he who affirms sovereignty to result immediately from compact, doth not in the least detract from the sacred character of civil government, or maintain that princes bear rule by human right, and not by divine." Such divine right he undertakes to prove in the next section. The substance of his argument is, that the establishment of civil government is necessary for the peace and safety of men; that the laws of nature dictate such establishments;-that in pursuance of these laws, which could not otherwise among great multitudes be carried into effect, civil governments have been formed, that God who imposed the laws of nature on the human race, thereby commanded the establishment of civil societies, so far as they serve as instruments and means of improving and enforcing those laws. Grotius, who wrote before Puffendorf, had said," that men, not influenced by the express command of God, but of their own accord, having experienced the weakness of separate families against the assaults of violence, united in civil societies, the effect of which was civil power, styled on this account by St. Peter the ordinance of man."* Puffendorf, remarking on this passage, says, Grotius' opinion is not so profane but that it may be borne with, if assisted by a dexterous interpretation; but that other opinion of Grotius, that the civil authority is therefore termed divine, because God approved of what man wholesomely instituted, we can by no means admit as though God approved of civil government, as it were, ex post facto, or after it had been actually settled.+" Grotius was a citizen of the United Provinces of the Netherlands, enjoying a republican government, and was ready to consider all governments in their formation as human institutions;-still he maintained the opinion, that the divine right of sovereignty and the sacred character of government were necessary to give it efficiency. Puffendorf thought Grotius' opinions of a subsequent divine approbation only erroneous and profane. They differed from each other, and both from former advocates of divine right, in the mode of derivation only. Both Grotius and Puffendorf, according to the metaphysics of the schools, considered sovereignty as an

entity, not a physical, but a moral entity, capable of supporting attributes, and of subsisting in any government; in a republic as well as a monarchy. But whatever the form of government, sovereignty was to be a unity. They allowed that in a republic, it might be committed to several organs according to the form of the government, which did not make a division of the powers; it still continued one and indivisible.* Such was the force allowed to abstract terms, and abstract notions formed in the mind by aggregation, that while the doctrine of abstract entities, the doctrine of the Realists continued, it was at least difficult, if attempted, to consider the notion of sovereignty as a complex idea, capable of being analyzed into separate and distinct powers, as the legislative power, the power of making laws, the judiciary, that of interpreting and applying the laws, and the executive, or power of executing the laws. It was not sufficiently considered that these powers had been confounded, by having been engrossed by a single organ, and that although they are all equally necessary and contribute equally to the ends of government, yet they are in their nature distinct, and require different modes and different talents in the administration. We may add with propriety, that, although the doctrine of the divine right of sovereigns has long since been rejected, and its absurdities so exposed that none, even of the princes of modern Europe would venture to rest their authority on that ground; and although the doctrine of abstract entities and their unities has been exploded and become obsolete, yet many of its terms remain in use, and without being properly defined, lead not unfrequently to erroneous conclusions.

The most eminent English writers, who have been perhaps inadvertently influenced by the notion of the unity of the sovereignty or supreme power, have, in that nation, vested it in their legislature or parliament, concerning which, judge Blackstone says, that "Legislature is the greatest act of superiority that can be exercised by one being over another; wherefore it is requisite to the very essence of law, that it be made by the supreme power,-sovereignty and legislature are

* Vide Puff. 490. B. 7. Ch. 4. Sec. 1.

*

indeed convertible terms; one cannot subsist without the other. And further, having given an account of the parliament, he says, The power and jurisdiction of parliament, says sir Edward Coke, are so transcendent and absolute that it cannot be confined, either for causes or persons within any bounds. It hath sovereign and uncontrollable authority, in making, confirming, restraining, abrogating, repealing, reviving, and expounding of laws concerning matters of all possible denominations, ecclesiastical or temporal, civil, military, maritime, or criminal,-this being the place where that absolute despotic power, which must in all governments reside somewhere, is entrusted by the constitution of these kingdoms. All mischiefs and grievances, operations and remedies, that transcend the ordinary course of the laws, are within the reach of this extraordinary tribunal. It can alter or new model the succession to the crown; it can alter the established religion of the land; it can change and create afresh even the constitution of the kingdom,—and of parliaments themselves. It can, in short, do every thing which is not naturally impossible, and therefore some have not scrupled to call its powers by a figure rather too bold, the omnipotence of parliament."+ Other writers have followed in the same opinion, Mr. Paley has embodied it into a universal principle, which he lays down in language the most decisive. "As a series of appeals must be finite, there necessarily exists, in every government, a power from which the constitution has provided no appeal, and which power for that reason may be termed absolute, uncontrollable, arbitrary, despotic, and is alike in all countries"-the person or assembly in whom this power resides, is called the sovereign, or supreme power of the state; and since to the same power universally pertains the office of establishing public laws, it is called also the legislature of the state."-(Moral Phi. 2 part.-185.)

