until some one should receive it under an expired contract, which could never happen. He also gave them the monopoly of filling all failures in future. This exercise of unauthorized power renders the whole contract null and void.

SECOND. The plaintiffs have been fully compensated for all the services actually rendered by or for them in transporting the mail.

The plaintiffs did not carry the mail at all from San Antonio to El Paso. Skillman took it once only, on the first of July, and on his own account. This was before the contract with the plaintiffs.

It is true, they took the mail from Wasson at El Paso, and out of the hands of the regular contractor, to carry from there to Santa Fé. But this was not within their contract, which only provides for carrying until such time as the mail should be received by the contractor at San Antonio or Santa Fé. When that occurred, which happened on the first of August, at San Antonio, then the right to carry and be compensated ceased. It follows that the only transportation for which compensation could be demanded under the contract was limited to carrying from Santa Fé, and this must be limited to the time when the contractor failed to be ready at that place or at San Antonio to take the mail. This limits the time of lawful transportation from Santa Fé to the month of July, and that to carrying one way, being half-service for one month, and they only took it at Santa Fé three times before the contractor called for it. Whereas they were paid for full service for the months of July and August, and half-trip in September. So it appears that the plaintiffs have been, in fact, over compensated for the services actually rendered under authorized employment, and more than they were legally entitled to.

THIRD. The whole transaction on the part of the plaintiffs and the postmasters at Santa Fé and El Paso, after the arrival of the July mail at El Paso from San Antonio, and after the demand of it at Santa Fé by Wasson, was a fraud upon the latter and upon the Post Office Department, and therefore the plaintiff's cannot recover.

From the record, it is perfectly apparent that the plaintiffs and these postmasters were fully apprised of the contract with Wasson, and understood all about his efforts to perform it, and were engaged in a common purpose to prevent his doing so, and that the contract between the postmaster at Santa Fé and the plaintiffs had for its object to defeat the execution of that contract, and that the acts of all of them were designed to accomplish the same purpose. This want of good faith must prevent a recovery.

FOURTH. There being no authorized and valid contract between the department and the plaintiffs, the latter are only entitled to such compensation as their actual services were really worth.

The contract as made was unauthorized, and therefore not valid, and cannot measure the plaintiffs' compensation. In such cases the rule of compensation is, to pay what the services are really worth. Nothing more can be legally claimed. In this case the plaintiffs

have not shown what said services were actually worth. They having omitted all direct proof upon the subject, we must resort to the best evidence which the record contains applicable to the question. This is to be found in Wasson's contract, in which he stipulated to carry the mail both ways and perform certain incidental services, at the rate of $16,750 per year. Giddings, when he succeeded to the rights of Wasson, agreed to carry the mail and perform these other services at the same rate. This would be at the rate of about $1,395 per month. The season when the plaintiffs carried the mail was in the summer and fall, when grass was plenty on the route and the roads good. It was worth much less per month than during the winter, when grass is scarce and the roads wet and bad. If they had carried the mail both ways during the whole time charged, (six months,) and at the rate of Wasson's contract, the service would only amount to $8,375, being only $2,517 more than they have been already paid. But they only carried it one way, and in that case would only be entitled to half that sum, to wit: $4,287, and, consequently, they have already received $1,571 more than the services were worth. Surely they cannot be entitled to anything more as a matter of equity and good conscience. They have already received as much into $2,617 as they ought to have received if they had in good faith actually carried the mail both ways for six months. But they neither carried the mail both ways, nor did they act in good faith. Upon no ground are they entitled to more than they have actually received.

R. H. GILLET,

APRIL 18, 1859.

Solicitor.

IN THE COURT OF CLAIMS.

May 21, 1860.

ELIAS BREVOORT et al. vs. THE UNITED STATES.

LORING, J., delivered the opinion of the court.

The petitioners set forth in their petition that under a contract made with the United States July 2, 1854, (and shown in the record,) they carried the mail upon route No. 12900, from Santa Fé, by the way of El Paso to San Antonio de Bazar, for the term of six months; that the United States have paid them for only two and a half months' service, and are now indebted to them in the sum of sixteen hundred and fifty dollars.

The evidence shows (p. 13, &c.,) that the regular mail contractor on the route was David Wasson, and that on his failure to present himself for service at the commencement of his term, viz: July 1, 1844, Mr. Miller, the postmaster at Santa Fé, contracted with Breevoort & Houghton for temporary mail service, until such time as the regular mail contractor should appear and commence his service; that under

this contract the petitioners carried the mail from Santa Fé, the northern extremity of the route, by the way of El Paso, the intermediate post, to San Antonio, the southern extremity of the route, on the downward trip until December 1, 1854, and on the upward trip from El Paso to Santa Fé till November, 1854, when Mr. Giddings, the agent of Wasson, carried the mail on the upward trip from El Paso to Santa Fé, (pp. 8, 9.)

