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ought not to be drawn from him; for, to be suspected of harboring such vindictive feelings towards another as would induce a commission of perjury for the sake of revenge, is certainly a disgrace. Peake's Ev. 136. Rex. v. Lewis & al. 4 Esp. Rep. 225. McBride v. McBride, 4 Esp. Rep. 242.

'But the practice on this subject seems not to be well settled. Peake's Ev. 130. 2 Stark. Ev. 139. In my opinion, the rule is, or ought to be, the same as in proving a witness interested, viz. by examining him on the voir dire, or proving his interest by other testimony, but not by both. The election of one mode precludes the other. The reason is the same in both cases. "It is certainly unreasonable," said the court, in Butler v. Butler, 3 Day, 204, "that the party should be permitted to sport with the conscience of the witness, when he has other proof of his interest." Stebbins v. Sackett, 5 Conn. Rep. 150. Chance v. Hine, 6 Conn. Rep. 231.

3. The authorities which admit witnesses of the faith in question, seem to take it for granted, that their incredibility is as their infidelity; and that the ratio must be settled by the jury; but they furnish no rule to ascertain the effect of speculative opinions upon the consciences of witnesses. By what standard is their testimony to be weighed? The jury have none but their own sectarian prejudices. What confidence has a Christian in the testimony of a Mahometan, who believes that paradise is his inevitable portion? What credit will be given, by a Protestant, to the testimony of a Catholic with an indulgence in his pocket? Or what would be the fate of a Free-Mason, accused and tried by AntiMasons, and vice versa? Let the history of parties and persecutions, from the days of Mather's Magnalia to our own times, answer these questions.

"The moral character of a witness is the only safe criterion; and, upon this topic, I adopt the sentiment and language of the late Chief Justice: "It may often be difficult to ascertain what are the speculative opinions of men, and how far they influence their conduct. In the conflict of parties, both religious and political, misrepresentations will often take place; and it will commonly be safer to rely on the general character for truth, which a man has acquired, by his own conduct in society, than on his mere opinions." Swift's Ev. 50.’(a)

In the case of Peck v. Botsford, p. 172, of Mr. Day's seventh

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(a) A new trial having been granted in this cause, it came on again for trial before the Superior Court, in August, 1828, Daggett, J. presiding. The same witness was offered, and the same objection taken to his testimony. Many witnesses were examined relative to the opinions of the witness as to a future state of rewards and punishments. Judge Daggett was satisfied, in view of the testimony, that he was a believer in future, though not endless punishment. He was, therefore admitted.'

volume, the question comes up, whether the acknowledgment by the personal representatives, of a debt due from their testator, will take it out of the statute of limitations, and the court decides that it has not this effect. Mr. Justice Daggett goes. into a full examination of the authorities in giving his opinion. Hosmer, Chief Justice, and Lawrence, J. agreed with him, and the decision is founded on the opinion of those three judges, Mr. Justice Peters dissenting, and Mr. Justice Brainard being absent. Mr. Justice Peters's reasons of dissent are not reported. The decision is in pursuance of the present general leaning of the courts in favor of giving effect to the statute, and limiting the exceptions.

The case of Wylie v. Lewis, 7 Day, 301, was against an endorser, who endorsed a promissory note in blank, not being himself either payee or endorsee, and being, for any thing that appears in the case, a voluntary endorser. It is alleged by the plaintiff to have been endorsed on the same day on which it was made, and this, as we infer from the statement, was proved, though it is not specifically stated to be so. It appears, however, that no specific consideration for the endorsement was proved. On this endorsement the plaintiff declares that on the same day [to wit, the date of the note] the defendant, by his endorsement of said note, for value received of said Wylie, promised and engaged that said Tucker [the maker] then was of ability to pay said note, and should continue to be, and should pay said note according to its tenor; that said Tucker then was, and ever since hath been, a bankrupt,' &c. The court decide that the holder was not authorized to fill up the endorsement with such an agreement; and 'consider the count a novelty in pleading, an avis rara in terris, nigroque simillima cycno.' The court does not decide what agreement the holder was authorized to write over the endorsement.

DIGEST OF RECENT DECISIONS.

THIS number contains a digest of the principal cases in
HARRIS & GILL'S REPORTS, Vols. 1 and 2.

DAY'S CONNECTICUT REPORTS, Vol. VII. Part 1.

ACTION.

1. A promise by a debtor to his creditor to pay his debt to a third person, will not enable such person to maintain an action at law, in his own name, for its recovery. Owings's Ex'rs. v. Owings, 1 Har. & Gill, 484.

2. Where one person pays money to another for the use of a third person, or where a person, having ready money belonging to another, agrees with that other to pay it over to a third person, in both these cases an action may be brought in the names of the persons beneficially interested. Ib.

3. A promise to one to pay a sum of money to several other persons in equal portions, where it was not the intention of the contracting parties, that such other persons should receive or recover by law, the entire sum, and then divide it among themselves, if the foundation of an action at all, it will confer a right to maintain a separate action for each part. Ib. See ASSUMPSIT 5, 6.

ADVANCEMENT. See DEVISE, 3, 4, 5.

AGREEMENT.

APPRENTICE.
ALIEN.

