book I. The moral criterionClarendon Press, 1907 |
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abstraction action actual admission admitted altruistic animals Aristotle axioms Benevolence Bishop Butler categorical imperative character circumstances conception condemn conduct Conscience consequences contradiction course desire for pleasure disinterested desires doctrine doubt egoistic elements emotion equal ethical judgement experience F. H. Bradley fact faculty feeling happiness Hedonism hedonistic Psychology Henry Sidgwick higher human hysteron-proteron idea ideal implied impossible impulses individual instinct intellectual Intuitionism intuitions involves judge judgements of value Kant Kant's Kantian less logical man's matter means merely metaphysical mind moral consciousness moral judgements Moral Law Moral Philosophy moral value motive nature object pain persons Philosophy pleasant point of view possible practical Principia Ethica principle Professor Sidgwick promote pronounce psychological psychological Hedonism purely question rational rationalistic Reason recognize regard rule satisfaction seems social supposed T. H. Green tendency theory things thought true truth ultimate universal Utilitarianism Virtue volition Well-being whole wrong
Priljubljeni odlomki
Stran 51 - The creed which accepts as the foundation of morals, Utility, or the Greatest Happiness Principle, holds that actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness.
Stran 25 - It is quite compatible with the principle of utility to recognise the fact, that some kinds of pleasure are more desirable and more valuable than others. It would be absurd that while, in estimating all other things, quality is considered as well as quantity, the estimation of pleasures should be supposed to depend on quantity alone.
Stran 287 - Punishment is punishment, only where it is deserved. We pay the penalty because we owe it, and for no other reason; and if punishment is inflicted for any other reason whatever than because it is merited by wrong, it is a gross immorality, a crying injustice, an abominable crime, and not what it pretends to be.
Stran 25 - If one of the two is, by those who are competently acquainted with both, placed so far above the other that they prefer it, even though knowing it to be attended with a greater amount of discontent, and would not resign it for any quantity of the other pleasure which their nature is capable of, we are justified in ascribing to the preferred enjoyment a superiority in quality so far outweighing quantity as to render it, in comparison, of small account.
Stran 285 - Juridical punishment can never be administered merely as a means for promoting another good either with regard to the criminal himself or to civil society, but must in all cases be imposed only because the individual on whom it is inflicted has committed a crime.
Stran 50 - There is nothing originally more desirable about money than about any heap of glittering pebbles. Its worth is solely that of the things which it will buy; the desires for other things than itself, which it is a means of gratifying. Yet the love of money is not only one of the strongest moving forces of human life, but money is, in many cases, desired in and for itself; the desire to possess it is often stronger than the desire to use it, and goes on increasing when all the desires which point to...
Stran 144 - He has shewn beyond all contradiction, that virtue is naturally the interest or happiness, and vice the misery, of such a creature as man, placed in the circumstances which we are in this world. But suppose there are particular exceptions : a case which this author was unwilling to put, and yet surely it is to be put : or suppose a case which he has put and determined, that of a sceptic not convinced of this happy tendency of virtue, or being of a contrary opinion.
Stran 26 - Few human creatures would consent to be changed into any of the lower animals for a promise of the fullest allowance of a beast's pleasures ; no intelligent human being would consent to be a fool, no instructed person would be an ignoramus, no person of feeling and conscience would be selfish and base, even though they should be persuaded that the fool, the dunce, or the rascal is better satisfied with his lot than they are with theirs.
Stran 131 - So act as to treat humanity, whether in thine own person or in that of any other, in every case as an end withal, never as a means only.
Stran 287 - ... for no other reason; and if punishment is inflicted for any other reason whatever than because it is merited by wrong, it is a gross immorality, a crying injustice, an abominable crime, and not what it pretends to be. We may have regard for whatever considerations we please — our own convenience, the good of society, the benefit of the offender; we are fools, and worse, if we fail to do so. Having once the right to punish, we may modify the punishment according to the useful and the pleasant,...