human life; whereas it appears from what has been said, that it is like all other obligations, and that obligation is nothing more than an inducement of sufficient strength, and resulting from the command of another." He had before given what he calls a definition of virtue, that it is "the doing good to mankind, in obedience to the will of God, for the sake of everlasting happiness,”—and a definition of obligation," A man is said to be obliged, when he is urged by a violent motive resulting from the command of another." I do not know that any one, who has at all considered the subject, has supposed that obligations differ in kind, but in species. A general definition, if correct, is true of all the species comprehended in the general term, but cannot mark their specific distinction; and when it becomes necessary or proper to mark their specific distinctions, something must be added to the general definition. It is true that moral obligation is superinduced upon every legitimate obligation or blended with it; but I believe that Mr. Paley would not have hazarded the assertion, that all civil obligations, and moral obligations, are specifically the same, and that the world have hitherto been amused with distinctions merely nominal. I will here only point out a marked distinction between civil and moral obligation, which will be more fully explained in another place. Civil obligation is considered as fulfilled by the mere performance or forbearance of the act enjoined or prohibited, without regard to the intention of the agent; but moral obligation cannot be fulfilled as such, without the good intentions of the agent ; and besides, moral obligation is much more comprehensive than civil obligation. In these definitions, and indeed in his whole account of the moral constitution of man, although he makes his duty to consist in doing good to mankind, yet Mr. Paley seems not sufficiently to have considered him as a social being by the constitution and laws of his nature; that the social affections are necessary to that moral constitution, and that without them he could not be the subject of moral obligation. Accordingly, when he introduces the principle of utility, which is indeed the end of all moral laws, he leaves it a mere selfish principle, with the agent. Besides, his plan of treating actions in the abstract and that only, according to

his own confession, exeludes the intention of the agent, without which actions are neither virtuous nor vicious; in fine, have no moral quality, but are to be considered, as merely useful or detrimental, as chance directs.

Let us inquire, what, according to his definition of virtue and obligation, is the inducement.--Is it the will or command of God? the consequence alone? or both united? The consequence alone replies the author. "We can be obliged to nothing but what we ourselves are to gain or lose something by it; for nothing else can be a violent motive to us. As we should not be obliged to obey the laws or the magistrate, unless reward or punishments, pleasure or pain, somehow or other, depended on our obedience; so neither should we, without the same reason, be obliged to do what is right, practice virtue, or obey the commands of God." But this motive must result from the command of another; in the case of moral obligation, from God. On this same plan, that the motive must result from the command of another, can only be explained to mean a firm belief that the author of the command has the power and the will to reward the obedient and punish the disobedient. Do the sentiments of the mind, under a sense of moral obligation respond to this? I think not. The sense of desert, of praise or blame, due to our conduct, seems not to be consistent with it; or at least to intimate that something more is wanting. Why do we feel ourselves accountable to God, or to our fellow men? Is that sense of accountability to be resolved into a mere dread of power? or is it a mere sentiment of regret for what we may lose? or of pleasure for what we may gain and shall we for merit and demerit, substitute. useful and injurious to ourselves, and consider our accountability as a mere account of profit and loss?

What then is wanting in this system? Clearly the affections, which involve the disposition and intention of the agent, and which, as he tells us in a note, his plan excluded, and at the same time acknowledges that the agent is virtuous or vicious according to his design, or, which is the same thing, actions as they relate to the agent are virtuous or vicious according to that design; from hence they derive their moral quality. But he tells us at the same time, that actions are right or wrong according to their

tendency to produce good or evil. In this plan, then, that actions are right, means only that they are useful, and wrong, that they are injurious, but they are not therefore virtuous or vicious. If, as he tells us in the same note, his concern was with actions in the abstract, and that only, he should have adhered to that plan, and in all instances, have substituted utility for virtue, useful for virtuous, and injurious for vicious. His definition of virtue would then have been consistent as definition of utility, and with this his definition of obligation would correspond. Had he, through the whole of his treatise so deservedly esteemed, adhered strictly to his plan of considering action, in the abstract only, excluding the intention of the agent, it would have been found very little in harmony with that practical moral system, which the Author of nature has ordained for man. He that would write a practical system of morality, to be useful, must study the moral constitution and situation of man; the end and design of that constitution, and the means provided for attaining that end, for carrying the design into effect. This will keep him in a constant communication with human action, with moral action, which can never be found to exist without intention. In such a system, utility will be the important end, but it will be a social not a selfish utility, and virtue will be the means of attainment. Such, notwithstanding the plan which he had announced, of treating actions in the abstract only, was clearly, the author's practical opinion; for we find him almost constantly bringing down his theory to practical morality, which gives to his work its principal value. Thus we find him almost in the outset, in the sixth chapter of his preliminary book, making human happiness first of all, to consist in the exercise of the social affections. By the social affections he must mean a kind disposition in one toward his fellow men, at least, those within the sphere of his connection, which is, in fact, an habitual intention to do them good, as occasion presents. The social affections make the man an integral part of society, and in degree, identify his happiness with that of others; they add what was wanting in the author's definition, the doing good to mankind with affection, that is with good intentions, and unite benevolence with prudence; but the definition includes