See CONSIDERATION; SHIPPING ARTICLES.
See NOTICE AND DEMAND.

An alien may purchase lands, and hold them against every one, (except the State,) until office found, or until the government shall exercise its authority over them; but by the common law a feme covert, being an alien, is not entitled to be endowed, nor to inherit lands. (a) Buchanan v. Deshon, et al. 1 Har. & Gill, 280.

APPEAL.

The setting aside a judgment against the casual ejector, on motion of the landlord of the tenant in possession, awarding restitution of the premises, and ordering the action to be tried, is but an interlocutory proceeding, from which an appeal will not lie;

(a) By the Maryland Statute of 1813, c. 100, an alien widow, resident in the United States during her coveture, is entitled to dower.

and the refusal of the court below to reconsider such proceedings, does not alter the case. Gover v. Cooley, 1 Har. & Gill, 7.

APPEARANCE. See PRACTICE, 3, 4.

APPRAISER under Statute. See EXECUTION, 2, 3.
ARBITRATION.

1. Arbitrators cannot reserve to themselves the authority to act judicially upon the subject submitted, after their powers are put an end to by making an award; neither can they delegate to another any part of their judicial authority, which is personal to themselves, nor refer to another, the decision of a point on which they find a difficulty to decide themselves, and much less to the parties to the submission, or either of them. Archer v. Williamson, 2 Har. and Gill, 62.

2. The reservation or delegation in an award of a power over the thing submitted, shows the award not to be final, and consequently void; unless, indeed, it relates only to some merely ministerial act. Ib.

3. Where the subject referred to arbitrators was one undivided matter, specifically brought to their notice, and on which they professed to act, and the purpose of the parties was to have a final determination of the whole matter submitted;-an award comprehending a part only of the matter submitted, was held to be void. Ib.

ASSIGNMENT. See ACTION.

ASSUMPSIT. See ACTION; DEPOSIT.
AWARD. See ARBITRATION.

BILLS OF EXCHANGE AND PROMISSORY NOTES.
1. W. drew a promissory note, which did not bear date at any
particular place, but was made negotiable at the bank of the
plaintiffs; it was in favor of C. R. & Son, or order, and
specially endorsed by C. R., the defendant, in their names,
to the plaintiffs, whose bank was at Georgetown, in the District
of Columbia. The note not being paid at maturity, it was on
the day after the third day of grace, presented for payment at
the said bank, to an agent of W. appointed for the purpose of
attending to the payment or renewal of W's. notes held by the
plaintiffs, which being refused, notice of its dishonor was put
into the post office at Georgetown, directed to C. R. the de-
fendant, at Baltimore, in the state of Maryland, where he
resided. W., when the note became due, resided in Prince
George's county, in Maryland. It appeared that it was the
custom of all the banks and merchants in the District of Co-
lumbia to demand payment of notes on the fourth day after
they became due. Held, that the defendant was liable on his
endorsement to the plaintiffs. Raborg v. Bank of Columbia,
1 Har. & Gill, 231.

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2. In an action on a promissory note, drawn in favor of C. & R. and endorsed by R. in their names, to P., the writ was against R. as surviving partner of C., but the declaration was not. It was proved that C. died before the making of the note. Judgment was rendered against R. without stating as surviving partner. On appeal-Judgment affirmed. Ib.

3. A drew a promissory note dated at Georgetown, in the District of Columbia, and there payable sixty days after date, in favor of B, or order, who endorsed it to the plaintiffs, by whom it was discounted. On the first day, after the third day of grace, payment was demanded of this note of A, who not paying it, notice of its dishonor was sent by post to Baltimore, in Maryland, to B, who did not then, nor when he endorsed the note, reside at Georgetown, in the District of Columbia. It appeared that it had been the universal practice of banks and merchants in the District of Columbia, for twenty years, to present negotiable notes due and unpaid, to the drawer for the payment, on the fourth day of grace; that such usage was of public notoriety, and that the demand and notice abovementioned, were in conformity thereto. Held, that B's contract was to be considered as made in reference to this usage; that both he and the drawer looked to the place where the money was to be paid, and the contract performed, and must be presumed to have known this usage, and he was, therefore, liable as endorser. The Bank of Columbia v. Fitzhugh, 1 Har. & Gill, 239. 4. A blank endorsement, by A, of the promissory note of B, payable to C, or order, does not imply a valuable consideration from C to A, and an engagement by A, that B was of ability to pay, and should pay, such note. Wylie v. Lewis, 7 Con. 301.

See USURY.

BOND.

Where the legislature prescribes the substance of a bond, and it is so drawn as to include every obligation imposed by law, and to afford every defence given to it, it will be sufficient, notwithstanding it may be slightly variant from the literal form set out. Per Archer, J. Waters's Representatives v. Riley's Adm'r. 2 Har. & Gill, 305.

See CORPORATION.

BOOK DEBT.

In an action of book debt, the plaintiff is not a competent witness to prove an acknowledgment and promise of the defendant, to take the case out of the statute of limitations. Weed v. Bishop,

7 Con. 128.

CASE STATED. See PRACTICE, 1, 2.

CHANCERY.

1. Where funds are in the court of chancery, and a party petitions to have them applied in discharge of his claim, it has long

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