performs the duties of both positions, is entitled to receive the com- pensation appropriated and allowed by law for each. United States v. Saunders, 126.
3. Sections 1763, 1764, and 1765 of the Revised Statutes have no appli- cation to the case of two distinct offices, places, or employments, each with its own duties and compensation, but both held by one person at the same time. Ib.
SET-OFF.
See ASSUMPSIT, 2.
SHIPS AND SHIPPING.
See ADMIRALTY; LOCAL LAW, 1; TREATY.
STATUTE.
A. CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTES.
1. Prior to the enactment in the act of February 25, 1871, 16 Stat. 431, now Rev. Stat. § 12, that "whenever an act is repealed, which repealed a former act, such former act shall not thereby be revived unless it shall be expressly so provided," it was the general rule of law that the repeal of a repealing act restored the law as it was before the pas- sage of the latter act without formal words for that purpose, unless otherwise provided either in the repealing act or by some general stat- ute. United States v. Philbrick, 52.
2. The contemporaneous construction of a statute by the Executive De- partment charged with its execution is entitled to great weight, and ought not to be overturned unless clearly erroneous.
3. A statute being of doubtful construction as to what fees were to be returned, the interpretation of it by judges, heads of departments, and accounting officers, contemporaneous and continuous, was one on which the obligors in the bond had a right to rely, and, it not being clearly erroneous, it will not now be overturned. United States v. Hill, 169.
4. When the title of a statute of a state clearly and distinctly expresses the whole object of the legislature in the enactment, and there is nothing in the body of the act which is not germane to what is there expressed, the act sufficiently complies with a requirement in the con- stitution of the state that no law "shall relate to more than one sub- ject, and that shall be expressed in the title;" although some provisions in the act respecting details in the execution of the purpose of the legislature may not be expressed in the title. Carter County v. Sin- ton, 517.
5. In construing those articles of the Civil Code of Louisiana, which were originally enacted both in French and in English, the French text may be taken into consideration for the purpose of clearing up obscurities or ambiguities in the English text. Viterbo v. Friedlander, 707. See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, A, 2, 12; CUSTOMS DUTIES, 1 (1), 2;
B. STATUTES OF THE UNITED STATES.
1. In describing the defence against a citizen of the United States for which punishment is provided by Rev. Stat. § 5508, the word "citi-
is used in its political sense, with the same meaning which it has in the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution; and not as being synonymous with "resident," "inhabitant," or "person." Baldwin v. Franks, 678.
2. To constitute the offence described in the first clause of Rev. Stat. § 5336, it is not enough that a law of the United States is violated, but there must be a forcible resistance to a positive assertion of their authority as a government. lb.
3. To constitute an offence under the second clause Rev. Stat. § 5336 there must be a forcible resistance to the authority of the United States while they are endeavoring to carry their laws into execution. 1b. INTERNAL REVENUE; JURISDICTION, B, 7, 8, 9;
CLAIMS AGAINST THE UNITED STATES, 3; LONGEVITY PAY;
CALIFORNIA SCHOOL LANDS, 2;
Trustees under a mortgage from a railroad company with covenants of warranty are entitled to protect the trust property against a forced sale under a prior incumbrance, and upon the payment of that incum- brance to have the benefit of its lien as against the company, and to be reimbursed the amount so paid by them with legal interest: but the rate to be allowed is to be determined by the law in force at the time of the subrogation. Memphis & Little Rock Railroad v. Dow, 287.
Immunity from taxation by the state will not be recognized, unless granted in terms too plain to be mistaken. Chicago, Burlington, &c., Railroad v. Guffey, 569.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, A, 5, 6, 9; B, 1, 2, 3, 4; CLAIMS AGAINST THE UNITED STATES, 3.
TEXAS LAND GRANTS.
1. The Congress of Coahuila and Texas on the 28th April, 1832, passed a law respecting the grant of public lands. One Gonzales applied for a grant under this law, and, on the 16th October, 1832, the governor made the grant of the land in dispute, under which the plaintiffs claim, in the customary form for such grants. A commissioner was appointed to give possessory title to the tract, and on the 18th April, 1834, he de- livered to the grantee at Dolores formal possession of the tract and executed and delivered a formal "testimonio" thereof. On the 26th March, 1834, the Congress of Coahuila and Texas at Monclova re- pealed the act of April 28, 1832. The laws of the Mexican states did not then take effect in any part of the country until promulgated there. There was no evidence of the promulgation of the repealing act at Dolores, but there was presumptive evidence tending to show that on the 3d May, 1836, it had not been promulgated there. Held: that under all the circumstances, and in view of the distance of Dolores from Monclova, the presumption was that the repealing act had not been promulgated when the commissioner extended the title to Gon- zales. Gonzales v. Ross, 606.
