the party moving for such information may then, on petition and bond as herein before mentioned in this act, remove the cause for trial to the circuit court of the United States next to be holden in such district; and any one of either party removing the cause shall not be allowed to plead or give evidence of any other title than that by him or them stated as aforesaid as the ground of his or their claim, and the trial of issues of fact in the circuit courts shall, in all suits except those of equity and admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, be by jury.

such grant, any one or more of the party moving for such information may then, on petition and bond, as hereinbefore mentioned in this act, remove the cause for trial to the circuit court of the United States next to be holden in such district; and any one of either party removing the cause shall not be allowed to plead or give evidence of any other title than that by him or them stated, as aforesaid as the ground of his or their claim."

The following are the further sections of the act of March 3, 1887:

SEC. 2. That whenever in any cause pending in any court of the United States there shall be a receiver or manager in possession of any property such receiver or manager shall manage and operate such property according to the requirements of the valid laws of the State in which such property shall be situated, in the same manner the owner or possessor thereof would be bound to do if in possession thereof. Any receiver or manager who shall wilfully violate the provisions of this section shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and shall, on conviction thereof, be punished by a fine not exceeding three thousand dollars or by imprisonment not exceeding one year, or by both said punishments, in the discretion of the court.

SEC. 3. That every receiver or manager of any property appointed by any court of the United States may be sued in respect of any act or transaction of his in carrying on the business connected with such property, without the previous leave of the court in which such receiver or manager was appointed; but such suit shall be subject to the general equity jurisdiction of the court in which such receiver or manager was appointed, so far as the same shall be necessary to the ends of justice.

SEC. 4. That all national banking associations established under

the laws of the United States shall, for the purposes of all actions by or against them, real, personal, or mixed, and all suits in equity, be deemed citizens of the States in which they are respectively located; and in such cases the circuit and district courts shall not have jurisdiction other than such as they would have in cases between individual citizens of the same State.

The provisions of this section shall not be held to affect the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States in cases commenced by the United States or by direction of any officer thereof, or cases for winding up the affairs of any such bank.

SEC. 5. That nothing in this act shall be held, deemed, or construed to repeal or affect any jurisdiction or right mentioned either in sections six hundred and forty-one, or in six hundred and fortytwo, or in six hundred and forty-three, or in seven hundred and twenty-two, or in title twenty-four of the Revised Statutes of the United States, or mentioned in section eight of the act of Congress of which this act is an amendment, or in the act of Congress approved March first, eighteen hundred and seventy-five, entitled "An act to protect all citizens in their civil or legal rights."

SEC. 6. That the last paragraph of section five of the act of Congress, approved March third, eighteen hundred and seventy-five, entitled "An act to determine the jurisdiction of circuit courts of the United States, and to regulate the removal of causes from State courts, and for other purposes," and section six hundred and forty of the Revised Statutes, and all laws and parts of laws in conflict with the provisions of this act, be, and the same are hereby repealed: Provided, That this act shall not affect the jurisdiction over or disposition of any suit removed from the court of any State, or suit commenced in any court of the United States, before the passage hereof except as otherwise expressly provided in this act.

SEC. 7. That no person related to any justice or judge of any court of the United States by affinity or consanguinity, within the degree of first cousin, shall hereafter be appointed by such court or judge to or employed by such court or judge in any office or duty in any court of which such justice or judge may be a member.

INDEX.

ACCORD AND SATISFACTION.

The payment, after an adverse decree in the appellate court, of an agreed
sum in compromise and settlement of his liability, by a surety on an
appeal bond to the attorney of record in the suit, fully authorized by
his principal to make the settlement and compromise, and a written
receipt, signed by the attorney as attorney of record,' stating that the
money is paid "in full satisfaction of the decree rendered against" the
surety, constitute an accord and satisfaction which can be set up in an
action against the surety on the appeal bond; and proof that the prop-
osition for compromise was made by defendant and accepted by plain-
tiff in the original suit, with the expectation that the litigation would
be terminated, and that, notwithstanding this, other parties had taken
a further appeal to this court to which the surety was not a party, is
not admissible to vary the force of the satisfaction.
Tuyes, 198.

ACKNOWLEDGMENT.

See DEED, 1, 2.

ACTION.

See CORPORATION, 3, 4.

ACTION ON THE CASE.

See MALICIOUS PROSECUTION.

ADMIRALTY.

Boffinger v.

1. If a vessel in tow by one steam-tug collides on navigable waters with a
vessel in tow by another steam-tug and is injured, and the two tugs
are libelled in one proceeding in admiralty to recover damages for the
injuries sustained, the burden of proof is on the libellant to establish
negligence against each tug separately; and admissions in the answer
on the part of one tug cannot be used against the other tug to relieve
the injured vessel of this burden. The L. P. Dayton, 337.

2. The rule which presumes fault in case of a collision against a vessel in
motion in favor of one at anchor, does not apply to the case of a vessel
moved by a steam-tug colliding with another vessel moved by another
steam-tug. Ib.

3. If a vessel towed by a steam-tug, colliding with a vessel towed by an-
other steam-tug, libels the other steam-tug, its rights in the suit and
its standing in court will be the same which its own steam-tug would

have had, in case the collision had been directly with her; but if it
libels its own steam-tug, the latter is responsible, under its contract of
towage, only for the results happening from the want of ordinary care
on its part. Ib.

4. The relative position of the steam-tug of the other tow to the appellant
and its tug, before and up to the instant before the accident, and its
action during that time, were not such as to constitute a violation of
Rev. Stat. § 4233, rule 19, that "if two vessels under steam are cross-
ing so as to involve risk of collision, the vessel which has the other on
her own starboard side shall keep out of the way of the other." Ib.

APPEAL.

The entry, on the stipulation of the parties, in a suit in equity, in which an
appeal has been allowed but the record is incomplete, of an order ex-
tending the time for filing the appeal bond and the certificate of evi-
dence, is equivalent to an order as of that date renewing the allowance
of appeal in open court in the presence of both parties, and the appeal
is returnable at this court as if allowed at the date of the entry of the
order; but if the appeal bond in such case is not filed until after the
term in which the appeal was allowed by the court, citation or its equi-
valent is necessary to notify the appellee that the appeal allowed in
term time has not been abandoned by failure to furnish the security,
and the endorsement by counsel for appellees of his approval of the
appeal bond is the equivalent of such notice. Goodwin v. Fox, 775.
See APPEAL BOND;
JURISDICTION, A, 4;
PARTIES.

LOCAL LAW, 18, 19;
JUDGMENT, 4;

APPEAL BOND.

An injunction bond in an action in the District Court of the United States
for the District of Louisiana conditioned that the obligors "will well
and truly pay the " obligee, "defendant in said injunction, all such
damages as he may recover against us, in case it should be decided that
the said writ of injunction was wrongfully issued," which bond was
made under an order of court, "that the injunction be maintained on
the complaining creditors giving bond and security to save the parties
harmless from the effects of said injunction" is a sufficient compli-
ance with the order of the court, and when construed with reference to
the rule prevailing in the Federal courts (contrary to that prevailing
in the state courts of Louisiana), that without a bond and in the ab-
sence of malice no damages can be recovered in such case, means that
the obligors will pay such damages as the obligee may recover against
them in a suit on the bond itself, whether incurred before or after the
giving of the bond. Meyers v. Block, 206.

See APPEAL.

ARMY.

See MARINE CORPS.