deserving persons: there is no reason why the State should not enter into competition with other money-lenders. But as society becomes more complex, as money-lending becomes a business, and personal assets more numerous and valuable, and skilled services commanding a high rate of remuneration develop, the system will probably sooner or later disappear.

As it is one which casts considerable light on obscure problems of comparative law, the scientific jurist will hope. that its continuance will for many years prove compatible with the true interests of humanity. Meanwhile, there is every reason why its working should be carefully and dispassionately examined. As has been indicated, the greatest danger to its existence does not now lie in humanitarian sentiment, grounded on false analogies with negro slavery, and stimulated by abuses which are not properly incidents of the practice. It lies rather in the modern exaltation of the State, and in the tendency to break up domestic and quasi-domestic ties, and to hand over the functions connected with them to the supervision of a bureau. If this arbitrary and unsocial tendency can be resisted, and if the custom can only succeed in getting itself styled barutang, or indentured debtorship, or companionage, or something equally agreeable and respectable, there is still a future-if a limited one-for debtslavery.

The events which have been recounted, as attending the establishment of British rule in Pêrak, happened twenty-five years ago. Till the secret history of those times is written, it must remain impossible for anyone, writing with the best intentions, to be secure from totally misapprehending the true nature of events. If, therefore, the present writer should have fallen into mistakes, or should have estimated wrongly the value of competing authorities, all that remains is to ask the critic to believe

that the foregoing pages have been written with the sole purpose of arriving at and elucidating the truth, with regard to the vexed questions with which they deal. Inadequate as they are, it cannot be pretended that this end has, even approximately, been attained. But, in its small measure, it is hoped that this paper may have contributed towards its fulfilment.

Na little book' recently published, a solicitor plain

IN

tively tells of the wiles practised by unscrupulous persons in obtaining goods on credit, and the difficulties that beset creditors when they seek to recover what is due to them. The author, who has evidently had a good deal of experience, seems to think that, seeing how hard it is to squeeze blood out of a stone, some Act should be passed making it a criminal offence for anyone to incur a debt without reasonable expectation of being able to pay it when called upon (the burden of proving such expectation being upon the debtor), and allotting severe punishment to the culprit on his conviction.

Considering the rush of competition in the present day, the necessary freedom of contract, the power which every one has of seeing after his own interests, and the somewhat

1 How to Avoid Payment of Debt. By a Solicitor. London: Simpkin, Marshall, Hamilton, Kent & Co. 1901.

reckless facilities that many traders afford to easily tempted customers to buy things they do not want, it is probable that the aspirations of the author will be relegated to the limbo of dreams never to be fulfilled. But the sug

gestions made, lead to an enquiry into a much larger subject; namely, whether the existing Bankruptcy Acts are all that can be desired.

Let us consider for a minute the history of the Bankruptcy Laws. These laws were not, as the Inspector-General in his report in 1885, somewhat inaccurately stated, originally introduced for the purpose of providing" for the relief of insolvent debtors who were unable otherwise to arrange their affairs," but they were introduced for the purpose of punishing bankrupts. The Act of Henry VIII. was entitled "an Act against such persons as do make bankrupt." The Act of Elizabeth states in the preamble, that, notwithstanding the Act of Henry against bankrupts, "those kinds of persons have and do still increase into great and excessive numbers and are like more to do if some better provision be not made for the repression of them." The first Act of James I. was passed "for the better relief of the creditors against such as shall become bankrupts," and the second (21 Jac. I., c. 19) was made for the same purpose, and also for inflicting corporeal punishment upon the bankrupts in special cases. These facts sufficiently show that the Acts were not passed for the relief of insolvent debtors, and also that bankruptcies were increasing. In the last-mentioned Act it was laid down that these laws were to be "in all things largely and beneficially expounded for the aid, help, and relief of the creditors," and a bankrupt fraudulently concealing his goods or unable to render a just reason why he became bankrupt was to be indicted, and, if found guilty, "shall be set in the pillory in some publick place for the space of two hours, and have one of his or her ears nailed to the pillory,

and cut off." It is to be remembered, too, that all his assets were realised for the benefit of creditors, and that there was no provision at this time for his discharge; so that whatever he might afterwards acquire was equally, with his existing estate, liable to be utilised for his debts. One would have thought that, if legislation could make people moral, these statutes would have had that effect. But when we come to the reign of Anne we find (4 & 5 Anne, c. 17) that "many persons have, and do daily, become bankrupt not so much by reason of losses and unavoidable misfortunes as to the intent to defraud and hinder their creditors of their just debts and duties to them owing." It appears to have been then discovered that it would be as well to coax bankrupts to be honest as to frighten them. While, on the one hand, a bankrupt not surrendering and delivering up all his estate and effects was on conviction to suffer as a felon without the benefit of clergy, he was, on the other, under this Act, if he conformed, to be allowed £5 per cent. out of his estate, not exceeding in the whole £200, provided that such estate produced a dividend of 8s. in the pound, and he was entitled to be discharged from all his debts. If a man had lost £5 in one day or £100 in one year by gambling, he was not to have his discharge.

By the statute 5 George I., c. 24, the bankrupt who surrendered was for the first time protected from arrest in going to, staying with, or coming from the commissioners, in obedience to their summons, and by a statute passed in the succeeding reign, this protection was made continuous for forty-two days after his surrender.

I have thus endeavoured to show that in the earlier laws severity was tried (if putting a man in the pillory, cutting off his ear, or hanging him may be called severity), and that notwithstanding these enactments, bankruptcies grew and flourished, until at last it was deemed wise to bribe the dis

honest trader to become good. Not for his relief, but in the interests of the creditors, the discharge, the allowance, and the protection were dangled before his eyes.

He

We may, I think, pass over the laws which were in force from the time of George II. up to the year 1869, accepting the statement of Sir Robert Collier, the Attorney-General, when he introduced the Bill of that year, as accurate. described the oscillations of the statutory pendulum in relation to Bankruptcy Law. Sixty years before, Lord Eldon had said that in a number of cases under the then law its provisions were little more than stock-in-trade for Commissioners, Assignees, and other officials. The law existing in 1869 was as bad, and had been spoken of in terms of condemnation by the highest legal authorities and the most eminent commercial men. In later times a reaction had occurred, too much in favour of the bankrupt, and, judging from the recent Bankruptcy Laws, their object seemed to have been to protect the bankrupt against the creditors, to enable him to get rid of his debts and liabilities, with the least possible trouble or annoyance to himself, and to facilitate him in defrauding those to whom he was indebted, and in setting them at defiance. Sir R. Collier described or adverted to the scandals which existed under the system then existing owing to officialism, and the negligence and delay which existed in dealing with estates. Creditors were afraid of driving, or even allowing their debtors to go into Bankruptcy. It had become necessary, he said, to inaugurate a new system. There had been lengthened enquiries held, and suggestions made, and it seemed to have been agreed that the sole and proper object of a good Bankruptcy Law was, not to punish the debtor, but to collect the estate of a bankrupt, and to distribute the outcome as fairly, cheaply, and speedily as possible. It was not suggested that bankrupts might not be guilty of special offences in relation to their bankrupt