2. The act of the Congress of Coahuila and Texas of March 26, 1834, creat- ing a new system of disposing of the public lands, did not abrogate the grants and sales which had been made under the act of April 28, 1832, nor abolish the office and function of commissioners necessary for extending such grants. Ib.
3. From the notorious public history of the colony of Beales and Grant, and from other notorious facts which are stated in the opinion of the court, it is Held, that the governor in the grant to Gonzales, which is the subject matter of this suit, intended to designate and did designate the commissioner of the neighboring enterprise as the officer to locate the grant and deliver possession to the grantee, and that his official acts therein, having been accepted and acquiesced in by the govern- ment, must be considered as valid, even if done by him only as com- missioner de facto. Ib.
4. The public officer who extended the lands in dispute must be presumed to have extended them in the proper department, and this presumptive conclusion of law is made certain in fact by examining the laws re- ferred to in the opinion of the court.
5. In 1834 the state of Coahuila and the department of Monclova extended eastwardly at least as far as the river Nueces. Ib.
6. As all favorable presumptions will be made against the forfeiture of a grant, and as it will be presumed, unless the contrary be shown, that a public officer acted in accordance with law and his instructions, and as the government acquiesced in the commissioner's acts in extending the grant in dispute and no attempt had been made to revoke them or to assert a forfeiture: Held, that he had authority to extend the title, and his acts must be considered valid. 7. The testimonio in this case sufficiently connects itself with the original grant and the subsequent steps taken under it: it is not necessary that it should be attached to it by a physical connection. Ib.
8. The grant in this case gave power and authority to the commissioner to extend it, and no further order was necessary. Ib.
9. The extension of the title of the grantee by the commissioner in a Mexi- can grant completed the title, without patent or other act of the gov- ment, and notwithstanding the imposition of conditions subsequent; and the non-performance of such conditions subsequent constituted no objection to the admission of plaintiff's evidence to show such extension. 1b.
10. If a forfeiture of a Mexican land grant from non-payment or condition subsequent can be availed of by a private person at all, it can only be after he has shown some right to the land in himself by virtue of a subsequent purchase or grant from the sovereignty of the soil. Ib. 11. Prior to the adoption of the constitution of 1876 the laws of Texas did not require that a title under a Mexican grant should be registered in the county or deposited among the archives of the land office, in order to give it vitality; and it was only void as against third persons acquir ing title from the sovereignty of the soil, not having notice of it. Ib.
12. Defences against Spanish and Mexican titles in Texas under Art. XIII of the constitution of Texas of 1876 constitute no objection to the ad- mission of evidence in support of such titles. Quære, as to the effect of the provisions in that article prohibiting the future registration of titles, or the depositing of them in the land office. Ib.
TREASURY SETTLEMENT.
See CLAIMS AGAINST THE UNITED STATES, 1.
Article XI of the Convention between Belgium and the United States of March 9, 1880, 21 Stat. 781, conferring power upon Belgian consuls in the United States to take cognizance of differences between captains, officers, and crews of Belgian merchant vessels which are in ports of the United States, and providing that the local authorities shall not interfere except when a disorder arises of such a nature as to disturb tranquillity or public order on shore or in the port, does not apply to a case of felonious homicide committed on board of a Belgian merchant vessel in a port of the United States, and does not deprive the local authorities of the port of jurisdiction over such a crime so committed by one Belgian upon the person of another Belgian, both belonging to the crew of the vessel. Wildenhus's Case, 1.
See JURISDICTION, B, 1; LOCAL LAW, 1. TRUST.
A mortgage of a railroad and of lands granted by Congress to aid in its construction, to trustees which directs the trustees to apply moneys arising from the sale of the lands to the payment of the coupons at- tached to the bonds secured by the mortgage, also authorizes them to purchase therewith over-due coupons which have been cut from those bonds and have been deposited with the trustees of the mortgage for the purpose of securing scrip issued to the holders of those coupons, with the object of extending the payment of the amount due on them beyond the time of payment named in them. Little Rock & Fort Smith Railway v. Huntington, 160.
LIMITATION, STATUTES OF, 4, 5; SUBROGATION.
UNFORESEEN EVENT.
See LANDLORD AND TENANT, 2.
See CLAIMS AGAINST THE UNITED STATES.
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