to be enjoined by the constitution, which indeed is not the first in order, but among the first in importance under this form of government, and that is to make an effectual provision for the diffusion of common and useful learning through every class of the community, by an establishment of common schools every where in convenient districts, that they may be accessible to all, with funds or means suitable to the importance of the object; and to establish seminaries suitably endowed for instruction in the higher walks of literature and science. The power of making war, or of placing the nation in a state of hostility with other nations has in most governments, and particularly in those of the monarchical form, been considered as pertaining to the excutive power, the prerogative of the monarch; but in a government depending on the will of the people, it is a concern too general and too important to be intrusted to the caprice, or even the wisdom of one man in whatever station he may be placed. If the power be not precisely of a legislative character, it may, nevertheless, be best exercised by the legislative body, as representing the interests and sentiments of the nation. To that body therefore ought to be intrusted the sole power of placing the nation in a state of war. The making of peace belonging to the treaty-making power, should be left to the proper organ.

From a view of their duties it will be seen that the powers entrusted to the legislature ought to be very ample, or-if any, one so pleases-sovereign within their proper sphere, which however can never nothing more than that they be fully.competent to the objects of their institution. Powers so ample will, indeed, be liable to abuse, either through inattention or from design. It is, however, a great security, that the members of the legislature are subject to their own laws, and amenable for a violation equally with all others; but this is not sufficient. It is necessary that the constitution contain a declaration of those rights, which the legislature shall have no power to infringe; and although it is often necessary to make special provisions by law, and to grant relief in particular cases, by which justice may be done to any party without injury to the rights of others; yet, in whatever may affect the common rights, the legislature ought by express pro

vision, to be confined to the passage of general and prospective laws, and prohibited the enactment of personal penalties, ex post facto laws, and the granting of privileges to individuals or associated bodies. Such partial laws are the commencement of an attack on equal rights, and a violation of natural principles. This provision, however, ought not to extend to prevent the establishment of subordinate political institutions for local purposes, nor for the purpose of transacting certain business, or of prosecuting certain enterprises, to which the powers of individuals, are from the nature of the subjects incompetent.

By the establishment of companies for such purposes, new powers are created, but the right of no individual is infringed. Nor should the provision extend to a prohibition of laws for the encouragement of useful knowledge. Authors of books by which useful knowledge is disseminated, and of those inventions, by which the labors of life are facilitated, are equally with other citizens entitled to the fruits of their industry, and the application of their powers; but such is the nature of their productions, that without a legislative provision in their favor, they must remain wholly at the mercy of others. The power of each house of the legislature, to organize itself, to judge of the qualifications and election of its own members, to appoint its own officers, to make all rules necessary to an orderly proceeding, to repress disturbances, and punish contempts seems to be necessarily incident to their institution. There are other powers and duties, which may be entrusted to them, either to both houses jointly, or to one separately; less in their legislative character than that of general representation of the people, or as bodies already organized to whom such powers and duties, may with convenience and safety be committed.

It is requisite that there should be an enquiry into the conduct of public officers; that prosecutions should be commenced against the guilty, for the purpose of removal, and that there should somewhere exist a constitutional court for their trial. The enquiry, prosecution, and trial, from the importance to the community, the character and situation of the parties, ought to be more public and solemn than those which are appointed for common offenders. And to this we may add, that

the prosecution is for a political delinquency, not for a civil crime the cognizance of which belongs to the civil judicature, and the end is the removal or disqualification of an unworthy public servant, not a vindictive punishment of the offender. For these, among other reasons, the house of representatives has been thought the most proper board to institute the enquiry and to bring forward the accusations of the public, and the senate to constitute the most proper tribunal for the trial of such accusation. Objections may be suggested to this depository of the power of impeachment; but probably no better provision can be made. The introduction of an independent tribunal for the trial of impeachments might have greater inconveniences, without securing the command of more wisdom, integrity, and weight of character in the judges.

