois Industrial Commission to hold hearings to formulate rules and regulations to protect leadworkers. The commission refused. Only after the union filed suit in district court did the commission relent and hold public hearings in May 1971.

As a result of that hearing, where even National Lead officials admitted that a serious lead problem existed, the Industrial Commission set up an Advisory Committee to develop standards for lead poisoning. Business members of the Advisory Committee included the director of the Lead Industries Association as well as other prominent medical authorities knowledgeable in lead control.

During the committee meetings, the business members as well as the public expressed concern and dissatisfaction with National Lead's continued use of oral versenate to control the blood/lead levels of their employees.

The Advisory Committee did recommend that a lead standard be promulgated. Despite this, no standard for lead poisoning was ever set in Illinois because of the Industrial Commission refusal to act upon or even review the committee's recommendations.

In 1973, the Steel workers Union petitioned NIOSH to undertake a health hazard evaluation of the chelate drug versenate at this same National Lead Hoyt Plant. The NIOSH study took over 1 year to complete. It found that approximately one-third of the workers examined had blood/lead levels in excess of 80 μg/100g, this was even with the routine use of oral versenate.

Both company and worker freely admitted to NIOSH investigators that an oral prophylaxis program had been in use for many years at the Hoyt Plant. One such employee admitted to NIOSH investigators that because of his fear of lead poisoning, he had taken as many as 250 versenate pills every 2 weeks. Versenate pills at the Hoyt Plant were readily available to most employees desirous of them upon request at the dispensary.

In spite of this uncontrolled usage, NIOSH investigators concluded that the use of the oral versenate did not present harmful effects. As a result, the company did not discontinue the use of oral versenate and, in fact, interpreted the NIOSH health hazard evaluation as an authorization to continue the program.

In a letter addressed to me by Mr. Jerome Flesch, Chief of Hazard Evaluation Services Branch of NIOSH, he stated:

The request for Health Hazard Evaluation specified the substance in ques tion as calcium disodium versenate which is also known as edathamil, calcium disodium edetate-I will use the initials. Mr. Chairman, CaEDTA is what it is commonly referred to-For more than a decade it has been the medical policy within the Hoyt Plant to administer oral CaEDTA to numer ous employees as a routine prophylactic method in attempting to control the potential effects of overexposure to lead within the facility. While this practice is depreciated as a control measure, no serious health effects resulting from the prolonged administration of this compound were identified during the

survey.

At that time, a more thorough physical examination of the workers might have disclosed-the same disorders in Granite City, Ill. and-s continued pattern of lead emissions in excess of the OSHA promulgated TLV standard on lead. Unfortunately, it was not until the Selikoff medical study in 1976 that the enforcement snafu and its dire consequences were discovered.