Opinion of the Court. the division of lands in the enterprise to which corresponds the one which petitioner solicits, and in his default, or in case there is none, or not being engaged in any other enterprise, the alcalde 1st, [that is, the first alcalde,] or the only one acting, of the respective municipality." Now, what commissioner was meant, or could be meant, but the commissioner of the Beales and Grant colony-probably the only colony within a hundred miles. It is not said, "the commissioner for the enterprise in which the lands lie," but "the commissioner for the enterprise to which corresponds the one which petitioner solicits." From all the circumstances taken together, it is obvious to us that the commissioner of the Beales and Grant colony was the very one intended. We have only the translation of the grant before us, which is somewhat awkwardly expressed; but, according to that (which is our only guide), we think it was not the commissioner of the enterprise in which the lands were to be located, (for, as understood by the parties, they were not to be located in any existing enterprise,) but the commissioner of the neighboring enterprise, that was intended to be designated. There was no other enterprise in that region, at least so far as we know. A strong circumstance in favor of this conclusion is the fact that Soto's official acts as commissioner, in this case, were never repudiated by the government; on the contrary, his protocol was received and deposited in the public archives, where it still remains. His official acts, accepted and acquiesced in by the government, must be considered as valid, even if done by him only as a commissioner de facto. The pretence that Soto designates himself in the testimonio as commissioner in the colony of Rio Grande, and that no such colony is known to have existed, is too frivolous to deserve serious attention. It is well known, as already stated, that the colony was designated by various names, "Rio Grande," amongst the rest, and Soto was well and publicly known as the commissioner thereof. It was the first great colony attempted to be established in Coahuila and Texas on the Rio Grande, and nothing was more natural than to call it by that name. Besides, it was situated in the old district of Rio Opinion of the Court. Grande, which was afterwards annexed to the department of Monclova, as hereafter stated. The criticism of the defendants in error, that it was not shown that the lands in question were in the department of Monclova, is not well founded. In the first place, it will be presumed that they were situated in that department if nothing is shown to the contrary. The public official who extended the lands must be presumed to have extended them in the proper department. But there cannot be any doubt that they were situated in the department of Monclova. Prior to the constitution of March 11, 1827, the state of Coahuila and Texas was divided into five districts or departments: Saltillo, Parras, Monclova, Texas, and Rio Grande: Article 7 of Laws and Decrees of Coahuila and Texas, Houston, 1839, page 47; but by that instrument (Art. 7), it was declared that "for the better administration thereof, the territory of the state shall for the present be divided into three departments, as follows; viz.: Bexar, embracing all the territory corresponding to what was called province of Texas, which shall form one sole district; Monclova, consisting of the district of the same name and that of Rio Grande; Saltillo, comprehending the district of the same name and that of Parras, Ib. page 314. Power was given to the Congress to alter and modify this division. We find only the following laws of the Congress on the subject: First, a law passed January 31, 1831, setting off a new district from the eastern part of Bexar, to be called the district of Nacogdoches, Ib. page 171. Secondly, a law passed in April, 1833, declaring that the district of Saltillo should constitute a sole department by itself; and that the district of Parras should constitute another separate department, Ib. page 210. Thirdly, a law passed 18th March, 1834, dividing the state into seven departments or districts, to wit: Bexar, Brazos, Guerrero, Monclova, Nacogdoches, Parras, and Saltillo. Article 2 declared that in the section denominated Coahuila the limits and capital towns of each shall be the same as heretofore. Article 3 created Brazos from the eastern part of Bexar. By Article 4 the limits of the department of Nacogdoches were continued as before. The boundaries of Guerrero Opinion of the Court. are not given, Ib. page 245. This shows that no alteration was made in the limits of the departments in Coahuila. Saltillo and Parras were in the southern part of Coahuila, and Monclova comprised the northern part, and joined the department of Bexar, which (as shown above) corresponded with the old province of Texas. This makes it certain that the department of Monclova included the lands in question; for the old boundary between Coahuila and Texas was situated over 100 miles east of the Rio Grande; and the northern boundary of Tamaulipas, which joined Coahuila on the southeast, and also separated the province of Texas from the Rio Grande, was some 70 or 80 miles southeast of the county of Kinney. Captain Pike, who traversed the country from Chihuahua to Texas in 1807, passing through Coahuila and the centre of the first tract described in Beales and Grant's purchase, and who was very minute and particular in his observations, locates the exact boundary between Coahuila and Texas at that time. After describing his passage of the Rio Grande near Presidio, and four days' travel from thence northeastwardly, a distance, in all, of 136 miles, he gives