performs the duties of both positions, is entitled to receive the com-
pensation appropriated and allowed by law for each. United States
v. Saunders, 126.

3. Sections 1763, 1764, and 1765 of the Revised Statutes have no appli-
cation to the case of two distinct offices, places, or employments, each
with its own duties and compensation, but both held by one person at
the same time. Ib.

See LONGEVITY PAY.

SEA-PAY.

See SALARY.

SET-OFF.

See ASSUMPSIT, 2.

SHIPS AND SHIPPING.

See ADMIRALTY;
LOCAL LAW, 1;
TREATY.

STATUTE.

A. CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTES.

1. Prior to the enactment in the act of February 25, 1871, 16 Stat. 431,
now Rev. Stat. § 12, that "whenever an act is repealed, which repealed
a former act, such former act shall not thereby be revived unless it
shall be expressly so provided," it was the general rule of law that
the repeal of a repealing act restored the law as it was before the pas-
sage of the latter act without formal words for that purpose, unless
otherwise provided either in the repealing act or by some general stat-
ute. United States v. Philbrick, 52.

2. The contemporaneous construction of a statute by the Executive De-
partment charged with its execution is entitled to great weight, and
ought not to be overturned unless clearly erroneous.

Ib.

3. A statute being of doubtful construction as to what fees were to be
returned, the interpretation of it by judges, heads of departments, and
accounting officers, contemporaneous and continuous, was one on
which the obligors in the bond had a right to rely, and, it not being
clearly erroneous, it will not now be overturned. United States v.
Hill, 169.

4. When the title of a statute of a state clearly and distinctly expresses
the whole object of the legislature in the enactment, and there is
nothing in the body of the act which is not germane to what is there
expressed, the act sufficiently complies with a requirement in the con-
stitution of the state that no law "shall relate to more than one sub-
ject, and that shall be expressed in the title;" although some provisions
in the act respecting details in the execution of the purpose of the
legislature may not be expressed in the title. Carter County v. Sin-
ton, 517.

5. In construing those articles of the Civil Code of Louisiana, which were
originally enacted both in French and in English, the French text may
be taken into consideration for the purpose of clearing up obscurities
or ambiguities in the English text. Viterbo v. Friedlander, 707.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, A, 2, 12;
CUSTOMS DUTIES, 1 (1), 2;

NAVY.

B. STATUTES OF THE UNITED STATES.

1. In describing the defence against a citizen of the United States for
which punishment is provided by Rev. Stat. § 5508, the word "citi-

zen

is used in its political sense, with the same meaning which it has
in the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution; and not as being
synonymous with "resident," "inhabitant," or "person." Baldwin v.
Franks, 678.

2. To constitute the offence described in the first clause of Rev. Stat.
§ 5336, it is not enough that a law of the United States is violated,
but there must be a forcible resistance to a positive assertion of their
authority as a government. lb.

3. To constitute an offence under the second clause Rev. Stat. § 5336 there
must be a forcible resistance to the authority of the United States
while they are endeavoring to carry their laws into execution. 1b.
INTERNAL REVENUE;
JURISDICTION, B, 7, 8, 9;

See ADMIRALTY, 4;

CLAIMS AGAINST THE UNITED STATES, 3; LONGEVITY PAY;

CALIFORNIA SCHOOL LANDS, 2;

Trustees under a mortgage from a railroad company with covenants of
warranty are entitled to protect the trust property against a forced
sale under a prior incumbrance, and upon the payment of that incum-
brance to have the benefit of its lien as against the company, and to
be reimbursed the amount so paid by them with legal interest: but the
rate to be allowed is to be determined by the law in force at the time
of the subrogation. Memphis & Little Rock Railroad v. Dow, 287.

TAX AND TAXATION.

Immunity from taxation by the state will not be recognized, unless granted
in terms too plain to be mistaken. Chicago, Burlington, &c., Railroad
v. Guffey, 569.

See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, A, 5, 6, 9; B, 1, 2, 3, 4;
CLAIMS AGAINST THE UNITED STATES, 3.

TEXAS LAND GRANTS.

1. The Congress of Coahuila and Texas on the 28th April, 1832, passed a
law respecting the grant of public lands. One Gonzales applied for a
grant under this law, and, on the 16th October, 1832, the governor
made the grant of the land in dispute, under which the plaintiffs claim,
in the customary form for such grants. A commissioner was appointed
to give possessory title to the tract, and on the 18th April, 1834, he de-
livered to the grantee at Dolores formal possession of the tract and
executed and delivered a formal "testimonio" thereof. On the 26th
March, 1834, the Congress of Coahuila and Texas at Monclova re-
pealed the act of April 28, 1832. The laws of the Mexican states did
not then take effect in any part of the country until promulgated there.
There was no evidence of the promulgation of the repealing act at
Dolores, but there was presumptive evidence tending to show that on
the 3d May, 1836, it had not been promulgated there. Held: that
under all the circumstances, and in view of the distance of Dolores
from Monclova, the presumption was that the repealing act had not
been promulgated when the commissioner extended the title to Gon-
zales. Gonzales v. Ross, 606.

