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extended. It is not easy to determine, how early the human mind is capable of these impressions, how early the susceptibility exists; but we have reason to believe it to be co-existent with mind. For the first mental acts which we observe in children are complacency in acts of kindness and resentment of injuries. In that state, however, from the absence or weakness of intellect, these acts are not considered as moral, in the sense of being imputable; it seems like the embryo state of the moral powers. Nor do infants distinguish, as moral, the objects from which they receive the impressions, and often resent with the same violence an injury received from an inanimate as an animate, from an irrational as a rational, object; nor do they begin to distinguish between intentional and unintentional injuries, until some development of the rational powers has taken place. The susceptibility of moral impressions, having its origin in nature, is entitled to be considered as a first principle, and as much an essential part of the mental, as the organs of sense are of the animal constitution. The moral faculty is, however, yet in its germ-something farther is necessary towards its cultivation and improvement; we find it here wrapt in self. It cannot be said fully to act a moral part; and the means of improvement are found intimately connected with its first principle. I have before said, that moral sentiments are of a social nature, and have shown that the social affections, by which man is connected with, and becomes an integral part of society, have their origin in a mental susceptibility of impressions. This is the same susceptibility which we have now found to be the first simple principle of the moral faculty; and the process by which the social affections, springing from that natural source, were shown to be cultivated, is in every step a moral process. Thus by this simple natural principle, the social and moral relations are found to be indissolubly connected, or with more strict propriety may be said to be identified. The sentiments of complacency and resentment excited in the infant mind, by the impressions made by different objects, are but the germ of moral sentiments, not being yet accompanied with a conception of moral right and wrong, which is necessary to their becoming practically moral, in the sense to be imputable. The cultivation of the

social affections contributes to this end, but which can be fully attained, only by a development of the intellectual powers. A degree of intellect is, we have before said, necessary, not only to the development of the moral faculty, but to the moral quality of human actions, as imputable to the agent. Without this a human action is no more imputable than the actions of a brute animal, or the movements of a machine. It is the province of the intellectual powers to combine and distinguish the moral relations, to discern and appreciate their results in duty, and to direct the performance of those duties, as they are found to conduce not only to the interest of the individual, but to the general interest of society, and the promotion of human happiness. Still, the moral powers must always be imperfect. They are the moral powers of man, liable to be led astray by his vicious habits, by his passions and appetites, by his weakness and sometimes by his reason.

In this same constitution, and originating in the same principle, nature has founded her moral law, the law of human conduct; and the next inquiry is, what provision is made for enforcing on the human mind a sense of obligation to observe and obey that law? This will be found originating in the same principle and an essential part of the same moral constitution. When actions come to be considered as right or wrong, according to their beneficial or injurious effects and tendency, from this circumstance, the sentiment of complacency in regard to a beneficent act, becomes as referred to the agent, a rational sentiment of approbation, and that of resentment for an injurious act, of disapprobation. Nature has also given an early and ready discernment of analogy by which not only man, but animals in general, distinguish their species, and each discerns that the species to which it belongs, has a common nature, on which they all rely with confidence in their mutual intercourse. Hence every man relies that all other men have, under the same circumstances, the same feelings and the same sentiments with himself, and finds it confirmed by observation and experience. In viewing the conduct of others, he is conscious of a sentiment of approbation of the right, and disapprobation of the wrong, accompanied with a sense of desert, of praise for the one,

and of censure for the other. In viewing his own conduct he is conscious of the same sentiment of approbation and disapprobation accordingly, and the same sense of desert; but in the latter case, the sentiment is more vivid, more pointed as being brought home to the mind by its own consciousness. Thus a provision is made by nature for the reward and punishment of moral actions. On the same principle every man is led to seek the approbation and to dread the censure of his fellow men, which he considers in the one case, the reward due to his good conduct, and in the other, the punishment due to his crimes. On the same principle, but by a stronger motive, he is led to seek the approbation and to dread the censure of that Omniscient Being, who is the Author of nature, and nature's laws; from whom he received his own existence, and to whose goodness he is indebted for all his enjoyments, for all his prospects of happiness. Under these inducements, to seek the approbation of his own conscience, of his fellow men, and of his Cod, he finds himself bound by a three-fold cord of accountability-in other words under a moral obligation to do what is good and right,—to practice virtue.

Thus we find that moral obligation, of which I have here given an account, without attempting to force it into a definition, is an important part, or rather is the result, of the moral constitution, and is indissolubly connected with the same universal principle in the nature of man, which is the source of all our moral sentiments, of all the social affections. It will perhaps be remarked, that in explaining the origin and progress of this moral faculty, I have scarcely more than alluded to what is, or ought to be, the great end of all moral actions, general utility, or the general interest of society; but the subject, so far as it was here found necessary to pursue it, did not require. its discussion. It was sufficient to consider it so far as the individual is affected; and besides, the laws of nature, rightly understood, are found to aim, as well at the promotion of the individual as the general interests-or rather the promotion of the general interest of the community, through the private. interests of the individual members;-for the general interest consists of an aggregate of the individual interests, properly estimated. If ever they clash or run in opposite directions, it

is owing so some error in the estimate; and indeed, with man there can never be a perfect estimate; it will at best, be but a near approximation.

Let us now see how far man, provided with such moral constitution, is, notwithstanding some seeming incongruities, fitted to become the subject of civil government and laws. The moral sense, (for I will now venture to use that term to express the perception of moral right and wrong, including a sense of moral obligation,) is to man the final arbiter of justice, veracity, and of all the moral virtues, of all his moral actions. When be perceives his actions to be right, or productive of good, agreeable to the laws of his nature, he is conscious of a pleasurable emotion of approbation; when wrong, of a painful emotion of disapprobation. Hence his love of justice, veracity, and all the moral virtues. What he is conscious of in himself, he expects to find in others. This is the foundation of his confidence in the justice of others, and his reliance on human testimony. That he sometimes violates these virtues, is not sufficient proof that he does not admire and even love them. Justice, for instance, is the result of certain reciprocal relations, subsisting between the agent and the object; it is often therefore not a little complex. A little more or less comprehension of the relations may wholly vary the result, as to the moral quality of the action.

Viewing things through the medium of prejudice, or some present passion, man is liable to err in his estimate of those relations, and while he loves virtue in general, to admit vice in particulars. Considered as to his mind, man has not only active powers, but susceptibilities, in regard to which, the mind appears to be merely passive. He is capable of deliberation and choice. He is likewise susceptible of various impressions, from objects both external and internal; for the affections and operations of the mind, by reflection become objects, and have their impressions. The impressions made, produce a change in the mind, which is the subject; a difference in the subject causes a difference in the effect. Hence it is, that, not only different men, but the same man at different times, may be differently affected by the same object, and the same apparent motive have a different influence. And hence comes a fluctuation

of choice. This fluctuation is corrected by the moral sense, and by the force of reason and of habit, which places the choice of objects, or the admission of the causes of such impressions, in the power of the mind.

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Were man unassailable by external impulses, were the influence of motives excluded, he would be wholly unaccommodating, wholly unaccountable. Law might as well be promulgated to a machine-rewards and punishments could add no inducement to obedience. However such a state may be suitable or necessary to any other order of beings, it is very ill suited to man, intended as he is for a state of government and laws. The sense of accountability, arising more immediately from the deep interest which we feel in the approbation of others, as above explained, is a principal ingredient in the moral constitution of man. When he has done well, he is conscious that he is deserving of the approbation of others; when ill, of their censure. Judging in the same manner of others, he is made to perceive the necessity of government, and the necessity and propriety of submitting his conduct in society to the regulation of laws, as well civil as moral.

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