the following account of his fifth day's journey: "7th June, Sunday. - Came on 15 miles to the river Mariano [now Medina], the line between Texas and Cogquilla [Coahuila]-a pretty little stream, Rancho. From thence in the afternoon to Saint Antonio." Pike's Expedition, page 265. Other authorities also state that the Medina was the old boundary between Coahuila and Texas. At a later date, perhaps in virtue of some law not published in the general collection of laws, Texas seems to have been extended to the river Nueces. It is so laid down on several maps, (see map in Ward's "Mexico in 1827," and others of that period,) and Hon. David G. Burnet, a resident of Texas long before its independence, and afterwards first President of the Republic, in a letter written in November, 1830, and published at the time, after stating that Texas in its most extensive acceptation was bounded by the Rio Grande, says: "This definition, however, is not in strict accordance with the political organization of the country, as the state of Tamaulipas and the department of Coahuila both cross the Rio Grande, making the Nueces Opinion of the Court. strictly the western limit." (See also speech of Mr. Benton in the United States Senate, May 16, 1844.) There can be no doubt, therefore, that in 1834 the state of Coahuila and the department of Monclova extended eastwardly as far as the river Nueces, at least, and consequently included the premises in question. Another objection to the authority of the commissioner to extend the title in controversy was, that the time limited by the act of 1832 for reducing the grant to possession had expired. The 16th article of the law declares that the purchasers shall enter into possession of the land acquired within eighteen months from the ratification of the contract, under penalty of forfeiture for the non-fulfilment thereof. In this case the concession was dated October 16, 1832, and the testimonio is dated April 18, 1834, two days more than eighteen months afterwards. This objection assumes that possession was given on the date of the testimonio. But that does not appear. The latter was executed at Dolores, ten or a dozen miles from the premises in question. The document had to be prepared after the parties returned to the village. They may not have returned the same day. All favorable presumptions will be made against the forfeiture of a grant. As before said, it will be presumed, unless the contrary be shown, that a public officer acted in accordance with the law and his instructions. The government accepted Soto's acts, and it does not appear that any attempt was ever made to revoke or annul his proceedings, or to assert a forfeiture for the cause now insisted on. We think that the mere date of the testimonio is not sufficient under the circumstances to make it invalid. Besides, it will be observed that the law does not say that the delivery of possession after the eighteen months shall be void, but only that it shall be a ground of forfeiture of the grant. And, of course, the forfeiture, if incurred, might be waived by the government, and we think it was waived by accepting and acquiescing in the commissioner's acts. On the whole we think it clear that Fortunato Soto had authority to extend the title in question, or, at least, that his official acts were acquiesced in by the government, and are to be considered as valid. Opinion of the Court. But objections were made to the instrument itself; namely, to the testimonio which was offered in evidence for the purpose of proving and authenticating the commissioner's acts. One of these objections was, that it does not connect itself with any grant, concession or primitive title, nor contain any petition for a concession, or for a survey of the land, or execution of final title of possession, nor any order referring it to an empressario's order of survey. It is a sufficient answer to the first part of this objection to refer to the testimonio itself, which does in terms refer to the original contract between the government and Juan Gonzales, giving its date, and purporting to be executed in accordance with its provisions. We do not see how it could connect itself any more closely with the original concession, unless it were tied to it by a string, or fastened to it by a wafer, as is often done. But we do not remember to have seen it decided that a string or a wafer is a constituent or necessary part of the title. The objection is wholly without foundation. Gonzales had a grant which authorized a commissioner to extend it in possession. The proper commissioner did so extend it, and this was shown by the testimonio -the proper documentary evidence for that purpose. In the recent case of Hanrick v. Jackson, 55 Texas, 17, 27, the Supreme Court of Texas says: "We know of no authority for saying that the title is void because, he, [the officer] has not incorporated into it the evidence of the concession or sale. If there was, in fact, no concession, there could have been no legal grant by the alcalde. But whether there was a concession, and whether there was proper evidence of it presented to him by the interested party, was a matter for his official inquiry and determination. Whether he set forth in the title the evidence upon which he acted, or merely recited as a fact that a concession had been granted and authority given him by the government to extend the title, the presumption which is always indulged in favor of the validity of acts of officers of a former government, warrants the conclusion that the officer acted in conformity with law and not in violation of it." As to the remainder of the objection, it is sufficient to say, that no petition or order was necessary to have the grant |