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unable to touch. We may admit that Public Morality is a phrase to conjure with, and that if it really could be possible to make a nation virtuous by Act of Parliament no one would be likely to find fault with the expense reasonably incurred. Unfortunately the experience derived from some centuries of legislation teaches us that such a result is not to be obtained by such means. We have seen in relation to bankruptcies that in the earlier days, though a man remained continuously liable to arrest from his debts, and dishonesty on his part might be punished with the pillory, and the loss of his ear, or even by death itself, it did not conduce towards an improved moral tone. "Tot volumina legis" was answered by "Crescit in orbe dolus." The main results of many statutes has been that people have evolved devices for evading them.

Since 1883 two enactments have been passed to which reference should be made.

Arrangement Act, 1887.
Bankruptcy Act, 1890.

The first is the Deeds of

The second the Amending

The Act of 1883 was never a popular Act. As a rule creditors did not like it. Neither did debtors, nor solicitors, nor accountants. The dictatorial manners of many of the first officials had much to do with this, but, apart from this objection, it was felt by all the other parties interested that they could often do much better for themselves than the somewhat hard and fast limitations of a Bankruptcy Court and an Official Receiver could do for them. The contracting of the debts had been private, and there was no reason why the solution of those debts should not be private too.

As for public morality, any ordinary creditor would prefer five shillings, or even three-and-fourpence in the pound paid quietly and without any fuss to a dividend of one-andeightpence coupled with the glorification of a public principle. So private arrangements with creditors grew. It was clear that in some instances it would be better for

all concerned that any creditor who was disposed to stand out and be troublesome should be settled with on his own terms, and, if the other creditors chose to assent to this or authorise a trustee to negotiate with the opposing party, there could be no objection. These things could not be managed under the Act, or, if managed, not without expense, publicity, and delay. Therefore, as I have said, private arrangements grew, and with this result Publicity was not the only thing which was avoided. Fees which in bankruptcy cases would have flowed into the Bankruptcy Estates Account were not paid. For this and other reasons it was deemed wise to pass the Deeds of Arrangement Act, 1887, to enforce publicity by means of registration of all such deeds. Of course, fees were to be paid on registration. It is needless to say that in many cases the Act has been evaded. If a debtor induces a friend to go round to the creditors and buy up their debts for much less than the face value, and afterwards settles with that friend, there is nothing to register. There are other ways of avoiding the necessity for registration.

The main feature of the Bankruptcy Act, 1890, is the limitation of the power of Judges to grant a bankrupt his discharge. It seems that Judges, being human, and not mere atoms of a Government department, used too much discretion when applications for discharge were made. They looked at the case all round, and, if they thought that the offence was a slight one, or that more good would be done by granting an immediate discharge, or only with a short suspension, they decided accordingly. It is easily to be understood how terribly wrong this must have appeared to the official mind. A remedy was found by thisAct, under the 8th section of which when any of the offences against public morality not being crimes are proved against a bankrupt, the judge is forced, whether he thinks it right or not, to refuse the discharge or suspend it for two years, or until a

dividend of not less than 10s. has been paid, or make the bankrupt assent to judgment to be enforced against his future earnings for the whole or a part of his unpaid debts, which in nine cases out of ten is a farcical proceeding.

Let us see how this law has worked. It has, as I have said, never been popular. In the year 1883, under the old law, there were 8,555 proceedings commenced, as I have before stated. In 1899, according to the InspectorGeneral's Report, the total number of Receiving Orders made all over the country were only 4,083, less than half the record of 1883. There were deeds of arrangement registered 2,974. Out of the 4,083 Receiving Orders only 37 approvals of composition and oneof a scheme of arrangement were given. 2,893 adjudications were made on debtor's own petition and 3,392 out of the 4,045 (4,083 -38) were dealt with as small estates. Bearing in mind that the population and trade of the country has increased, we can form some estimate of the favour with which the Bankruptcy Law and its officials are regarded by the public.

Can we put the reduction in business to a corresponding improvement in public morality? Hardly. If we were to add to the registered deeds of arrangement, the number of failures that are settled without there being anything to register, we should probably find but little difference in the failures recorded in 1883 and those which take place in one form or another in the present day.

In the opinion of the writer, a creditor now rarely petitions against a debtor unless actuated by personal spite and a desire to make things as unpleasant as possible. The vast majority of debtors' petitions are filed in the country, and are put on when there are but small assets.

The punishments of the Act are confined to those persons only who apply for discharges. They appear to be about one-fifth of those who have been adjudicated bankrupts, so

that we may take it that the remaining four-fifths do not care whether they get discharged or not. It is true that an undischarged bankrupt, obtaining credit to the extent of £20 or upwards from any person without informing such person that he is an undischarged bankrupt, is liable to be indicted for misdemeanour; but most bankrupts in these days are quite equal to the occasion. Most of them have a wife or friend or relation in whose name, and nominally in whose behalf, they can continue to trade. They do not pledge their own credit, but the persons with whom they deal are quite satisfied that they will get paid, and trust accordingly. The banking account, if there is any, is in the name of the nominee, whether wife or otherwise, and the bankrupt signs cheques, " p.p.," or under an authority previously given. In the hurry of commercial life creditors soon get tired of looking after a debtor who does not pay. Even the Official Receivers and the Board of Trade find the business of the current day sufficient for them, and unless the man comes notoriously into a legacy on his own account, a thing which testators usually take care shall not be the case, the whole matter passes into oblivion.

The writer has no intention of finding fault with Official Receivers. They may be taken to be high-minded and honourable men, a little, perhaps, at times puffed up with a sense of their own importance, but not more so than might be naturally expected. The fault is in the system which has crystallised them into, too often, mere representatives of red tapeism, and has fixed upon their minds the idea that everything which in anyway runs counter to the Bankruptcy Act must necessarily be opposed to public morality; that a creditor commits a moral fraud if he does not insist on his debtor's estate being wound up in the Bankruptcy Court, and express his willingness to receive only a proportionate dividend out of such portion of

the debtor's estate as may be left after the same has been sold, often at a disadvantage, and has been reduced by the mulct necessary to keep the officers of public moralityin their places; and that a debtor also commits a moral fraud if he does not voluntarily submit to the annoyance of all the bankruptcy processes, and does not permit himself to be punished by two years' suspension of his discharge if his estate does not realise ten shillings in the pound.

There are several ways of placing the question on a proper footing, but I will only deal with two which appear to be most consonant with existing feelings. Either let us revert to the old Act of 1869 modifying the powers of delegation of judicial functions as before referred to, and confining the proxies to those who can really represent the creditors, altering too, if need be, the majorities by which resolutions can be carried, and giving to Judges greater facilities and powers of examining into the reasonableness of the proposals to be put before them; or let the existing Acts be altered and made far more elastic than they are at present. Let the powers of the Official Receiver be reduced, and the semi-judicial position that they at present occupy be taken away from them.

It is impossible in the limited space at the writer's disposal to do more than indicate very shortly the details of the proposed modifications in three or four of the more important proceedings.

The first great step in any bankruptcy, after the Court has made a receiving order, is the holding of the first meeting of creditors, who are then supposed to decide whether they will accept a composition or scheme if offered by the debtor, or direct that the estate shall be administered in bankruptcy. In the latter case they can nominate a trustee unless they wish to leave the matter in the hands of the Official Receiver.

The decision upon these points is essentially a matter for

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