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Opinion of the Court.

stood upon the exemption contained in its charter. Any stock issued by it, and sold to aid in the construction of such a branch road, would, in that case, have been on the same footing in all respects as other stock it may have issued; and its main and branch lines would have been parts of the same system, controlled by the board of directors as they deemed proper. But the company elected not to adopt that course, for the reason, perhaps, that it could not, in that mode, have raised the money necessary to build a branch road. In the condition in which all the railroads of Missouri were left by the civil war, it would have been difficult to raise money to build branch roads, if their future was to be endangered by connection with main lines which needed repairs, and the corporations owning which were without credit. It was, doubtless, for that reason, the St. Joseph and Iowa Railroad Company, instead of constructing a branch road, under the charter of 1857, determined to avail itself of the provisions of the statute of 1868, which permitted it to construct and maintain what is called a branch road, but what, in fact, would be a road having only nominal connection with the main line of the company.

The branch roads to which the charter of the St. Joseph and Iowa Railroad Company referred were, in our judgment, such as would be subject to the same control and management as its main line, and not roads that were branch roads only in name, but were distinct lines, operated solely with reference to the interests and pursuant to the directions of those holding stock therein, irrespective of the necessities of the main line.

To avoid the conclusion that there was a purpose to devise a plan whereby railroad property should be exempt from taxation, which the constitution of 1865 intended should be taxed, we must assume that the legislature intended to invite railroad corporations having general power under their charters to construct branch roads, to waive the exercise of such power, and construct roads under the provisions of the act of 1868 which, although not granting an immunity from taxation, yet afforded peculiar protection to those whose money might be used in such construction.

To say the least, it is not clear that the legislature intended

Syllabus.

that the exemption from taxation, given by such charters as that granted to the St. Joseph and Iowa Railroad Company, should be extended to branch roads constructed under the act of 1868. As that statute does not grant immunity from taxation to roads constructed under its provisions, and as the system established by it is complete in itself without reference to other legislative enactments, the present claim to exemption must be denied; for it is the settled doctrine of this court that an immunity from taxation by the state will not be recognized unless granted in terms too plain to be mistaken. Providence Bank v. Billings, 4 Pet. 514 ; Philadelphia, Wilmington & Baltimore Railroad v. Maryland, 10 How. 376; Memphis & Little Rock Railroad v. Commissioners, 112 U. S. 609, 617; Southwestern Railroad v. Wright, 116 U. S. 231, 236; Vicksburg, &c., Railroad v. Dennis, 116 U. S. 665, 667.

As our conclusion upon this point accords with that of the state court, and is sufficient to dispose of the whole case, we omit any consideration of other questions presented in argument. Judgment affirmed.

SCHLEY v. PULLMAN CAR COMPANY.

ERROR TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS.

Submitted January 6, 1887. Decided March 7, 1887.

An irregular act of practice by an attorney of record rebuked.

A deed, dated May 26, 1856, by C. L., grautor, described as " sister and heirat-law of H. M.," and as "of the county of St. Clair and state of Michigan," which conveyed to the grantee a tract of land in Illinois, and was signed and sealed by C. L. and by W. L., the name of W. L. not appearing in the granting clause of the deed, and which was acknowledged May 27, 1856, by said "C. L. and W. L. her husband," held sufficient to pass said title of husband and wife, under the statute of Illinois of February 22, 1847, then in force, respecting the conveyance of lands or real estate situate in Illinois by a feme covert not residing within the state, and respecting her joining with her husband in the execution of the deed.

A magistrate's certificate, attached to a deed of land in Illinois, that on the 27th of May, 1856, personally came C. L. and W. L., her husband, "known

Opinion of the Court.

to me to be the persons who executed the foregoing instrument, and acknowledged the same to be their free act and deed," is equivalent to stating that they came before the officer, and were personally known to him to be the real persons who subscribed the deed, and in this respect complied with the requirements of the statutes of Illinois then in force. An officer's certificate of the acknowledgment on the 27th May, 1856, of a deed of land in Illinois by a married woman, showing her privy examination separate and apart from her husband, and which shows that she, "fully understanding the contents of the foregoing instrument, acknowledged," &c., is a sufficient compliance with the statutes of the state in force at that time respecting the communicating the contents of such a deed to her.

EJECTMENT. Plea, general issue. Plaintiff sued out this writ of error. opinion of the court.

Judgment for defendant.

The case is stated in the

Mr. S. Corning Judd, Mr. Albert Ritchie, Mr. W. Ritchie, Mr. E. B. Esher, and Mr. E. S. Judd, for plaintiff in error.

