1. The judgment of the court as to the competency of the juror upon his
declaration under oath or otherwise, as above, is conclusive. Hept v.
Utah, 430.
2. When a challenge by a defendant in a criminal action to a juror, for
bias, actual or implied, is disallowed, and the juror is thereupon per-
emptorily challenged by the defendant, and excused, and an impartial
and competent juror is obtained in his place, no injury is done to the
defendant, if until the jury is completed he has other peremptory chal-
lenges which he can use. Ib.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, A, 2;
EVIDENCE, 3.
LACHES.
See EQUITY, 4, 5;
LOCAL LAW, 23 (4).
LANDLORD AND TENANT.
1. The Civil Code of Louisiana, following the civil law of Rome, Spain,
and France, and differing from the common law, regards a lease for
years as a mere transfer of the thing leased; and holds the landlord
bound, without any express covenant, to keep it in repair and other-
wise fit for the use for which it is leased, even when the want of repair
or the unfitness is caused by an inevitable accident; and if he does not
do so, authorizes the tenant to have the lease annulled or the rent
abated. Viterbo v. Friedlander, 707.
2. The breaking of a crevasse in the levees by the waters of the Mississippi
River is a fortuitous or unforeseen event, within the meaning of the
Civil Code of Louisiana; and if in consequence thereof a sugar planta-
tion, leased for five years, with the buildings, mules, and implements
necessary for the cultivation of sugar-cane, and with the growing crop
of cane (which the lessee agrees to cut and plant as seed cane, and, by
way of reimbursing the lessor for it, to leave a certain amount of
growing cane on the plantation at the end of the lease), is overflowed
for three months, all the cane destroyed, the canals and ditches neces-
sary for drainage filled up, the bridges swept away, and a deposit from
three to six inches deep left over the whole ground, making it neces-
sary, in order to cultivate it as a sugar plantation the following year,
to spend large sums of money to dig out canals and ditches, repair
bridges, and buy seed cane, the plantation is partially destroyed, or
ceases to be fit for the use for which it was leased, within the meaning
of articles 2697 (2667) and 2699 (2669) of that code, and the lessee is
entitled to have the lease annulled; notwithstanding the provision of
article 2743 (2719) that the tenant of a predial estate cannot claim an
abatement of rent for a destruction of a whole or part of his crop by in-
evitable accidents, unless they are of such a nature that they could not
have been foreseen by either party when the lease was made. Ib.
The counterfeiting of foreign securities, whether national or corporate,
which have been put out under sanction of public authority at home -
especially the counterfeiting of bank notes and bank bills
offence against the Law of Nations. United States v. Arjona, 479.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, A, 3, 4.
LETTERS TESTAMENTARY.
See LIMITATION, STATUTES of, 2, 3.
1. When relief is asked in equity in courts of the United States on the
ground of fraud, time will not run in favor of defendant until dis-
covery of the fraud, or until, with reasonable diligence, it might have
been discovered; and this rule is not affected in the state of New York
by the provisions of § 382 of the code of that state as amended in 1877
in so far as they may be construed to modify it. Kirby v. Lake Shore
& Southern Michigan Railroad, 130.
2. A statute of a state which provides that "the time which shall have
elapsed between the death of any person and the granting of let-
ters testamentary or of administration on his estate, not exceeding
six months, and the period of six months after the granting of such
letters shall not be deemed any part of the time limited by any law
for the commencement of actions by executors or administrators," does
not give the party claiming the benefit of its provisions both periods
of six months therein mentioned, but only such time, not exceeding
six months, as elapsed after the death of the testator or intestate,
before the granting of letters, and the additional time of six months
after the granting of letters. Ib.
3. In a state where ancillary letters are authorized to be issued on a will
proved in another state, on depositing in the office of the probating
court a certified copy of the will and its probate, the executor cannot
prevent the state statute of limitations from running against him in a
Circuit Court of the United States sitting within the state, by unrea
sonable delay in taking out ancillary letters. Ib.