It may be a very proper provision, that in the exercise of some powers entrusted to the executive, the advice and consent of the senate should be made necessary to the validity of his acts. An instance of this is found in appointments to office. By subjecting nominations to office by the president to the approbation of the senate, a more judicious selection will generally be made, and the appointment of unworthy persons prevented. The members of that body coming from the different parts of the state may know of objections to the person nominated, which had not come to the knowledge of the executive. So in the case of a treaty, the advice and consent of the senate may well be made necessary to its final ratification. For although the power of making a treaty as a national compact is, with propriety entrusted to the executive; yet, as when ratified, it becomes a law binding on the citizens as well as a compact binding on the state, the senate in this case may be said not to depart altogether from their character as legislators. It may also be sometimes proper for the legislature as general representatives of the people, to advise and recommend to the attention of the executive, the pursuit of some national measure that may be deemed highly necessary or expedient. Their previous advice will give weight to the measure, and a facility to the execution. Such advice, however, should be general and in those matters that are considered discretionary with the executive, and never extend to those

particular instances of conduct which may become the ground of impeachment.

Finally, it should be a sacred stipulation in the constitution that all debates in the legislature should be open, except when some measure submitted to their consideration by the executive may require secrecy; and that effectual means be adopted for their publication in course, and to facilitate an early and general circulation among the people. This will prove an efficient and salutary check on the members, by enabling their constituents to form a just estimate of the characters of those to whom they entrust the powers of legislation.

ernment.

The executive is the ultimately efficient power in the govFor the sake of despatch and unity of action, and of representing the individuality and sovereignty of the state in transactions with other nations, this power ought to be vested in a single person, who with us has been denominated the governor or president. We shall generally adopt the term president. Some have thought that the election of the executive chief may with the greatest safety be entrusted to the legislature. Others have held that this right should be retained by the people. There are certainly very strong objections to committing its exercise to the legislature. It gives an idea of a dependence of the executive on that body, and intercepts his accountability to the people, whose power he ought to represent in his department. All elections by the representative body are subject to intrigues and coalitions which are very injurious in their influence on public measures, and on morals. This evil is increased in proportion to the importance of the election.

An upright and faithful discharge of the duties of the executive office is the most honorable of any in the state,-an abuse, the most dangerous and in no office are the temptations more powerful. It ought therefore to be guarded with every rational check ; at the same time, it must not be so encumbered as to clog its necessary activity. The good or bad conduct of the executive, is in most instances of internal administration, immediately felt by the people. To avoid any hurtful coalition between this high officer and the legislative body, and to subject him to the control of public sentiment, his appointment should be by

periodical elections by the people. In more complicated governments, such as that of the United States, this mode of electing the president may be extremely inconvenient or even impracticable. When this shall appear to be the case, some other provision must be made; but care should be taken to exclude all legislative interference in the election, unless as may sometimes happen, no choice shall have been made in the mode prescribed, and to make it depend as much as possible on the sentiments of the people.

It will be the duty of the president as head of the executive department, to execute the laws, to carry into effect many provisions of the constitution and the measures directed by the legislature within the limits of their powers, and the decisions of the judiciary in the manner prescribed by the laws and constitution, and to represent the state in public transactions. In the president also will with propriety be vested the chief command of the military, a peculiar department, which by the constitution must be placed in subordination to the civil power. Besides the duties of the executive, just mentioned, there are other duties to be performed very necessary to an orderly and economical arrangement of measures. It will at all times be the duty of the president, the head of this department, to inform the legislature of the situation of public affairs, of the event of measures that have been adopted, and to recommend to their consideration those measures, which demand their more immediate attention.

The business of the executive is too extensive and various to be performed by one man. Many of its duties must be performed by subordinate officers and ministers. According to the ordinary routine of official business, it will be the duty of the subordinate ministers of the executive department, under the direction of the president, as often as shall be required by the legislature, to make proper reports of the matters committed to their management and to accompany them with all the necessary information, which may assist that body to pursue and adopt a regular system in the internal economy of the state and enable it to conduct with propriety and good faith as well towards the citizens, as in the intercourse with foreign nations. Although there ought to be maintained an amicable inter