1. In an action for goods sold and delivered, tried in the Circuit Court of
the United States in Pennsylvania, the defendant under a plea of "pay-
ment with leave," and by way of recoupment, may prove damages re-
sulting to him from a breach of warranty, or from a fraudulent repre-
sentation of the seller that the goods were of a certain quality or fit
for a certain purpose. Dushane v. Benedict, 630.
2. Under the statute of Pennsylvania of 1705, which allows the defendant,
in an action upon a contract, to set off any matter of contract, and to
recover judgment thereon against the plaintiff, upon proving that the
plaintiff owes him more than he owes the plaintiff, the defendant in an
action for goods sold and delivered, may set off a claim in the nature
of assumpsit upon a warranty; but not a claim for a fraudulent repre-
sentation, or other claim sounding in tort only. Ib.
ATTACHMENT.
See GARNISHEE.
1. At common law, a factor has no power to pledge, whether he is intrusted
with the possession of the goods, or with the bill of lading or other
symbol of property. Allen v. St. Louis Bank, 20.
2. A usage of trade for banks to take pledges from factors, as security for
the payment of the general balance of account between them, of goods
known to be held by them as factors, is unlawful. 1b.
3. An unauthorized pledge by a factor, of goods owned by a partnership of
which he is a member, to secure the payment of his own debt to one
who knows him as a factor only, is invalid against the partnership. Ib.
4. If a factor, to whom the owner of goods has made a negotiable promis-
sory note and consigned the goods under an agreement between them
that the proceeds of the goods when sold shall be applied to the pay-
ment of the note, indorses the note and pledges the goods to secure
the payment of advances made to him by one who knows him to be a
factor and to hold the goods as such, the pledgee is bound to apply
the proceeds of the goods to the payment of the note, and the maker
may set up this obligation in defence of an action by the pledgee on
the note. Ib.
Without deciding the mooted question whether a check or draft of a per-
son on a bank in which he has deposits operates as an equitable as-
signment of the fund so on deposit to the holder of the check to the
amount of it, it is clear that such check or draft does not bind the
fund in the hands of the bank until it has notice of the draft or check
by presentation for payment, or otherwise: until then, other checks
drawn afterward may be paid, or other assignments of the fund, or
part of it, may secure priority by giving prior notice. Laclede Bank
v. Schuler, 511.
BANKRUPTCY.
See EQUITY PLEADING, 1;
HUSBAND AND WIFE, 1.
BELLIGERENT RIGHTS AND POWERS.
See CLAIMS AGAINST THE UNITED STATES, 4, 5.
1. Lands listed to California as indemnity school lands, and patented by
the state, are not open to preëmption settlement while in possession of
the patentee. Durand v. Martin, 366.
2. The act of March 1, 1877, 19 Stat. 267, "relating to indemnity school
lands in the state of California," was a full and complete ratification
by Congress, according to its terms, of the lists of indemnity school
selections which had been before that time certified to the state of
California, by the United States as indemnity school selections, no
matter how defective or insufficient such certificates might originally
have been, if the lands included in the lists were not any of those
mentioned in § 4, and if they had not been taken up in good faith by a
homestead or preemption settler prior to the date of the certificate. Ib.
CASES AFFIRMED OR APPROVED.
1. Blair v. Cuming County, 111 U. S. 363, affirmed.
Frank, 41.
2. Davenport v. Dodge County, 105 U. S. 237, affirmed.
v. Frank, 41.
3. New Orleans Water Works v. Rivers, 115 U. S. 674, affirmed. St. Tam
many Water Works v. New Orleans Water Works, 64.
4. Oakley v. Goodnow, 118 U. S. 43. affirmed. Leather Manufacturers' Bank
v. Cooper, 778.
5. Phipps v Sedgwick, 95 U. S. 3, affirmed.
6. Provident Savings Society v. Ford, 114
Manufacturers' Bank v. Cooper, 778.
Huntington v. Saunders, 78.
U. S. 635, affirmed. Leather
7. Robbins v. Shelby County Taxing District, 120 U. S. 489, affirmed and
applied. Corson v. Maryland, 502.
8. Trust Co. v. Sedgwick, 97 U. S. 304, affirmed. Huntington v. Saunders,
9. United States v. Reese, 92 U. S. 214, affirmed and applied. Baldwin v.
Franks, 678.
10. United States v. Taylor, 104 U. S. 216, affirmed. United States v.
11. The court restates what was decided in Winchester v. Heiskell, 119
U. S. 450, and, on petition for rehearing, adheres to it. Winchester v.
Heiskell, 273.
12. Christian Union v. Yount, 101 U. S. 352, commented upon, explained,
and affirmed. Gilmer v. Stone, 586.
1. Bein v. Heath, 12 How. 168, distinguished. Meyers v. Block, 206.
2. Louisiana v. Jumel, 107 U. S. 711, distinguished. Rolston v. Missouri
Fund Commissioners, 390.
