persons, and property, after the manner they shall judge most consonant to their happiness; on condition of their acting within the limits of the laws of nature, and that they do not any way abuse it to the prejudice of other men." The author of this definition has, with the utmost propriety, considered natural liberty as of the moral, that is, of the social kind. Such are the rights of man, and such to him are the laws of nature. These laws not only prohibit the doing of what is prejudicial, but enjoin many things to be done, that are beneficial to individuals, as well as to society; they enjoin positive acts as well as restraints. The definition, therefore, leaving out all the active moral duties, appears to me to be materially deficient. To correct this, and a small inaccuracy in the forepart, I would express it thus. Moral or natural liberty consists in the free exercise and enjoyment of that right which nature gives all mankind, of disposing of their persons and property in the manner they judge most consonant to their happiness, on condition of their getting within the limits of the laws of nature, and that they observe towards others, all the moral duties enjoined by that law. Such limitation is necessary, unless we admit that the natural liberty of a moral and social being may dispense with moral obligation. Civil liberty consists in the secure exercise and enjoyment of all civil rights, which comprehend the natural rights, and the subordinate rights which in the civil state flow from these, and in a strict sense, limited only by the necessary, equal, and expedient laws of the community; but in a more general sense, limited also, by moral obligation. This definition agrees very nearly with the concise definition of Judge Blackstone. "Civil liberty, which is that of a member of society, is no other than natural liberty so far restrained--and no farther—as is necessary and expedient for the general advantage of the public," and with that of Mr. Paley which is, "civil liberty is the not being restrained by any law, but what contributes in a greater degree to the public advantage," and we may here add, that civil liberty can be enjoyed only under an upright and impartial administration of just, equal, and expedient laws. Political liberty consists in the exercise and enjoyment of those rights which we have distinguished by the denomination of political rights, rights reserved to the people, by the fundamental laws, the constitution of the state, in such manner and under such regulations only, as are provided and authorized by those laws. Mr. Christian, who has observed, that, "no ideas or definitions are more distinguishable than those of civil and political liberty, yet they are generally confounded," tells us, that "political liberty may be defined to be the security, with which, from the constitution and form of the established government, the subject enjoys civil liberty." But this is a definition of the end and intended effect of political liberty, not of the liberty itself. The important end of political liberty, and for which alone it is valuable, is to secure the permanent enjoyment of civil liberty. It is the only security the wisdom of man has been able to devise against civil and political slavery. It may be laid down as an unfailing maxim that the extinction of political liberty is the establishment of slavery. From its importance in this view, it is not to be wondered, that where any idea of a free government has existed, this species of liberty has been always the idol of mankind. The writer last mentioned, indeed, asserts, that civil liberty may exist in perfection under an absolute monarch, and to this purpose cites a passage from Claudian, who wrote under a Roman Emperor. Fallitur egregie, quisquis sub principe credit and then in favor of political liberty asks the question-" But what security can the subjects, have for the virtues of his successor ? With the same propriety, and the same emphasis, it might be asked-What security can the subjects have for the virtues of the present possessor, placed as he is supposed to be, beyond the reach of accountability? It is true, they may enjoy the semblance of liberty, such as the veriest slave may enjoy under an indulgent master; both may, from ignorance of a better state, and a comparison with others, be contented, and even feel a happiness in their condition; but both are nevertheless slaves; this, under a private-those, under a public absolute master. It appears from what has been said in this chapter, that there is a closer coincidence between those rights which have been denominated natural, civil, and political, than writers on law and government have generally been disposed to allow; and as it is one great end of this work, to refer all necessary civil institutions to such natural and moral principles as may give satisfaction to every serious inquirer, we shall treat the subject a little more at large. That man, on entering into civil society sacrifices a part of his natural liberty, has been very generally asserted, or taken for granted, by all political writers. They speak of it as a necessity arising from the very nature of all civil institutions, even the best as well as the worst, differing in degree only. This notion of a sacrifice must have been adopted from a very indefinite and, indeed, very absurd notion of natural liberty; what this notion was has been already noticed; but we will take it from the Marquis Beccaria in his admirable work on crimes and punishments. He there tells us, that man, on entering into society, makes a sacrifice of that liberty of action common to all sensible beings, and limited only by our natural powers. What sort of liberty is that which is common to man, to the lion, and the tiger? Man is allowed by all to be a moral