Economic Evolution: An Inquiry into the Foundations of the New Institutional EconomicsRoutledge, 19. okt. 1995 - 256 strani The new institutional economics offers one of the most exciting research agendas in economics today. Yet can it really explain processes of economic change? Economic Evolution explores three of the main approaches within the new institutional economics:* the new theory of the firm,* Nelson and Winter's evolutionary economics * game theoretic accoun |
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Stran
... Williamson's transaction cost economics; evolutionary economics, taking theworkofNelson and Winterasthe benchmark; game theoretic accountsof the spontaneous evolution of conventions and institutions inspired by Hayek. The analysis ...
... Williamson's transaction cost economics; evolutionary economics, taking theworkofNelson and Winterasthe benchmark; game theoretic accountsof the spontaneous evolution of conventions and institutions inspired by Hayek. The analysis ...
Stran
... Williamson's transaction cost economics and Schotter's and Sugden's game theoretic treatmentsof institutions. They can all be said tobe concerned with'evolutionof institutions'. But 'institution'comprises many different phenomena ...
... Williamson's transaction cost economics and Schotter's and Sugden's game theoretic treatmentsof institutions. They can all be said tobe concerned with'evolutionof institutions'. But 'institution'comprises many different phenomena ...
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... Williamson's transaction cost economics seems todealwith phenomena 'one level below'. The evolution of organizationforms is accounted forinterms oftheendeavours ofindividuals. Here, the individualhuman agent is theelementary unitof ...
... Williamson's transaction cost economics seems todealwith phenomena 'one level below'. The evolution of organizationforms is accounted forinterms oftheendeavours ofindividuals. Here, the individualhuman agent is theelementary unitof ...
Stran
... Williamson, for example,that the explanations given in his transactioncost economics are ofa functional type. A relatedmodeof explanation that is typical ofbothdisciplines is equilibrium explanation. In equilibrium explanations, some ...
... Williamson, for example,that the explanations given in his transactioncost economics are ofa functional type. A relatedmodeof explanation that is typical ofbothdisciplines is equilibrium explanation. In equilibrium explanations, some ...
Stran
... Williamson's transaction costs approach. Although these approaches differ from each other in important respects,itwill be arguedthat they all sharethe supposition that prevailingorganization forms are efficient. Special attentionwill be ...
... Williamson's transaction costs approach. Although these approaches differ from each other in important respects,itwill be arguedthat they all sharethe supposition that prevailingorganization forms are efficient. Special attentionwill be ...
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Druge izdaje - Prikaži vse
Economic Evolution: An Enquiry Into the Foundations of New Institutional ... Jack J. Vromen Predogled ni na voljo - 1995 |
Economic Evolution: An Enquiry Into the Foundations of New Institutional ... Jack J. Vromen Predogled ni na voljo - 1995 |
Pogosti izrazi in povedi
adaptive learning Alchian altruistic antimarginalists argues arguesthat assumed assumption Axelrod Becker biology bounded rationality bythe canbe causal ceteris paribus Chapter Coase competitive cultural evolution Darwinian natural selection Dawkins deliberate Demsetz discussion economic theory efficient Elster entrepreneurs environmental equilibrium evolutionary economists evolutionary game theory evolutionary mechanisms example firm behaviour firm’s forces Friedman functional explanation genes genetic Hayek HDgame Houthakker hypothesis individual organisms industry behaviour inheritance institutional economics institutions inthe isnot isthat itis Jensen Lamarckian Machlup marginal analysis marginalist Maynard Mform mutations Nash equilibrium Nelson and Winter Nelson andWinter Nelsonand neoclassical theory notion onthe optimal organization forms orthodox players population predicted problem processes profit maximization realistic replication replicator dynamics routine behaviour rules satisficing seems selection argument selection mechanism Simon situations Smith’s social survival thatare thatis thatthe theoretical theorists thesame tobe tothe transaction cost economics unit of selection Williamson Winter’s evolutionary theory