3. Packet Co. v. Keokuk, 95 U. S. 80, distinguished. Baldwin v. Franks,
4. Presser v. Illinois, 116 U. S. 252, distinguished. Baldwin v. Franks, 678.
1. In Michigan, when a chattel mortgage is attacked as fraudulent against
subsequent creditors or mortgagees in good faith, by reason of the mort-
gagor being permitted to remain in possession and to prosecute his
business in the ordinary way, it is the province of the jury to deter-
mine whether such fraud is proved; but when the evidence is over-
whelming, and leaves no room for doubt as to what the fact is, the
court may give the jury a peremptory instruction covering the issue.
People's Savings Bank v. Bates, 556.
2. In Michigan a creditor at large cannot attack a chattel mortgage made
by the debtor, except through some judicial process, whereby he ac-
quires an interest in the property; as by levy of attachment or execu-
tion. Ib.
3. In Michigan the mortgagee in a chattel mortgage, given to secure a
preexisting debt, is not a "mortgagee in good faith," within the intent
of the statute of that state which provides that every such mortgage
"which shall not be accompanied by an immediate delivery, and fol-
lowed by an actual and continued change of possession of the things
mortgaged, shall be absolutely void as against the creditors of the
mortgagor, and as against subsequent purchasers or mortgagees in
good faith, unless the mortgage, or a true copy thereof, shall be filed"
in the place or places indicated in the act. Ib.
4. The doctrine that the bona fide holder for value of negotiable paper,
transferred as security for an antecedent debt merely, and without
other circumstances, is unaffected by equities or defences between
prior parties of which he had no notice, does not apply to instruments
conveying real or personal property as security, in consideration only
of preexisting indebtedness. Ib.
CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES.
See JURISDICTION, A, 3; B.
CITIZEN.
See STATUTE, B, 1.
See LANDLORD AND TENANT. STATUTE, A, 5.
CLAIMS AGAINST THE UNITED STATES.
1. It is not decided (1) whether after settlement of an account at the
Treasury it can be reopened by the accounting officers on the ground
of error arising only from mistake of law; nor (2) whether errors in
accounts with the United States, stated closed and settled by pay-
ment, can be corrected otherwise than by regular judicial proceedings
instituted by the United States. United States v. Philbrick, 52.
2. Contracts between the United States and a mail contractor, one for mail
station service, and the other for mail messenger service, construed in
reference to payment for extra service. United States v. Otis, 115.
3. Certain real property in Tennessee having been sold for direct taxes,
under the act of Congress of August 5, 1861, and the surplus of the
moneys received, after payment of the taxes and charges having been
deposited in the Treasury; Held, that the owner of the property, prior
to his application for the surplus had no claim therefor which could
be enforced by suit against the United States; and that the statute of
limitations began to run against it only from the date of his applica-
tion. United States v. Taylor, 104 U. S. 216, on this point affirmed.
United States v. Cooper, 124.
4. The United States are not responsible for the injury or destruction of
private property caused by their military operations during the late
civil war; nor are private parties chargeable for works constructed on
their property by the United States to facilitate such operations.
United States v. Pacific Railroad, 227.
5. Where bridges on the line of a railroad were destroyed during the civil
war by either of the contending forces, their subsequent rebuilding by
the United States as a measure of military necessity, without the re-
quest of, or any contract with, the owner of the railroad, imposes no
liability upon such owner. Ib.
CLERKS OF COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES.
COAHUILA AND TEXAS LAND GRANTS.
See TEXAS LAND GRANTS.
COHABITING WITH MORE THAN ONE WOMAN.
COLLISION.
See ADMIRALTY.
CONFLICT OF LAW.
See JURISDICTION, A, 3;
LOCAL LAW, 1;
MUNICIPAL BOND, 2.
CONSPIRACY.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, A, 10, 11;
STATUTE, B, 1, 2, 3.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.
A. OF THE UNITED STATES.
1. On similar facts, with reference to the same corporate grant, New Orleans
Water Works Co. v. Rivers, 115 U. S. 674, is affirmed to the point that
a legislative grant of an exclusive right to supply water to a munic-
ipality and its inhabitants, through pipes and mains laid in the public
streets, and upon condition of the performance of the service by the
grantee, is a grant of a franchise vested in the state, in consideration
of the performance of a public service, and, after performance by the
grantee, is a contract protected by the Constitution of the United
States against state legislation, and against provisions in state consti-
tutions, to impair it. St. Tammany Water Works v. New Orleans
Water Works, 64.
.2. A statute of a state which provides that in capital cases, in cities having
a population of over 100,000 inhabitants, the state shall be allowed
fifteen peremptory challenges to jurors, while elsewhere in the state it
is allowed in such cases only eight peremptory challenges, does not
deny the equal protection of the laws to a person accused and tried for
murder in a city containing over 100,000 inhabitants; and does not
violate the provision of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitu-
tion. Hayes v. Missouri, 68.
3. It is within the constitutional power of Congress to enact laws to pro-
vide for the punishment of the offences of counterfeiting notes of a
foreign bank or corporation, or having in possession a plate from
which may be printed counterfeits of the notes of a foreign bank or
corporation; and it is not necessary to allege in an indictment for
such an offence, or to show, that the notes of such a bank or corpora-
tion are notes of money or issue of a foreign government, sovereign,
or power; nor is it necessary to allege that the offence is "an offence
against the Law of Nations." United States v. Arjona, 479.
|