Opinion of the Court. It results that even if this be not an action "to procure a judgment, other than for a sum of money, on the ground of fraud," within the meaning of the New York Code of Procedure, the limitation of six years, being applied here, does not, as adjudged below, commence from the commission of the alleged frauds. Can the suit be maintained if the cause of action is to be deemed to have accrued from the discovery of the fraud? In Burke v. Smith, 16 Wall. 390, 401, where the local statute prescribed six years for the commencement of actions for fraud, the court, after observing that equity acts or refuses to act in analogy to the statute, said: "We think a court of equity will not be moved to set aside a fraudulent transaction at the suit of one who has been quiescent during a period longer than that fixed by the statute of limitations, after he had knowledge of the fraud or after he was put upon inquiry with the means of knowledge accessible to him." Without inquiring whether the plaintiff was not guilty of such gross laches, in applying for relief, as deprived him of all right to the aid of equity, and giving him the benefit of the limitation of six years, to be computed from the discovery of the fraud, there seems to be even then no escape from the conclusion that the suit was not brought in time. Seven years, lacking only seven days, elapsed after the discovery of the frauds by the plaintiff's testator before suit was brought. The plaintiff, however, contends that he had seven years within which to sue. This position is supposed to be justified by the New York statute, which declares that "the time which shall have elapsed between the death of any person and the granting of letters testamentary or of administration on his estate, not exceeding six months, and the period of six months after the granting of such letters, shall not be deemed any part of the time limited by any law for the commencement of actions by executors or administrators." Rev. Stat. N. Y. pt. iii, c. 8, tit. 3, art. 1, § 9, 1st ed. vol. 2, p. 448, 6th ed. 2, p. 733. [Sess. Laws, 1880, vol. 1, p. 367, c. 245.] If this statute has any application to a case where the cause of action accrued in the lifetime of the testator or intestate, it Opinion of the Court. cannot avail the plaintiff. It does not give the party claiming the benefit of its provisions both of the two periods of six months therein mentioned, but only such time, not exceeding six months, as elapsed after the death of the testator or intestate before the granting of letters, and the additional time of six months after the granting of letters. Here only sixteen days intervened between the death and the granting of letters testamentary. In computing the time for suing there must be excluded only these sixteen days and the six months immediately succeeding that period. In other words-applying that statute to the case in hand - the plaintiff had only six years six months and sixteen days, after the discovery on April 16, 1873, of the alleged frauds, within which to sue; whereas, this action was not brought until seven years, lacking only seven days, after the alleged frauds were discovered. We do not conceive that the time of granting the ancillary letters testamentary in New York can affect the question. The will having been proved in Illinois, the place of domicil, there was nothing to prevent the immediate issue of letters upon it in New York. By the laws of that state, no further probate was necessary; a certified copy deposited in the office of the surrogate was all that was required. As this was in the executor's power to have done at any time, he can hardly claim that his own voluntary delay should extend the period which equity considers reasonable for the institution of a suit. 2 N. Y. Rev. Stat. (2d ed.), marg. paging 67, § 82; Civil Code, $2695. The decree is affirmed. Syllabus. CRESCENT CITY LIVE STOCK COMPANY v. BUTCHERS' UNION SLAUGHTER-HOUSE COMPANY. ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA. Submitted January 6, 1887. - Decided January 24, 1887. According to the law and practice of Louisiana, the Supreme Court of that state, in cases brought before it by appeal from inferior courts, determines the matter in controversy, as presented by the record, both as to fact and law, without regard to the particular rulings of the courts below, and its opinion, showing the grounds of its judgment, constitutes part of the record to be reviewed in this court, upon writ of error, when the question for determination is whether the Supreme Court of the state decided a Federal question, necessary to the decision of the case, without respect to the rulings of the inferior state court. In Louisiana, an action for malicious prosecution is founded on the principles, and is subject to the defences, established by the common law; and in order to sustain it, it is necessary to show: (1) that the suit had terminated unfavorably to the prosecutor; (2) that in bringing it the prosecutor had acted without probable cause; (3) that he was actuated by legal malice, that is, by improper or sinister motives; and that these three elements concur. The question of probable cause is a question of law, where the facts are undisputed; and the judgment of the court, in favor of the plaintiff, is conclusive proof of probable cause for the