4. The general rule that express trusts are not within the statute of limi-
tations does not apply to a trust openly disavowed by the trustee with
the knowledge of the cestui que trust. Speidel v. Henrici, 377.
5. Implied trusts are barred by lapse of time.
See CLAIMS AGAINST THE UNITED STATES, 3;
1. Unless exempted by treaty, a foreign merchant vessel, entering a port
of the United States for purposes of trade, is subject to the local law,
and the local courts may punish for crimes committed upon the vessel,
within the port, by one foreigner upon another foreigner. Wildenhus's
2. The statute of Missouri of March 4, 1869, gives no validity to a transfer,
without indorsement in writing, of a bill of lading or warehouse
receipt. Allen v. St. Louis Bank, 20.
3. The statute of Missouri of March 28, 1874, making the pledge of goods
by a factor, without the written authority of the owner, a criminal
offence, does not render such a pledge valid as between the owner and
the pledgee. Ib.
4. In Illinois when a declaration in an action at law alleges a joint liability
of two defendants, a plea in bar which does not traverse this allegation
admits it, and makes the declarations of one defendant not served with
process evidence against the other who has appeared and answered.
Forsyth v. Doolittle, 73.
5. According to the law and practice of Louisiana, the Supreme Court of
that state, in cases brought before it by appeal from inferior courts,
determines the matter in controversy, as presented by the record, both
as to fact and law, without regard to the particular rulings of the
courts below, and its opinion, showing the grounds of its judgment,
constitutes part of the record to be reviewed in this court, upon writ
of error, when the question for determination is whether the Supreme
Court of the state decided a Federal question, necessary to the decision
of the case, without respect to the rulings of the inferior state court.
Crescent City Co. v. Butchers' Union Co., 141.
6. It appearing by the record in this court that the verdict at the trial of
an action of ejectment in the Circuit Court of the United States sitting
in Florida did not state the quantity of the estate or describe the land,
the judgment was reversed and the cause remanded for a new trial.
Pensacola Ice Co. v. Perry, 318.
7. Following the decisions of the Supreme Court of Kentucky, this court
holds that the justices of the peace of Muhlenburg County, in that
state, do not form a necessary part of the county court when levying a
tax to satisfy a judgment against the county, under § 9 of the Act of
the Legislature of Kentucky, of February 24, 1868, amending the
charter of the Elizabethtown and Paducah Railroad Company. Meri-
wether v. Muhlenburg County Court, 354.
8. The State of Missouri having loaned its credit to the Hannibal and St.
Joseph Railroad Company for $3,000,000, upon a first lien of the road
and property of the company, the legislature on the 20th February,
1865, authorized that company to mortgage its road and property to
trustees to secure an issue of bonds to that amount, and further en-
acted that whenever those trustees should "pay into the treasury of
the state a sum of money equal in amount to all indebtedness due or
owing by said company to the state, and all liabilities incurred by the
state by reason of having issued her bonds and loaned the same to
said company as a loan of the credit of the state, together with all in- .
terest that has and may at the time when such payment shall be
made have accrued and remain unpaid by said company, and such fact
shall have been certified to the governor of the state by the treasurer,"
the governor should “make over, assign, and convey to the trustees
aforesaid all the first liens and mortgages now held by the state." The
act further required the state treasurer to receive of the trustees in
payment of the $3,000,000 any outstanding bonds of the state, bearing
not less than six per cent. interest, or any of the unpaid coupons
thereof at their par value. Held, that this meant that if payment was
made in money, and not in state bonds or coupons, it must be of an
amount equal to the face value of the bonds issued to the company and
the accrued interest thereon to the time of payment, together with such
further sum, if any, as would be necessary to enable the state to cancel
then, or within a reasonable time thereafter, $3,000,000 of its outstand-
ing liabilities, bearing interest at the rate of six per cent. per annum.
