Letter of the Secretary of War: Transmitting Report on the Organization of the Army of the Potomac, and of Its Campaigns in Virginia and Maryland, Under the Command of Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan, from July 26, 1861, to November 7, 1862
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1864 - 242 strani
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advance approaches army arrived artillery Assistant attack August bank battery battle bridge brigade camp campaign Captain carry cavalry Colonel column command communication condition corps cover crossed defence delay despatch direction division duty enemy enemy's entire field fire force formed forward Franklin front G. B. MCCLELLAN general-in-chief give ground guard guns H. W. HALLECK Harper's Ferry heavy hill hold House immediately important infantry instructions land leave Major Manassas Maryland means miles Monroe morning move movement necessary night occupied October officers once operations organization pass Pennsylvania Porter position possible Potomac present President probably railroad re-enforcements reached rear rebels received regard regiments reserve Richmond river road Secretary secure sent side soon strong success Sumner supplies taken telegraphed thousand transportation troops United vicinity Virginia volunteers Washington whole York Yorktown
Stran 43 - My dear Sir : — You and I have distinct and different plans for a movement of the Army of the Potomac — yours to be down the Chesapeake, up the Rappahannock to Urbana, and across land to the terminus of the railroad on the York River; mine to move directly to a point on the railroad southwest of Manassas. If you will give me satisfactory answers to the following questions, I shall gladly yield my plan to yours.
Stran 189 - General Stuart will detach a squadron of cavalry to accompany the commands of Generals Longstreet, Jackson and McLaws, and with the main body of the cavalry will cover the route of the army and bring up all stragglers that may have been left behind. "The...
Stran 219 - The President directs that you cross the Potomac and give battle to the enemy, or drive him south.
Stran 83 - My explicit order that Washington should, by the judgment of all the commanders of army corps, be left entirely secure, had been neglected. It was precisely this that drove me to detain McDowell.
Stran 115 - I shall be in perfect readiness to move forward and take Richmond the moment McCall reaches here and the ground will admit the passage of artillery.
Stran 157 - It is by no means certain that the reduction of these fortifications would not require considerable time — perhaps as much as those at Yorktown. " This delay might not only be fatal to the health of your army, but in the mean time...
Stran 143 - I but give it as my opinion that with the aid of the gunboats and the reinforcements mentioned above, you can hold your present position — provided, and so long as, you can keep the James River open below you. If you are not tolerably confident you can keep the James River open, you had better remove as soon as possible. I do not remember that you have expressed any apprehension as to the danger of having your communication cut on the river below you, yet I do not suppose it can have escaped your...
Stran 99 - ... men ; and if you succeed in saving the bridges, you will secure a line of railroad for supplies in addition to the one you now have. Can you not do this almost as well as not, while you are building the Chickahominy bridges?
Stran 50 - In thirty-seven days from the time I received the order in Washington, (and most of it was accomplished in thirty days,) these vessels transported from Perryville, Alexandria, and Washington to Fort Monroe (the place of departure having been changed, which caused delay,) 121,500 men, 14,592 animals, 1,150 wagons, 44 batteries, 74 ambulances, besides pontoon bridges, telegraph materials, and the enormous quantity of equipage, &c., required for an army of such magnitude.
Stran 63 - This morning I felt constrained to order Blenker's division to Fremont, and I write this to assure you that I did so with great pain, understanding that you would wish it otherwise. If you could know the full pressure of the case, I am confident that you would justify it, even beyond a mere acknowledgment that the commander-in-chief may order what he pleases.