prosecution of the suit alleged to be malicious, notwithstanding its subsequent reversal by an appellate court, unless it is shown to have been obtained by means of fraud. This rule seems to reconcile the apparent contradiction in the authorities, is well grounded in reason, fair and just to the parties, and consistent with the principle on which the action for malicious prosecution is founded. The judgments and decrees of the circuit courts of the United States, sitting in a particular state, are to be accorded in the courts of that state, whether as the foundation of an action, or of a defence, either by plea or in proof, such effect, and such effect only, as would be accorded in similar circumstances to the judgments and decrees of a state tribunal of equal authority; and whether such due effect has been given by a state court to a judgment or decree of a court of the United States is a Federal question within the jurisdiction of this court, on a writ of error to the Supreme Court of the state. The decree of the Circuit Court of the United States, relied on by the plaintiff in error in this case, as a defence, was sufficient evidence of probable cause for the prosecution of the suit, notwithstanding its rever Opinion of the Court. sal, on appeal, by this court. It does not detract from its effect that in another previous suit, between the plaintiff in error and another defendant, the Supreme Court of Louisiana had decided the questions of law on which alone his right depended adversely to him. THIS was an action to recover on a bond. The case which makes the Federal question is stated in the opinion of the court. Mr. Assistant Attorney General Maury and Mr. Robert Mott for plaintiffs in error. Mr. E. Howard McCaleb and Mr. B. R. Forman for defendant in error. MR. JUSTICE MATTHEWS delivered the opinion of the court. This is a writ of error bringing into review a judgment of the Supreme Court of the State of Louisiana, reported in 37 La. Ann. 874. The Federal question arising upon the record presented for our consideration is, whether the Supreme Court of Louisiana in its determination of the case gave due effect to a certain decree of the Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Louisiana, in a previous litigation between the same parties. That question is presented upon the following case. The plaintiff in error is a corporation created by the laws of Louisiana, which, by an act of the legislature of that state, passed March 8, 1869, was invested with the sole and exclusive privilege of conducting and carrying on the live-stock landing and slaughter-house business within the city of New Orleans and the parishes of Orleans, Jefferson, and St. Bernard. The validity of this monopoly was sustained by the decision of this court in the Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall. 36, on the ground that this grant of exclusive right or privilege was a police regulation for the health and comfort of the people within the power of the state legislature, and not in violation of any provision of the Constitution of the United States. The company continued thenceforward to use and enjoy its exclusive Opinion of the Court. privileges until the adoption by the people of Louisiana of a new state constitution in the year 1879. That constitution contained the following articles : "ARTICLE 248. The police juries of the several parishes, and the constituted authorities of all incorporated municipalities of the State, shall alone have the power of regulating the slaughtering of cattle and other live-stock within their respective limits; provided no monopoly or exclusive privilege shall exist in this state, nor such business be restricted to the land or houses of any individual or corporation; provided the ordinances designating places for slaughtering shall obtain the concurrent approval of the board of health or other sanitary organization." "ARTICLE 258. The monopoly features in the charter of any corporation now existing in the State, save such as may be contained in the charters of railroad companies, are hereby abolished." The city of New Orleans, by ordinances adopted in 1881, proceeded to declare, under Art. 248 of the constitution, within what limits in the parish of Orleans animals, intended for food, might be slaughtered, in which the Board of Health of the State of Louisiana concurred. In March, 1880, the Butchers' Union Slaughter-House and Live-Stock Landing Company, the defendant in error, became incorporated under the General Law of Louisiana, and was authorized by its charter "to erect, at any point or place in the parish of Orleans, wharves, stables, sheds, yards, and buildings necessary to land, stable, shelter, protect, and preserve all kinds of horses, mules, cattle, and other animals, for the purpose of carrying on the live-stock landing and slaughter-house business, and for the purpose of sheltering and protecting all such cattle or other animals which may be sent to said company destined for slaughter; and the said company shall, as soon as practicable, build and complete a slaughter-house; also a sufficient number of sheds and stables and other buildings as may be deemed necessary for the carrying on said slaughtering business." This company having begun to acquire the necessary plant for conducting the live-stock and slaughtering business, in pur |