Opinion of the Court.

It is proper to say that the question under consideration is not free from difficulty, and we should have been glad to be guided in our determination of it by an express decision of the highest court of the state. The conclusion reached by us is more in harmony with what that court has held in cases somewhat analogous than would be a decision adjudging the deed of 1856 to be void.

One other question remains to be considered. It is contended that the certificate of acknowledgment is fatally defective for two reasons: 1st. It does not appear that Mrs. Lynn was personally known to the magistrate, or that she was proved by a credible witness to be the same person as the one who subscribed to the deed; 2d. It does not appear that she was informed of the contents of the deed.

In support of these objections, the counsel for the plaintiff in error relies upon the 20th section of the chapter on "Conveyances" in the Revised Statutes of 1845, p. 107. That section provides: "No judge or other officer shall take the acknowledgment of any person to any deed or instrument of writing as aforesaid, unless the person offering to make such acknowledgment shall be personally known to him to be the real person who, and in whose name such acknowledgment is proposed to be made, or shall be proved to be such by a credible witness, and the judge or officer taking such acknowledg ment shall, in his certificate thereof, state that such person was personally known to him to be the person whose name is subscribed to such deed or writing, as having executed the same, or that he was proved to be such by a credible witness (naming him)," &c. That chapter was amended by the act of February 11, 1853, the first section of which provides: "That no deed, mortgage, or other instrument of writing, heretofore executed, or hereafter to be executed, by husband and wife, in good faith, for the purpose of conveying or incumbering the estate of the husband, or the estate of the wife, or the right of dower in any lands situate in this state, and acknowledged by them before any officer authorized by the laws of this state to take acknowledgments, shall be deemed, held, or adjudged invalid, or defective or insufficient in law, by reason

Opinion of the Court.

of any informality or omission in setting forth the particulars of the acknowledgment, before such officer as aforesaid, in the certificate thereof: Provided, however, That it appears in substance, from such certificate, that the parties executing said deed, mortgage, or other instrument of writing, executed the same freely and voluntarily; and that in case of married women executing the same, it appear in substance, that they knew the contents of said deeds, mortgages, or other instruments of writing, and that they were examined by the officer aforesaid, separate and apart from their husbands." 1 Adams & Durham, 185.

It was said in Lindley v. Smith, 46 Ill. 523, 527, that the requirement that the certificate should show that the person acknowledging it was personally known to the officer to be the person whose name is subscribed to the deed, or was proved to be such, by a credible witness, was one of substance and salutary in its operation, and was not dispensed with by the act of 1853; and that "it is the acknowledgment of the feme covert which is the operative act to pass her title." See also Murphy v. Williamson, 85 Ill. 149, 152. Assuming this to have been the settled law of Illinois when the deed in question was executed, and that the case, on this point, is governed by the Revised Statutes of 1845, the result claimed by the plaintiff in error does not follow. The cases cited do not sustain the objection to the certificate of acknowledgment. In Lindley v. Smith-one of the cases relied upon by the plaintiff in there was no language in the certificate of the wife's acknowledgment from which it could be inferred that she was either personally known to him, or was proved by a witness to be the person who had as wife signed the deed. To the same class belong the cases of Heinrich v. Simpson, 66 Ill. 57, and Coburn v. Herrington, 114 Ill. 104, 107. The officer's certificate in this case states that "personally came Christina Lynn and William Lynn, her husband, known to me to be the persons who executed the foregoing instrument, and acknowledged the same to be their free act and deed." This is, in substance, a statement that they came before the officer and were personally known to him to be the real persons who in fact subscribed and acknowledged the deed.

error

Syllabus.

The objection that the officer's certificate does not state that she was informed of the contents of the deed — if it have any force whatever under the statute of 1847, permitting the non-resident feme covert to acknowledge her deeds as if she were unmarried — is not well taken. The certificate shows that she executed the deed freely and without force or compulsion from the husband or from any one else, "fully understanding the contents" thereof. Besides, this defect, if it be one, is of the kind that was cured by the act of 1853, which only required it to appear, in substance, as it does here, that the deed was executed freely and voluntarily, and, in the case of a married woman, that she knew its contents and was examined separately and apart from her husband. She must have known, if, as certified, she fully understood the contents of the deed.