prudence only in the motive," for the sake of everlasting happiness." And it would have been the same had the avoidance of everlasting misery, been made the motive. There is certainly in the motive nothing of benevolence.-If I am correct in this, it proves that the social affections must, in any moral view, constitute an essential part of that violent motive, which he makes the inducement to moral obligation; it proves also the deficiency of the explanation above given, "that we can be obliged to nothing, but what we ourselves are to gain or lose something by, for nothing else can be a violent motive to us." If the social affections be necessary, which must be the case, to render the obligation moral, what we are ourselves to gain or lose makes but a part, both must unite to complete the motive; one or the other may prevail according to the situation. Where our own life is in immediate danger, self preservation will be the prevailing motive; where the life of another, the social affections. Nor is it any answer to say that blending the social affections in the motive serves to promote our own happiness. It proves that our own happiness is not a mere isolated, selfish consideration.

We will now proceed to inquire into the moral constitution of man the origin and progress of the moral faculty, and the nature and end of moral obligation, as it relates to the individual, and to society. We have before noticed, in the human mind, a susceptibility of impressions,-impressions exciting in the mind feelings agreeable or disagreeable, of pleasure or pain which I shall denominate moral impressions. These are the germ of moral sentiments, and differ from sensation, or those impressions, whether agreeable or disagreeable, pleasurable, or painful, which are received through the organs of sense, and which are for the most part felt at the organ and terminate in the pleasure or pain excited; and though they are perceived and distinguished by the mind, yet they are perceived as impressions immediately on the respective external organs. The feelings excited by moral impressions are perceived to be in the mind itself, and to be independent of the organs of sense. There is, indeed, often a sensible and a moral impression from the same object. The sensible impression is direct; but the moral impression appears to be made by way of suggestion; both

excite feelings of pleasure or pain; but from habit, if they excite pleasure in a common degree only, they pass for indifferent. We are more sensible to any thing in a small degree painful. The feelings excited by moral impression are of the social kind; they have always some relation to society, to others ;-not so the mere sensible impression. Where they do not, by way of suggestion, cause some moral impression, the feelings excited terminate in self. Nor is it an objection, that we wish others to enjoy with us a fine picture or a fine present. That wish is a moral sentiment, introduced by suggestion.Indeed, there is not perhaps a sensible impression or sensation, which may not, on occasion, impress some moral sentiment, suggest some moral reflection. Moral sentiments may be just or unjust. It is not their rectitude that constitutes them moral in the sense of the term here used, but their social nature. But some entertain unsocial sentiments; are these of a moral nature? Certainly they are, and it is still in relation to society, that they have their moral quality. Of the susceptibility of moral impressions we have the same proof, as we have of a susceptibility of sensations, a universal consciousness of the impressions. We may therefore consider it to be clearly established as a first principle. Such is the constitution of the human mind, that the feelings excited by those impressions, whether agreeable or disagreeable, are always reflected back upon the object, and are considered as belonging to the object as the cause. In proportion as the feelings excited are pleasant or agreeable, they are accompanied with complacency toward the object; if disagreeable or painful, with disgust or resentment. These feelings appear to rise spontaneously, or rather without any intention in the mind to excite them; nay, to be often uncontrollable; although they may, by a course of discipline, be brought under restraint. That these things are so, we know from observation and experience; but why they are so, until we are able to discover further principles, we must resolve into the constitution of the human mind, or rather into the great first cause where all our researches must finally terminate. In infancy the range of moral impressions is very limited, because the comprehension of moral objects is also limited, and it is extended only as the comprehension of those objects is