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Opinion of the Court.

of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws; or for the purpose of preventing or hindering the constituted authorities of any state or territory from giving or securing to all persons within such state or territory the equal protection of the laws; each of such persons shall be punished by a fine of not less than five hundred nor more than five thousand dollars, or by imprisonment, with or without' hard labor, not less than six months nor more than six years, or by both such fine and imprisonment.”

- Sec. 5508. If two or more persons conspire to injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate any citizen in the free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege secured to him by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or because of his.having so exercised the same; or if two or more persons go in disguise on the highway, or on the premises of another, with intent to prevent or hinder his free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege so secured, they shall be fined not more than five thousand dollars, and imprisoned not more than ten years; and shall, moreover, be thereafter ineligible to any office, or place of honor, profit, or trust created by the Constitution or laws of the United States."

“Sec. 5336. If two or more persons in any state or territory conspire to overthrow, put down, or to destroy by force the Government of the United States, or to levy war against them, or to oppose by force the authority thereof; or by force to prevent, hinder, or delay the execution of any law of the United States; or by force to seize, take, or possess any property of the United States contrary to the authority thereof; each of them shall be punished by a fine of not less than five hundred dollars and not more than five thousand dollars; or by imprisonment, with or without hard labor, for a period not less than six months, nor more than six years, or by both such fine and imprisonment.”

As the charge on which Baldwin is held in custody was evidently made under $ 5519, and that is the section which was most considered in the court below, we will answer the questions based on that first. It provides for the punishment of those who "in any state or territory conspire

for Opinion of the Court.

the purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges or immunities under the laws.”

In United States v. Harris, 106 U. S. 629, it was decided that this section was unconstitutional, as a provision for the punishment of conspiracies of the character therein mentioned, within a state. It is now said, however, that in that case the conspiracy charged was by persons in a state against a citizen of the United States and of the state, to deprive him of the protection he was entitled to under the laws of that state, no special rights or privileges arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States being involved; and it is argued that, although the section be invalid so far as such an offence is concerned, it is good for the punishment of those who conspire to deprive aliens of the rights guaranteed to them in a state, by the treaties of the United States. In support of this argument reliance is had on the well settled rule that a statute may be in part constitutional and in part unconstitutional, and that under some circumstances the part which is constitutional will be enforced, and only that which is unconstitutional rejected. To give effect to this rule, however, the parts - that which is constitutional and that which is unconstitutional — must be capable of separation, so that each may be read by itself. This statute, considered as a statute punishing conspiracies in a state, is not of that character, for in that connection it has no parts within the meaning of the rule. Whether it is separable, so that it can be enforced in a territory, though not in a state, is quite another question, and one we are not now called on to decide. It provides in general terms for the punishment of all who conspire for the purpose of depriving any person, or any class of persons, of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges or immunities under the laws. A single provision, which makes up the whole section, embraces those who conspire against citizens as well as those who conspire against aliens those who conspire to deprive one of his rights under the laws of a state, and those who conspire to deprive him of his rights under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the

Opinion of the Court.

United States. The limitation which is sought must be made, if at all, by construction, not by separation. This, it has often been decided, is not enough.

Thus, in United States v. Reese, 92 U. S. 214, the indictment was against two of the inspectors of a municipal election in Kentucky, under SS 3 and 4 of the act of May 31, 1870, c. 114, 16 Stat. 140, which provided in general terms for the punishment of inspectors who should wrongfully refuse to receive the vote of a citizen when presented under certain circumstances, and for the punishment of those who by unlawful means hindered or delayed any citizen from doing any act required to be done to qualify him to vote, or from voting at any election. There was nothing in either of the sections to limit their operation to a refusal or hindrance “on account of the race, color, or previous condition of servitude” of the voter, and it was held that they were unconstitutional because, on their face, they were broad enough to cover wrongful acts without as well as within the constitutional power of Congress. An attempt was made there as here to limit the statute by construction, so as to make it operate only on that which Congress might rightfully prohibit and punish; but to this the court said, p. 221: “For this purpose we must take these sections of the statute as they are. We are not able to reject a part which is unconstitutional, and retain the remainder, because it is not possible to separate that which is unconstitutional, if there be any such, from that which is not. The proposed effect is not to be attained by striking out or disregarding words that are in the section, but by inserting those that are not now there. Each of the sections must stand as a whole, or fall altogether. The language is plain. There is no room for construction, unless it be as to the effect of the Constitution. The question then to be determined is, whether we can introduce words of limitation into a penal statute so as to make it specific, when, as expressed, it is general only." This was answered in the negative, the court remarking : " To limit this statute in the manner now asked for would be to make a new law, not to enforce an old one."