Rolston v. Missouri Fund Commissioners, 390.
9. The act of the General Assembly of Missouri of March 26, 1881, to pro-
vide for the transfer to the sinking fund of surplus money in the
treasury, recognized the act of February 20, 1865, providing for the
reduction of the state indebtedness, and constituted an agreement, on
the part of the state, that all moneys paid into the treasury by the
railroad company should be put into the state debt sinking fund, and
that all option bonds should be called in and paid as soon as it could
lawfully be done; and the use of the money so paid in taking up six
per cent. bonds of the state operated to discharge the company from
liability for the payment of either the principal or interest of an equal
amount of the bonds which had been issued for its benefit. Ib.
10. The provisions of the Constitution of the State of Missouri which went
into effect November 30, 1865, relating to the lien held by the state
upon any railroad, or to the release of the indebtedness of any corpo-
ration to the state, do not prevent the state authorities from comply-
ing with the requirements of the acts of February 20, 1865, and March
25, 1881, respecting the lien upon the Hannibal and St. Joseph Rail-
road and the debt of that company to the state, when the company has
performed the acts required by the statutes to be done upon its part.
Ib.
11. In Pennsylvania a warrant and survey, and payment of the purchase
money, confer a legal estate as against all but the Commonwealth, to-
gether with a legal right of entry which will support ejectment; and
this action of ejectment may be maintained by the owner who paid
the purchase money, without any conveyance from the person in whose
name the application was made and the warrant issued. Herron v.
Dates, 464.
12. The plaintiff in an action of ejectment in Pennsylvania, to prove
title, offered in evidence certified copies of (1) an application num-
bered 12,969, in the names of six separate persons for six separate
tracts of four hundred acres each, adjoining lands of A; (2) of old
purchase voucher, dated November 26, 1793, also numbered 12,969, in
the same names, with like quantities of land also adjoining lands of
A; (3) of old purchase blotter dated June 14, 1794, also numbered
12,969, at the side of which were written the words: "A gen'l rec't
wrote," and in the body of which, after the number and date and the
name of A, were the words "6 W'r'ts of 400 a's Am't, 2400 a's 50s p.
c't p'd specie ch. £60 ==. Fees 60s. p'd, rem'r charge of 168 D's.
Rec't d'd." Held, (1) That these documents were competent evidence
to prove the payment of the money and by whom it was paid; (2) that
the money for the six tracts was all paid in full by A; (3) that he was
the owner of the warrant by virtue thereof; (4) that notwithstanding
the differences between the date of the application and warrant
(November 16, 1793), and the date of the receipt of the purchase
money (June 14, 1794), the issue of the warrant was, in view of the
settled practice in Peunsylvania, evidence of the payment of the pur-
chase money sufficient to establish prima facie a legal title in A, which
was not liable to be overcome by a subsequent patent from the Com-
monwealth, purporting on its face, but not otherwise proved, to be
connected with the warrant and survey, and under which no claim of
title had been asserted for more than seventy-five years. Ib.
13. When the Orphan's Court in Pennsylvania has jurisdiction of a sub-
ject matter, its orders, judgments, and decrees therein cannot be im-
peached collaterally. Ib.
14. The plaintiff in ejectment in Pennsylvania having proved title to the
premises by establishing a warrant and survey and payment of the
purchase money perfected by return of the deputy surveyor into
the land office, evidence on the part of the defendant of a subsequent
patent from the Commonwealth, with no proof of its connection with
the warrant and survey except recitals to that effect in it, is inadmissi-
ble. Ib.
15. The act of the legislature of Kentucky of January 30, 1878, respecting
the compromise and settlement of the county of Carter with its cred-
itors is not in conflict with the provision in the constitution of the
State that "no law enacted by the General Assembly shall relate to
more than one subject, and that shall be expressed in the title." Car-
ter County v. Senton, 517.
16. Carter County in Kentucky under legislative authority subscribed to
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