Judge Blackstone and Mr. Paley, seem, in penning these passages, to have been influenced by the notion of a unity of the sovereign power, to which the expression "supreme

* 1 Comm. 46. +1 Comm. 60.

power," the general explanation of the term sovereignty, may have contributed; for it would be absurd to say there are two or more supreme powers in the state. They must of necessity be equal, or some must be subordinate, one only can be supreme-that is, above all others. Mr. Christian's note on the passage from Blackstone is applicable to both. He observes, "The omnipotence of parliament, signifies nothing more than the supreme power of the state, or a power of action uncontrolled by any superior.-In this sense the king in the exercise of his prerogatives, and the house of lords in the interpretation of the laws, are omnipotent, that is, free from the control of any superior provided by the constitution.*

Thus the parliament has the sole power in the kingdom of making and repealing laws; the house of lords, the sole ultimate power of interpreting them, and the king of sending ambassadors, of entering into treaties with foreign nations, and of making war and peace. There is provided by the constitution, no direct power of control over either, when acting within the constitutional limits assigned to each; but in the all absorbing sense of these writers, as they have expressed themselves, neither the parliament, the house of peers, nor the king, are possessed of sovereign power,-nor is it any where to be found, but in a state of absolute despotism, in which all the powers of government are concentrated in a sole organ, either a single person or an aristocratic body. And here it merits all the epithets so fondly lavished upon it, of absolute, uncontrollable, arbitrary, despotic.

In every state, where any degree of liberty is enjoyed by the subjects, and their rights in any way respected, the powers of government are, in some good degree, separately delegated to distinct organs, and the functionaries are held accountable in some way for the due exercise of the powers with which they are entrusted. The powers of each must be competent to the purposes for which they are delegated; but no one possesses the sovereign power in that absolute and unlimited sense. It is in an aggregate, an abstract view, only, of all the powers of

*1 Comm. 161.

government that the sovereignty of such state is found,such in fact is the constitution of the English government. All the functionaries in every department, are by the constitution placed in a state of accountability, even those over whom no direct control is provided, and whether the accountability be of a civil, or a moral nature, if indeed by the provisions of the conttitution it is equally a constitutional control. Let us for a moment, examine their constitution with that view.

In the legislature, the members of the house of commons are accountable to the people through the medium of periodical elections. On the good opinion the people entertain of their public conduct, they are dependant for a continuance of their functions. As the house of commons constitutes a co-ordinate branch of the legislature, any control on that branch, operates an equal control on the whole legislative power, since no law can pass without their consent, and although the king is vested with the sole power of sending ambassadors, entering into treaties, and of making war and peace, yet he can neither support his ambassadors, maintain a war, nor carry into effect a treaty in which are any money stipulations on the part of the nation, without the concurrence of the legislature in raising and appropriating money for those purposes. This check is the more effectual, as every law for raising revenue must originate in the house of commons, who will not in that case admit even a proposal of amendment from the other house; so that in this respect the house of commons hold the purse-strings of the nation. The king's power therefore, in these, as in most instances of his prerogatives, without the aid of parliament, is but a nrveless power; and although the king is not personally accountable for the abuse of any of his constitutional powers, yet he cannot act without the advice of his ministers, who are required to sign their names to the advice they give; and if they advise measures that are unconstitutional, illegal, or pernicious to the public interest; the advisers are liable to severe penalties on impeachment.

There is another check, arising from the nature of the constitution, and which is found in the public opinion of an enlightened community. This, although a moral control, acts on every department of the government, with a force, not