2. The act of the Congress of Coahuila and Texas of March 26, 1834, creat-
ing a new system of disposing of the public lands, did not abrogate
the grants and sales which had been made under the act of April 28,
1832, nor abolish the office and function of commissioners necessary for
extending such grants. Ib.

3. From the notorious public history of the colony of Beales and Grant,
and from other notorious facts which are stated in the opinion of the
court, it is Held, that the governor in the grant to Gonzales, which is
the subject matter of this suit, intended to designate and did designate
the commissioner of the neighboring enterprise as the officer to locate
the grant and deliver possession to the grantee, and that his official
acts therein, having been accepted and acquiesced in by the govern-
ment, must be considered as valid, even if done by him only as com-
missioner de facto. Ib.

4. The public officer who extended the lands in dispute must be presumed
to have extended them in the proper department, and this presumptive
conclusion of law is made certain in fact by examining the laws re-
ferred to in the opinion of the court.

Ib.

5. In 1834 the state of Coahuila and the department of Monclova extended
eastwardly at least as far as the river Nueces. Ib.

6. As all favorable presumptions will be made against the forfeiture of a
grant, and as it will be presumed, unless the contrary be shown, that
a public officer acted in accordance with law and his instructions, and
as the government acquiesced in the commissioner's acts in extending
the grant in dispute and no attempt had been made to revoke them or
to assert a forfeiture: Held, that he had authority to extend the title,
and his acts must be considered valid.
7. The testimonio in this case sufficiently connects itself with the original
grant and the subsequent steps taken under it: it is not necessary that
it should be attached to it by a physical connection. Ib.

Ib.

8. The grant in this case gave power and authority to the commissioner to
extend it, and no further order was necessary. Ib.

9. The extension of the title of the grantee by the commissioner in a Mexi-
can grant completed the title, without patent or other act of the gov-
ment, and notwithstanding the imposition of conditions subsequent;
and the non-performance of such conditions subsequent constituted
no objection to the admission of plaintiff's evidence to show such
extension. 1b.

10. If a forfeiture of a Mexican land grant from non-payment or condition
subsequent can be availed of by a private person at all, it can only be
after he has shown some right to the land in himself by virtue of a
subsequent purchase or grant from the sovereignty of the soil. Ib.
11. Prior to the adoption of the constitution of 1876 the laws of Texas did
not require that a title under a Mexican grant should be registered in
the county or deposited among the archives of the land office, in order
to give it vitality; and it was only void as against third persons acquir
ing title from the sovereignty of the soil, not having notice of it. Ib.

12. Defences against Spanish and Mexican titles in Texas under Art. XIII
of the constitution of Texas of 1876 constitute no objection to the ad-
mission of evidence in support of such titles. Quære, as to the effect
of the provisions in that article prohibiting the future registration of
titles, or the depositing of them in the land office. Ib.

TREASURY SETTLEMENT.

See CLAIMS AGAINST THE UNITED STATES, 1.

TREATY.

Article XI of the Convention between Belgium and the United States of
March 9, 1880, 21 Stat. 781, conferring power upon Belgian consuls in
the United States to take cognizance of differences between captains,
officers, and crews of Belgian merchant vessels which are in ports of
the United States, and providing that the local authorities shall not
interfere except when a disorder arises of such a nature as to disturb
tranquillity or public order on shore or in the port, does not apply to a
case of felonious homicide committed on board of a Belgian merchant
vessel in a port of the United States, and does not deprive the local
authorities of the port of jurisdiction over such a crime so committed
by one Belgian upon the person of another Belgian, both belonging to
the crew of the vessel. Wildenhus's Case, 1.

See JURISDICTION, B, 1;
LOCAL LAW, 1.
TRUST.

A mortgage of a railroad and of lands granted by Congress to aid in its
construction, to trustees which directs the trustees to apply moneys
arising from the sale of the lands to the payment of the coupons at-
tached to the bonds secured by the mortgage, also authorizes them to
purchase therewith over-due coupons which have been cut from those
bonds and have been deposited with the trustees of the mortgage for
the purpose of securing scrip issued to the holders of those coupons,
with the object of extending the payment of the amount due on them
beyond the time of payment named in them. Little Rock & Fort Smith
Railway v. Huntington, 160.

See EQUITY, 3;

LIMITATION, STATUTES OF, 4, 5;
SUBROGATION.

UNFORESEEN EVENT.

See LANDLORD AND TENANT, 2.

UNITED STATES.

See CLAIMS AGAINST THE UNITED STATES.

USAGE.

See BAILMENT, 2.