The judgment below was right, and is

A, a resident in Irish Grove, Illinois, died there, leaving a will by which, after bequeathing his library to the Presbyterian church of Irish Grove, and $500 for the erection of another Presbyterian church in Illinois, and $50 to be paid on the minister's salary of the Presbyterian church of Irish Grove for 1884, and some other bequests, he bequeathed and devised the remainder of his estate "to be equally divided between the board of foreign and the board of home missions." The Presbyterian Church in the United States of America has a corporate "Board of Foreign Missions" and a corporate "Board of Home Missions;" but it was agreed by counsel that several other religious bodies in the United States have similar organizations, for the same purposes. Held, that there was a latent ambiguity in the will respecting the object of the residuary gift, which ambiguity could be removed by extrinsic evidence; and that the evidence introduced on that point, taken in connection with the other bequests in the will for the benefit of Presbyterian churches, showed that the testator,

Argument for Appellee.

in making the residuary gift, had in his mind the Board of Foreign Missions and the Board of Home Missions of the Presbyterian Church of the United States of America, of which he was a member and an officer. The restriction upon the right of a congregation, formed for religious purposes, to receive "land not exceeding in quantity. . . ten acres," which is imposed by § 42 of the act of the legislature of Illinois of April 18, 1872, applies to congregations incorporated for the object named in § 35 of that act, viz.: "the purpose of religious worship; " and does not affect foreign benevolent or missionary societies incorporated either with the objects named in the incorporation of the Board of Foreign Missions of the Presbyterian Church in the United States, or with the objects named in the incorporation of the Board of Home Missions of that church, although both organizations are important agencies in the general religious work of that church.

Christian Union v. Yount, 101 U. S. 352, commented upon, explained, and affirmed.

BILL in equity to set aside a will and its probate for uncertainty so far as they related to the residuary devise and bequest. Decree, dismissing the bill, from which plaintiff appealed. The case is stated in the opinion of the court.

Mr. D. T. Littler, Mr. L. A. Whipp, and Mr. R. E. Lewis for appellant cited: 1 Jarman on Wills, Randolph & Talcott ed. 403 n. 3, 404 n.; Story Eq. Jur. §§ 1158, 1183; Perry on Trusts, 116, 713; Bridges v. Pleasants, 4 Iredell Eq. 26;1 Fontain v. Ravenel, 17 How. 369; Wheeler v. Smith, 9 How. 55, 79; Taylor v. Keep, 2 Bradwell, 368; Allen's Executors v. Allen, 18 How. 385; Runyan v. Coster, 14 Pet. 122; Lathrop v. Commercial Bank, 8 Dana, 114; Laws of Illinois, 1859, p. 20, Gross. Rev. 124; Rev. Stat. Ill. 1845, c. 35, § 44; St. Peter's Roman Catholic Congregation v. Germain, 104 Ill. 440; Laws Illinois, 1872, c. 32, § 42; Stevens v. Pratt, 101 Ill. 206.

Mr. James McCartney for appellee cited: 2 Phill. Ev. 745756; Wigram Extraneous Ev. 118, 138; 1 Jarman on Wills, c. 13 and note; King v. Ackerman, 2 Black, 408; Bradley v. Rees, 113 Ill. 327; Heuser v. Harris, 42 Ill. 425; Hinckley v. Thatcher, 139 Mass. 477; Allen's Executors v. Allen, 18 How. 385; Christian Union v. Yount, 101 U. S. 352; St. Peter's Roman Catholic Congregation v. Germain, 104 Ill. 440; Vidal v.

1 S. C. 44 Am. Dec. 94.

Opinion of the Court.

Girard, 2 How. 127; Hayward v. Davidson, 41 Ind. 212; De Camp v. Dobbins, 29 N. J. Eq. (2 Stewart) 36; Baker v. Neff, 73 Ind. 68; Alexander v. Tolleston Club, 110 Ill. 65.

MR. JUSTICE HARLAN delivered the opinion of the court.

Robert Gilmer, late of Irish Grove, Menard County, Illinois, died December 31, 1883, having made a last will by which he disposed of his entire estate, consisting of about four thousand dollars in personal property, and from three to four hundred acres of land in that state. The eleventh clause of the will is in these words: "I also, after paying all debts and claims against my estate, bequeath and devise the remainder of my estate to be equally divided between the board of foreign and the board of home missions." The object of the present suit is to obtain a decree declaring that clause to be void, and directing the estate of the testator, after meeting the debts and the bequests contained in other clauses to be paid to the complainant, the uncle and only heir-at-law of the decedent.

The "Board of Foreign Missions of the Presbyterian Church in the United States of America" and the "Board of Home Missions of the Presbyterian Church in the United States of America"-corporations created under the laws of New York --severally appeared, were made defendants, and filed answers, each claiming the right to share in the devise in the eleventh clause of the will. The executors admit the justice of these claims, but ask the direction of the court in the premises. To these answers a general replication was filed; and, the cause having been heard upon the pleadings and proofs, the bill was dismissed with costs.

It is agreed in the case that the Baptist, Methodist, Episcopal and other churches, like the Presbyterian Church in the United States of America, have boards of home and foreign missions; consequently, it is contended, the eleventh clause of the will is void for uncertainty as to the donee and the purposes of the gift. In this view we do not concur. It is undoubtedly the rule, in respect to the testamentary disposition of property, real and personal, that uncertainty either as to the subject or object of a devise will be fatal to its validity. But that rule has