Following this were the Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U. S. 82, in

Opinion of the Court.

which there were indictments under SS 4 and 5 of the act of August 14, 1870, c. 274, 19 Stat. 141, “to punish the counterfeiting of trade-mark goods and the sale or dealing in of counterfeit trade-mark goods.” Of this act the court said, speaking through Mr. Justice Miller, p. 98, that its broad purpose" was to establish a universal system of trade-mark registration, for the benefit of all who had already used a trade-mark, or who wished to adopt one in the future, without regard to the character of the trade to which it was to be applied or the residence of the owner, with the solitary exception that those who resided in foreign countries which extended no such privileges to us were excluded from them here.” A statute so broad and sweeping was then held not to be within the constitutional grant of legislative power to Congress, but p. 95, “whether the trademark bears such a relation to commerce in general terms as to bring it within congressional control, when used or applied to the classes of commerce which fall within that control," was properly left undecided. The indictment, however, presented a case in which the defendant was charged with having in his possession counterfeits and colorable imitations of the trade-marks of foreign manufacturers, and it was suggested that if Congress had power to regulate trade-marks used in commerce with foreign nations and among the several States, this statute might be held valid in that class of cases, if no further; but the court decided otherwise, and in so doing said, p. 98: “While it may be true that when one part of a statute is valid and constitutional, and another part is unconstitutional and void, the court may enforce the valid part, where they are distinctly separable, so that each can stand alone, it is not within the judicial province to give to the words used by Congress a narrower meaning than they are manifestly intended to bear, in order that crimes may be punished which are not described in language that brings them within the constitutional power of that body.” And again, further on, after citing United States v. Reese, and quoting from the opinion in that case, it was said, p. 99: “If we should, in the case before us, undertake to make by judicial construction a law which Congress did not make, it is quite probable we should do what,

Opinion of the Court.

if the matter were now before that body, it would be unwilling to do; namely, make a trade-mark law which is only partial in its operation, and which would complicate the rights which parties would hold, in some instances under the act of Congress, and in others under State law."

The same question was also considered and the foriner decisions approved in United States v. Harris, supra; and in the Virginia Coupon.Cases, 114 U. S. 269, 305, it was said that “to hold otherwise would be to substitute for the law intended by the legislature one they may never have been willing by itself to enact."

It is suggested, however, that Packet Co. v. Keokuk, 95 U. S. 80, and Presser v. Illinois, 116 U. S. 252, are inconsistent with United States v. Reese and the Trade Mark Cases; but we do not so understand them. In Packet Co. v. Keokuk, the question arose upon an ordinance of the city of Keokuk establishing a wharf on the Mississippi River and the rates of wharfage to be paid for its use. In its general scope the ordinance was broad enough to include a part of the shore of the river declared to be a wharf, which was in its natural condition and unimproved. The city had, however, actually built, paved, and improved a wharf at a large expense within the limits of the ordinance, and the charges then in question were for the use of the facilities thus provided for receiving and discharging cargoes. An objection was made to the validity of the ordinance, because it provided for charges to be paid for the use of the unimproved bank as well as for the improved wharves, but the court said, p. 89: “ The ordinance of Keokuk has imposed no charge upon these plaintiffs which it was beyond the power of the city to impose. To the extent to which they are affected by it there is no valid objection to it. Statutes that are constitutional in part only will be upheld so far as they are not in conflict with the Constitution, provided the allowed and prohibited parts are severable. We think a severance is possible in this case. It may be conceded that the ordinance is too broad, and that some of its provisions are unwarranted. When those provisions are attempted to be enforced, a different question may be presented.” That was

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