Economic Evolution: An Inquiry into the Foundations of the New Institutional EconomicsRoutledge, 19. okt. 1995 - 256 strani The new institutional economics offers one of the most exciting research agendas in economics today. Yet can it really explain processes of economic change? Economic Evolution explores three of the main approaches within the new institutional economics:* the new theory of the firm,* Nelson and Winter's evolutionary economics * game theoretic accoun |
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... assumed to be unaltered. Veblen believed thatthetime wasripefor a fundamentalreorientation ofthediscipline. Instead ... assuming an inert and immutable human nature, economists weretofocuson changes in institutions, inhabits of thought ...
... assumed to be unaltered. Veblen believed thatthetime wasripefor a fundamentalreorientation ofthediscipline. Instead ... assuming an inert and immutable human nature, economists weretofocuson changes in institutions, inhabits of thought ...
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... assumed that gradual changeis produced in this perfectly rational way. Itis maintained thatnotall individuals are capableof makingprompt and optimalresponses. Proponents of newinstitutional economics hold that gradual economic change ...
... assumed that gradual changeis produced in this perfectly rational way. Itis maintained thatnotall individuals are capableof makingprompt and optimalresponses. Proponents of newinstitutional economics hold that gradual economic change ...
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... assumption that business men pursue profits. Business menpursuing profitsmay end upwith less than maximum profits becauseof informational deficiencies. Withoutperfect information, entrepreneurs may resort torulegoverned behaviour ...
... assumption that business men pursue profits. Business menpursuing profitsmay end upwith less than maximum profits becauseof informational deficiencies. Withoutperfect information, entrepreneurs may resort torulegoverned behaviour ...
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... assumed that behaviour is determined by sheer chance. Nobodyisassumed to act deliberately and consciously(let alone rationally). When the environment changes, nobody is supposed to be adapting one's self to the new situation. There ...
... assumed that behaviour is determined by sheer chance. Nobodyisassumed to act deliberately and consciously(let alone rationally). When the environment changes, nobody is supposed to be adapting one's self to the new situation. There ...
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... in which firms can be assumed tobe profit maximizers: 'the essential pointisthat individualmotivation and foresight,whilesufficient, are not necessary' (Alchian 1950:217). Alchian does not believe that the foregoing account of business.
... in which firms can be assumed tobe profit maximizers: 'the essential pointisthat individualmotivation and foresight,whilesufficient, are not necessary' (Alchian 1950:217). Alchian does not believe that the foregoing account of business.
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Druge izdaje - Prikaži vse
Economic Evolution: An Enquiry Into the Foundations of New Institutional ... Jack J. Vromen Predogled ni na voljo - 1995 |
Economic Evolution: An Enquiry Into the Foundations of New Institutional ... Jack J. Vromen Predogled ni na voljo - 1995 |
Pogosti izrazi in povedi
adaptive learning Alchian altruistic antimarginalists argues arguesthat assumed assumption Axelrod Becker biology bounded rationality bythe canbe causal ceteris paribus Chapter Coase competitive cultural evolution Darwinian natural selection Dawkins deliberate Demsetz discussion economic theory efficient Elster entrepreneurs environmental equilibrium evolutionary economists evolutionary game theory evolutionary mechanisms example firm behaviour firm’s forces Friedman functional explanation genes genetic Hayek HDgame Houthakker hypothesis individual organisms industry behaviour inheritance institutional economics institutions inthe isnot isthat itis Jensen Lamarckian Machlup marginal analysis marginalist Maynard Mform mutations Nash equilibrium Nelson and Winter Nelson andWinter Nelsonand neoclassical theory notion onthe optimal organization forms orthodox players population predicted problem processes profit maximization realistic replication replicator dynamics routine behaviour rules satisficing seems selection argument selection mechanism Simon situations Smith’s social survival thatare thatis thatthe theoretical theorists thesame tobe tothe transaction cost economics unit of selection Williamson Winter’s evolutionary theory