being. The laws of nature applicable to him, as such, are of the moral kind-when we speak of the liberty common to man, liberty, and a right to act are convertible terms. Man indeed, has a natural, that is, a physical power to injure both himself and others. But is a right to do this conceded to him by the laws of his nature? That is, a right to transgress those laws power and liberty are not synonymous. Power is here, that by which we exercise our liberty, not the liberty itself, when considered as a right. In a larger sense liberty comprehends both the power and the right. Civil liberty is generally taken in this sense. It will not, I presume, be suggested that the natural liberty of man, a moral being, is at variance with moral obligations; it therefore follows, that the liberty common to man is limited by his natural powers, by the obligations of morality, in a word, by the laws of his nature. For a moral being to forbear the performance of any action, that is forbidden by the laws of moral and social nature, can never be deemed a sacrifice, and is no more a duty in civil society than out of it. But it is said, that every man has a right to pursue his own interest and happiness, and that in the commerce of civil society, there will arise oppositions, which will oblige one man to sacrifice his interest and happiness, to that of others. I answer-First, The nearer we approach to a state of individual independence, the supposed state of nature, and the less men direct their conduct by mutual laws, the more frequently will such oppositions arise, and sacrifices be necessarily made, and that under circumstances of violence.-Secondly, That a man, sociable by the laws of his nature, has no right to pursue his own interest or happiness, to the exclusion of that of his fellow men.Thirdly, The reciprocal relations of social beings dictate, that when, for want of foresight, or from the nature of the objects of pursuit, an opposition arises, and there is no preference of right, there should be an amicable compromise. Beyond this, nature may have given power; but she has accorded no liberty, no right, to man. This is the true principle of all commerce amongst men; of the accommodation of all claims, natural and civil, and the mutual submission of private opinion to public sentiment. It is true, men in their private intercourse, often lose sight of this principle, and in public bodies, it is too much neglected. The interests of the minority, which, on the principle of mutual compromise, where, in the nature of the case admissible, are entitled to a proportionable regard, are too often neglected, or wholly sacrificed to the more powerful interests of the majority. Still the principle, however neglected, is founded in the immutable relations of nature. It is further said, there are some rights which are conceded to be natural rights, and which are necessary to be exercised in a state of nature; but are not allowed in any well constituted civil society; one of which is, that every individual shall, in case of injury, be his own judge, and may take satisfaction, or rather, revenge, at his own pleasure. Such right has been, and still is admitted by some savage nations, among whom the law of retaliation, instead of a reparation of injuries, obtains, as mentioned in a former chapter, such as the right of the next of kin to avenge the blood of the slain; and in that state it is allowed to be natural right. On this we may observe that the right of judging is relative to the rights of justice, and is permitted for the sake of those rights. Men have a reciprocal right to demand justice of each other, and are reciprocally bound to make an adequate satisfaction for injuries. A right of judging amounts to a right of deciding what is right and just between one individual and another-a right of determining what satisfaction ought to be made for injuries, and in what manner. It is the duty of the judge to decide justly; if he decide otherwise, a second injury is committed. But such is the nature of man, we know, as a general rule, that he is incapable of judging justly and impartially in his own cause; and to this we may add, that he must frequently want the power to give effect to his decisions. In matters that depend on a mutual compromise, every man is, under the best regulated government, of right allowed to be the judge of his own interest, and an actor in his own cause. So in a present invasion of his rights by violence, he is his own judge, both of the means and the measure of defence, and this from the necessity of the case; but he must judge rightly, agreeably to the occasion, at the peril of becoming an aggressor; for the right is not independent and without appeal. There is, therefore, a deficiency as well in point of capacity to judge, as of power to execute. From a little consideration it will be evident, that this right of judging in his own cause is a temporary right, permitted to man from necessity only, until he shall arrive at a maturity to be capable of comprehending and carrying into effect that law of his nature which makes him accountable to the judgment of others, and which dictates in all controversies a submission to an impartial judge. Each one, as well the party injuring as the party injured, has a right to an impartial decision; and the laws of nature have pointed out the means of obtaining it. The right of justice is perpetual; the right of judging is incidental, and comes in, lest there should be a failure of the former. When men become capable of providing for a regular administration of justice in government, that right, which nature designed to be temporary only, ceases of course, so far as such provision is made. It cannot be said to be sacrificed or given up by any act of the individual. Such rights may, as it respects |