It also appears that Mr. Wasson, by his carrier, rendered himself for service on the route, at San Antonio, August 1, 1854, and there received the mail from the postmaster, Mr. Brown, and carried it to El Paso, and continued to do so thereafter; that on the 17th of August Mr. Wasson's carrier demanded the mails of Mr. Hubbel, the postmaster at El Paso, and in September, October, November, and December of Mr. Miller, the postmaster at Santa Fé, but these postmasters refused the applications of Mr. Wasson's carrier, on the ground that they were not satisfied that he was duly qualified and authorized to receive it, and they continued to deliver the mails at their respective offices to the petitioners, who continued to carry them, as before stated. In this conflict of claims, the right of the petitioners as against the regular contractor must depend on the words of their contract, and its stipulation is express that it was to continue until such time as the mail should be received at Santa Fé or San Antonio aforesaid by any contractor or contractors who shall have taken the mail for the year beginning July 1, 1854." Wasson was such contractor, (pp. 13, 14, 15,) and the evidence is clear, and put in by the petitioners, (p. 10,) that Wasson applied for and received the mail and "made his commencement of service under his contract at San Antonio, August 1, 1854." From that time, therefore, the contract with the petitioners was determined, and their rights under it to carry the mail ceased; at that time, also, the mail was refused them at San Antonio, and that was substantially notice to them, if under their contract notice was necessary, that the regular contractor had applied for and received the mail at the place stipulated. That the postmaster at San Antonio delivered the mail to Wasson's carrier gives the presumption that he was qualified to receive it, and there is no evidence to the contrary, and indeed Woods, the carrier of Wasson, whose affidavit was admitted and used without objection at the hearing, testifies that "on the 1st of August, 1854, he was sworn as carrier on the said route for said contractor.' And no evidence is necessary that the carrier was qualified when he applied at El Paso and Santa Fé, for by the contract the application at San Antonio was all that was required to determine it. This the petitioners were bound to know, and their rights cannot be extended, nor the rights of the regular contractor reduced, by the procedure of the postmasters at Santa Fé and El Paso.

It then appears that the United States have paid the petitioners for carrying the mail in July and August for the entire round trips, and for the downward trip in September, and this was more than they were entitled to under their contract upon the case shown here.

On the whole case we are of opinion that the petitioners are not entitled to the relief they claim.

36TH CONGRESS, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES. ( REPORT C. C. 2d Session. No. 267.

{

JAMES W. KNAGGS, ADMINISTRATOR OF WHITMORE KNAGGS.

DECEMBER 18, 1860.-Reported from the Court of Claims, committed to a Committee of the Whole House, and ordered to be printed.

The COURT OF CLAIMS submitted the following

REPORT.

To the honorable the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States in Congress assembled:

The Court of Claims respectfully presents the following documents as the report in the case of

JAMES W. KNAGGS, ADMINISTRATOR OF WHITMORE KNAGGS, vs. THE UNITED STATES.

1. The petition of the claimant.

2. Testator's will and proceedings of the court of probate thereon, transmitted to the House of Representatives

3. Other documentary evidence of the claimant transmitted to the House of Representatives.

4. Evidence of the government transmitted to the House of Representatives.

5. Claimant's brief.

6. Solicitor's brief.

7. Opinion of the court adverse to the claim.

By order of the Court of Claims.

In testimony whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the [L. S] A. D. 1860. seal of said court, at Washington, this 17th day of December, s]

SAM'L H. HUNTINGTON,

Chief Clerk Court of Claims.

UNITED STATES COURT OF CLAIMS.

To the honorable the judges of the Court of Claims:

The petition of James W. Knaggs, administrator with the will annexed of Whitmore Knaggs, respectfully represents:

That his testator, Whitmore Knaggs, for some years prior to 1812, was in the service of the United States as Indian interpreter and assistant agent.

That when the war commenced with the Indians and the government of Great Britain, in 1812, the said Whitmore Knaggs was placed in command of a company of Michigan militia.

That the said Whitmore Knaggs was, in his own right, the owner of a farm at Spring Wells, rear Detroit, on which were erected a dwelling-house, out-houses, storehouses, barns, and stables.

By order of the officers of the United States commanding in this district the said property of said Knaggs was taken for the use of the United States.

His storehouses were used as a place of deposit of public military stores, arms, &c. His houses, out-houses, barns, &c., were used as barracks, and his farm converted into a military station, at which troops, partly regular and partly militia, were stationed, under the command of a regular officer of the army of the United States.

By this act of the United States this property was severed from the mass of peaceful individual property; was appropriated to the use of the United States, and had a hostile military character impressed upon it.

When the British and their Indian allies invaded the north western portion of the United States, in 1812, this property was seized, the troops of the United States driven from it, and, on the day before Hull's surrender, the property was sacked, the buildings were seriously damaged and mutilated, and personal property of great value taken or destroyed by the enemy.

Your petitioner has no doubt, and therefore avers, that this property was thus damaged, taken and destroyed, because of its occupancy by the United States and the military character thus impressed on it.

Your petitioner is advised that the United States became bound to indemnify his testator for these losses, under the fifth amended article of the Constitution of the United States.

The Congress of the United States, on the 9th day of April, 1816, passed an act authorizing payment. (See St. L., vol. 3, page 261, chap. 40.) This act was amended by an act passed 3d March, 1817, (vol. 3 St. L., page 297, chap. 110,) and was further amended by an act passed 20th April, 1818, (vol. 3 St. L., page 465, chap. 124.)

The testator, Whitmore Knaggs, presented his claim for these damages to the government, and it was referred to Richard Bland Lee, the commissioner appointed under this act.

To ascertain fully the facts in this case, a sub-commissioner was appointed, and the commissioner took much testimony, which is now in these papers. R. B. Lee, the principal commissioner, reported the