course between the legislature and the executive for the purpose of mutual information, and a mutual co-operation of the several departments of the government, in the exercise of their several powers, yet as will appear in the sequel, no one of the departments should be permitted to exercise any of the essential powers, committed to either of the others. The president therefore, as head of the executive department, ought not to have a negative, or any direct controling power in legislation. He may, however, within certain limits, well be allowed a deliberative voice-conversant in the execution of the laws and all the measures of government; his department will be the centre of information on those subjects. It will be his duty at all times to communicate such information to the legislature, so far as will be necessary to assist them in their deliberations. He will more readily than others perceive the difficulties that may arise in the execution of a law from any discrepancy with the provisions of the constitution or the general system of public measures. Every act of the legislature, therefore, ought, before it become a law, to be submitted to the president for his approval. If he approve it, he will affix his signature with his approval simply, whereupon it will become a law. If he do not approve, he should be required to return it with his objections fairly stated in writing to be re-considered by the legislature. If the legislature, on re-consideration, still pass the act, it must become a law, notwithstanding the objection of the president. If this be made a provision of the constitution, as I think it ought, it furnishes an additional reason against the election of the president by the legislature.

Although the members of the legislature cannot, from the nature of their functions, be made accountable for their acts to any other tribunal but that of public sentiment expressed by the people in their elections, yet happily for mankind it has been found, that the executive power is capable of limitations sufficiently precise, by known and established laws. Its ministers therefore, from the president down through every grade, may be subjected to trial before a proper tribunal, to removal. and to further punishment for their unconstitutional acts. Impunity should on no account, be annexed to office or dignity. So far is it from consisting with the good of the community,

that it is directly opposed to the common interest and safety. By the constitution it is to be made the province of the judiciary to decide on the laws by interpreting and applying them to particular cases according to their analogy; and by their decisions to pronounce upon whom, and in what way and manner the executive power shall be exercised, either for the satisfaction and reparation of injuries, or the punishment of offenders. To the judges, the ministers of this power, it will belong to interpret all acts of the legislature agreeable to the true spirit of the constitution as founded in natural principles, and the rules therein explicitly given, and to make a just and impartial application in all cases of disputed right; and as under. this form of government the constitution is the supreme law limiting the powers of the several departments, it will be within their power, as it is their duty, to decide in questions coming before them, on all acts both of the legislature and the executive, and in all cases in which the acts of either are opposed to that supreme law or are clearly not warranted by it, to pronounce them unconstitutional and void. By this provision, the rights and interests of all the members of the legislative and executive departments will be kept in union with the rights and interests of the citizens; all will be equally protected against an unconstitutional law; all will be equally exposed by an unjust law, or amenable for an arbitrary execution.

The situation of the judges, the ministers of the judiciary department, is very different from the situation of other functionaries of the government. The integrity of their conduct has a powerful influence. It is indispensably necessary to an impartial administration of justice and the security of public and private rights. Their decisions, though sometimes extending to the acts of the other departments, are mostly of local and private rights; but the precedents established by their decisions, become general rules for the interpretation of the laws which follow the principles of the government. In a republican government, the laws should be interpreted with a spirit of equity, impartiality, and moderation. In the mode of performing the duties of the legislature and the judiciary, there is a very material distinction. In making laws, a regard must be had to the circumstances, the manners and sentiments

of the people, as well as to the principles of the constitution.. The laws are to be the best the people will bear. In judging, whether between individual citizens, or between private persons and public officers or functionaries, a strict regard is to be had to the very right and justice of the case, agreeable to the laws of the land and the principles of the constitution.

The judges ought not to stand in awe of the frowns of power, or be influenced by the temporary smiles of popular favor. That kind of accountability, therefore, which is supported by popular elections, and which is proper for a member of the legislature, is not proper for a judge. From the interest which men of great property and influence might expect in future decisions, the people might be misled in their judgment of characters. The same observations will hold of a legislative appointment of the judges, in addition to what was before observed of election by the legislature generally, that they excite an idea of dependence on that body, and give rise to intrigues and coalitions, hurtful to public measures. In popular appointments, no one holds himself accountable for the character of the person appointed. In the legislature responsibility is, in a great measure, lost among numbers.