Mr. Alfred Ennis for defendant in error.

MR. JUSTICE IIARLAN delivered the opinion of the court.

This is an action of ejectment, in which the plaintiff in error claims title to certain real estate in Cook County, Illinois, of which Pullman's Palace Car Company is in possession. A jury having been waived, the case was tried by the court, pursuant to a stipulation between the parties, that judgment should be entered for the defendant if the court was of opinion that a certain deed was valid and binding as a conveyance by husband and wife of the real estate therein described.

The deed and the certificate of acknowledgment annexed thereto, referred to in the stipulation, is as follows:

"THIS INDENTURE, made this twenty-sixth day of May, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and fifty-six, witnesseth: That I, Christina Lynn, sister and heir-at-law of Henry Millspaugh, deceased, who was a recruit of Lieutenant T. W. Denton, of Thirteenth Regiment, United States Infantry, war of 1812, with Great Britain, of the county of St. Clair, and State of Michigan, party of the first part, in con

Opinion of the Court.

sideration of the sum of forty-three dollars in hand paid by Milton & Thomas C. McEwen, of the county of Orange and State of New York, party of the second part, the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, do hereby release, grant, bargain, and quit-claim unto the said party of the second part, their heirs and assigns, forever, all her right, title, claim and interest in that certain tract of land granted by the United States unto David Millspaugh and Christina Lynn, the brother and sister and only heirs-at-law of Henry Millspaugh, deceased, as follows, to wit: [Here follows a description of the land] .; to have and to hold the said premises, with all the appurtenances thereunto belonging or in anywise appertaining, to their only proper use, benefit and behoof of said parties of the second part, their heirs and assigns, forever.

"In witness whereof the said grantor- have hereunto set our hands and seals the day and year first above written.

"CHRISTINA LYNN. [SEAL]

"WILLIAM LYNN. [SEAL.]

"Signed, sealed and acknowledged in presence of

"MARY A. LYNN,

"OBED SMITH.

"STATE OF MICHIGAN, COUNTY OF ST. CLAIR, SS:

"On this twenty-seventh day of May, A.D. 1856, before me, a justice of the peace in and for said county of St. Clair, personally came Christina Lynn and William Lynn, her husband, known to me to be the persons who executed the foregoing instrument, and acknowledged the same to be their free act and deed; and the said Christina Lynn, having been by me privately examined separate and apart from the said husband, and fully understanding the contents of the foregoing instrument, acknowledged that she executed said deed freely and without any force or compulsion from her said husband or from any one.

"OBED SMITH,
Justice of the Peace."

The court being of opinion that the deed was valid to pass to the grantees all the right, title, and interest of Christina

VOL. CXX-37

Opinion of the Court.

Lynn and William Lynn, her husband, in the real estate therein described, entered judgment for the defendant on its plea of not guilty.

Before entering upon the consideration of the case it is proper to notice the motion made in behalf of the plaintiff in error, to strike out certain parts of the printed argument filed by the counsel for the defendant in error. Notwithstanding the agreement, that the case should be heard in the court below upon the single question referred to in the stipulation, the counsel for the defendant in error states many things, which he declares to be "incontrovertible facts," and within the knowledge of opposing counsel, but which are wholly unsustained by anything in the record. The motion to strike out relates to those matters. The excuse given for this breach of professional propriety is "the extreme brevity of the record." But it is the same record upon which counsel for the company succeeded for his client, and which, by agreement, contained all that was to be submitted to the court. The excuse given furnishes no apology whatever for his violation of the terms of the stipulation, much less does it palliate his attempt to influence the decision here, by reference to matters not in the record, and which, he must have known, could not be taken into consideration. It is only necessary to say that the facts, dehors the record, which have been improperly introduced into the brief of the counsel for the defendant in error, have not in any degree influenced our determination of the case.

The plaintiff insists that the deed was void under the laws of Illinois, upon two grounds: 1. That the husband is not a party to the deed; 2. That the acknowledgment is defective.

In Lane v. Soulard, 15 Ill. 123, it was held that the Revised Statutes of Illinois of 1845 repealed all former laws on the subject of conveyances of real estate, and authorized married women within that state to convey land by joining with their husbands and acknowledging the deeds in a specified way; but that no provision was made for the conveyance by nonresident married women of their lands in Illinois until the passage of the act of February 22, 1847. See also Higgins v. Crosby, 40 Ill. 260; Rogers v. Higgins, 48 Ill. 211.

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