СНАРTER VII.

Of Subordinate Political Institutions.

In every state of any considerable extent, there will always be found many local concerns and interests, which, though not at variance with the general interest, of which indeed they form constituent parts, cannot be managed with propriety and to the general advantage by one central administration. For this reason among others, states have been divided into districts, severally organized with administrations adapted to the management of their local concerns, in due subordination to each other, and all to the general administration of the state. Such generally subsist in this country in the several states of the union, deriving their origin from similar institutions in England, the country of our own ancestors. In adapting them to general circumstances, they have received many alterrtions and improvements, on which it is unnecessary to dwell.

The first grand division is generally in these states, into counties, which are again subdivided into towns, so denominated, especially in the Northern states. This division, also, comprehends cities, which are in fact only more populous towns, and the local interests of which become more intricate and important in proportion to their population and wealth, requiring a different organization and more extensive powers. One principal end in view in a division into counties, is the more convenient administration of justice. For this purpose the

county is organized with a court, denominated the County Court, with a jurisdiction in causes civil and criminal, more or less extensive, under the supervision of the Supreme Court of the state. It is also generally provided that the trial in all causes pending before any superior court shall be had in their proper counties. By this institution, instead of a forced attendance of the parties at an extreme distance, as might frequently happen, and at an enormous expense, which can be sustained only by the most wealthy class, justice in civil causes is brought within the reach of all; and in criminal prosecutions it gives the prosecutor the advantage generally of having his witnesses to prove the charge, and the accused to prove his innocence, as we may say, on the spot. The powers of police, and the management of the local interests of the county, has been more frequently vested in the judges of the County Court, sometimes assisted by the sessions. In some states, the power has been vested in a board of supervisors, so called, the members of which are annually elected by the people of the several towns in the county. Their powers and duties are determined and regulated by a general law. They sometimes exercise a legislative power, as in the imposing of taxes on the inhabitants to defray the expenses incident to the county. They have also the direction and regulation of public or county roads. They sometimes act more in a judicial capacity, as in determining the proportion which each shall contribute, and in what manner, where the law has imposed a common duty or burden on two or more towns. Such county institutions best accord with the nature of our free governments.

. The next subordinate division is that of towns. Towns in these states have been so called from an analogy which they bear to towns corporate in England, of a lower grade than cities and of a different organization. In this country, especially in the Northern states, the towns are, for the most part, incorporated by a general law. In each state, therefore, the organization is uniform, and the powers and privileges the same. The organization of these corporations, their powers, and the exercise of those powers ought to bear an analogy to the general government of the state as far as their subordinate situation and the end of their institution will permit; and to attain that end they

must be vested with a certain portion of legislative and executive powers. The form of their government, for such it is, on however small a scale, ought, like that of the state, to be republican; not of the representative kind, but a pure and simple democracy, in which the power of making local laws and regulations, and the appointment to corporate offices will reside in the people, the inhabitants of the town.

It is proper that there should be appointed by law, a meeting to be held annually in each town for the election of town officers, and for the transaction of such other business as shall be found necessary, and within the limits of their powers. They will also be authorized to call meetings at other times on necessary occasions. Among the officers to be annually appointed, will be a town-clerk, and one-or rather a select board-whose duty it shall be to take care of the prudential affairs, and to carry into effect all the legal acts of the town. As to other town officers, how many there will be, and what the nature of their several offices, will depend on the powers vested in the corporation, and the duties enjoined. Some few of these I will mention.

To carry into full effect such local regulations as the towns are empowered to make, and especially in what relates to the maintenance of peace and good order, civil magistrates will be found necessary. Such magistrates will be furnished through the justices of the peace appointed in every town by the proper appointing power of the state.-But there must be appointed by each town a constable, to be empowered by law to arrest disturbers of the peace, and to serve within his limits all process both civil and criminal, issued by a justice of the peace and also one or more officers in each to present and prosecute before some justice, all breaches of the peace and other offences committed within the town for which they are appointed. Such officer has sometimes been denominated a grand-juror. On the towns will properly be enjoined the duty of laying out, making and repairing roads, and of building and repairing bridges, within their respective limits, to perform which there must be an appointment of proper officers. It will also be made the duty of each town to provide for their own poor, agreeable to the provision of the general laws of

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the state. To enable the towns to fulfil these duties, it is necessary that each should have the power of laying and collecting taxes under proper restrictions, and to appoint an officer who shall have the powers necessary to make the collection. It may, and indeed ought to be made the duty of the towns severally, to appoint annually suitable persons assessors, for the purpose of taking, in the manner prescribed by law, a valuation of the taxable property in each, agreeable to which all state and other taxes authorized by law, shall be apportioned for collection. In this mode a valuation more just, equal, and satisfactory, will be obtained, than in any other which could probably be devised.

The towns may also be entrusted with the appointment of the collector of state taxes within their several districts, for whose abilities and the faithful performance of his duties, the town appointing, should be made responsible to the state treasury. In no other mode can the public taxes be collected with equal facility, security, and economy.

It will be further, as I conceive, a very important and necessary provision, that for the election of representatives, and all state and public officers to be elected by the suffrages of the people, the votes should be taken at public meetings to be appointed by law in the several towns, in each of which, none should be permitted to vote but the qualified inhabitants of the same town. Such provision will effectually prevent that violent excitement, those tumults, and even riots which are found too often to prevail among the multitude at the poll from a large district, and besides, it affords an opportunity to a greater number of citizens to exercise the invaluable right of suffrage.

There is another division of the several towns, which, though the lowest in grade, is not the least in its usefulness and importance, a division of each into school districts. Each town should have the power of making such divisions as occasion may require, in the manner best calculated to accommodate the inhabitants and the attendance of the scholars at that early age, when they are to be taught the first rudiments of common learning. These districts ought to be instituted with corporate powers, which will be few and simple, adapted

to the end and design of their institution, the establishment and maintenance of common schools. The inhabitants of these districts, severally, must be empowered to appoint proper officers, to tax themselves in such manner as shall be provided by law, for the purpose of building a school house, and maintaining a school, or to raise money by subscription, or in any other mode upon which they shall agree; to collect such tax and to carry their agreements into effect. They ought also to be enabled to hold funds to a reasonable amount, and entitled to receive each a due proportion of any general fund belonging to the town for the use of schools, or which may be appointed by the state, on such conditions as the law shall prescribe. It is unnecessary here to dwell on the usefulness of such institution to the rising generation, and to the community in general.

Cities, which I have placed in the same division, are to be considered as towns consistering of a more numerous and dense population, where we find, pressed as it were, into contact with each other, people of every condition in life, from the extreme of wealth, to the extreme of poverty, and of character, from the highest degree of integrity and moral worth, to the lowest degree of profligacy, vice, and crime. They will therefore demand a different organization, and powers more extensive and efficient. Cities in this country have generally, in the form and manner of their government, had a more arbitrary cast than what belongs to our free institutions: the examples have been taken from governments of different principles and a different construction.

The situation and circumstances of cities, above hinted, will require an organization different from that of the common towns, and a more energetic government, and which may have a nearer analogy to the state government. In this case the powers of local legislation cannot be properly exercised by the people in their public meetings, which would bring together a heterogenous and ungovernable multitude, setting at defiance all discussion, all deliberation and every semblance of order. It therefore appears most proper that resort should be had to the system of representation. The power of making all the necessary local laws and regulations may, under proper guards, be vested in a city legislature to consist like the state