The appointment, or at least the public nomination of the judges ought to be entrusted to the president or head of the executive department. His conduct is constantly, and singly exposed to the public view. He will be holden responsible to the people for the character and talents of those whom he appoints to office, and will sufficiently feel that responsibility.. To secure the judges in that degree of independence, that shall place them above a temptation to a bias, they ought to hold their offices during good behavior, and their compensation should be fixed beyond the power of the legislature to alter, at. least, to diminish, during their continuance in office. For corruption and mal-conduct in office, although not for mere error of opinion, they ought to be liable to removal by impeachment, as in the case of other officers of the government.

There may, however, be some things in the conduct of a judge, which affect his character and destroy that respectability and public confidence so necessary to produce a ready acquiescence in the decisions of the judiciary, and a prompt obedience

to the laws;-they may nevertheless be of such a nature, that they cannot be made the subject of impeachment, which will reach nothing but official conduct. To remedy this evil, which has sometimes been found a matter of great consequence in government, and to impress on the minds of the judges the necessity of purity and integrity of character,-a provision may be made for the removal of any one from office on an address to the executive by both branches of the legislature. To prevent the effect of intrigue, and any popular excitement of the moment, it ought to be attended with great deliberation. To this end let it be necessary, that at least two thirds of the members of each house concur in the address. These provisions, it is believed, while they leave the judges sufficiently independent, will also hold them sufficiently accountable.

We have mentioned the compensation of the judges only; but it is no less necessary than just for a provision to be made, that every officer, every person employed in the service of the government in every department, should be paid a reasonable compensation for his services; a stated compensation apportioned to the labor and expense, the respectability and responsible nature of the employment. It would be in vain to expect, and unreasonable to insist on a strict account of services required to be rendered not only without compensation, but often with great hazard and loss.

From what has been said of the powers committed to the three departments and the duties of the functionaries, it is evident that a separation is not intended to produce an opposition, but a mutual co-operation of those powers, without which, there can be neither harmony nor energy in the government. The reason will also obviously appear why they should be committed to different departments in the state, and not be entrusted to one man or body of men. Different knowledge and different abilities are necessary for the making, judging, and executing of laws. They require the exercise of different powers, faculties, and talents. No man, perhaps, ever had a sufficient extent of abilities or versatility of genius to attend to them all at the same time, or in a quick succession. Such a union must frequently occasion a confusion of principles and violation of rights. To commit their exercise to one man

or body of men, constitutes a monarchy or an aristocracy for the time being. By giving them the power of avoiding all constitutional enquiry, it places them above a sense of accountability for their conduct. They have it in their power-either in the enacting, the interpretation or the execution of laws,to screen themselves and every member of their body from account or punishment. The situation itself, suggests to them views and interests different from those of the people, and leaves no common judge between them. It places them in respect to the people in that state of independence which is so often called the state of nature. In such case, In such case, the people, hopeless under oppression, sink into a state of abject slavery, or roused to a sense of their wrongs, assume their natural rights in such situation, and take exemplary vengeance on their oppressors.

In a government so constituted, the frequency of elections can serve only to aggravate the evil: The rulers, with all the powers of government in their hands, will find every instrument of factious violence devoted to their service. They will always have a hope of continuing themselves in the administration. Should there happen a change of men, a change of measures, if attempted, would be of short continuance. The same situation, and the same motives, would sooner or later produce the same fatal effects. It may be further observed, that a separation and precise limitation of the powers of government simplifies the duties of its ministers, their acts are thereby rendered distinct, enquiry facilitated, and abuses readily traced to their criminal sources, the particular agents. In addition to this it gives a degree of energy to public sentiment. Public approbation or censure, when directed to a number of men, some of whom it is known have acted well or ill, but the particular agents are concealed, lose much of their force. The guilty hide their blushes in the crowd. Guilt, or rather the sense of guilt, is diminished in proportion to the number of associates. The better to secure the accountability of individuals in the great departments of government, not only ought the powers of the several departments to be distinctly limited, but the several members should be declared incapable of holding a place in more than one of the departments at the same