Legislation thereafter enacted in the excercise of the police power which is not invalid otherwise than for its incidental effect upon such rights. (Id.)

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; DUE PROCESS OF LAW; REGULATING STORAGE OF OIL AND GASOLINE.-A municipal ordinance that forbids the storing of petroleum or gasoline within 300 feet of any dwelling, beyond certain small quantities specified, is not, on its face, so unnecessary and unreasonable as to render it invalid as taking property without due process of law. (Per Holmes, J., in Pierce Oil Corporation v. City of Hope, decided January 27, 1919, and reported in U. S. Adv. Ops., March 1, 1919, p. 210).

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; POLICE POWER; REGULATING BUSINESS. -A business that is lawful to-day may in the future, because of changed situation, the growth of population, or other causes, become a menace to the public health and welfare, and be required to yield to the public good. (Id.)

PLEADING; DEMURRER; WHAT ADMITTED BY; CONCLUSIONS OF LAW.-An averment in the bill in a suit to enjoin the enforcement of a municipal ordinance, that such ordinance is unnecessary and unreasonable, if it be regarded as a conclusion of law upon the point which the court must decide, is not admitted by a demurrer. (Id.)

PLEADING; DEMURRER; WHAT ADMITTED BY; FACTS NOT WELL PLEADING.—A demurrer to the bill in a suit to enjoin the enforcement of a municipal ordinance does not admit the averment in such bill that the ordinance is unnecessary and unreasonable, even it is to be taken to allege that the facts exist which lead to that conclusion, since, if there are material facts in the averment in this general form it is insufficient. Only facts well pleaded are confessed. (Id.)

PLEADING; DEMURRER; ADMISSION.-A demurrer does not necessarily admit the truth of an allegation in the bill in asuit to enjoin the enforcement of a municipal ordinance regulating the storage of oil and gasoline as unconstitutional, that complainant's plant is safe and does not threaten the damages that led to the passage of the ordinance. (Id.)

EVIDENCE; JUDICIAL NOTICE; UNEXPLAINED EXPLOSION.— Judicial notice may be taken that disastrous explosions have occurred for which no satisfactory explanations have been offered. (Id.)

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; POLICE POWER; REGULATING STORAGE OF OIL AND GASOLINE.-The fact that some innocent objects may be embraced by reason of the necessarily general form of an ordinance prohibiting the storage of oil and gasoline within a specified distance of a dwelling is not in it self enough to invalidate the ordinance, or to except such an object from its operation. (Id.)

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; IMPAIRING CONTRACT OBLIGATIONS; WHAT CONTRACTS PROTECTED; POLICE POWER.-A contract on the part of a municipal corporation not to legislate against the storage of oil and gasoline in a given situation if the public welfare shall require removal of such a business to its present site was made at the municipality's request, and such a contract, if made, would have no effect. (Id.)

(Decided by the Supreme Court of Spain.)
(Reported by A. C.)

ABANDONMENT OF CHILDREN; WHEN COMMITTED; INTENT PRESUMED.-The crime of abandonment of children is committed when a mother immediately after giving birth to a child leaves him alone in a solitary place, thus exposing his life to imminent peril altho the lack of intention cannot be ascertained, for its existence is presumed unless the contrary is proven. (Art. 487 Penal Code.) (Sent. of November 8, 1916; 97 Jur. Crim., 191.)

COERCION AND THREATS; ARBITRARY ACTS.-A lessor who forces a lessee to leave the house of the former by locking the door and putting the effects of the latter on the street against his will constitutes the crime of coercion provided for in art. 494 of the Penal Code, for such acts are arbitrary. (Sent. of November 18, 1916; Id., page 233.)

ROBBERY; PRINCIPAL AND ACCOMPLICE.-According to repeated doctrines, a person who, according to the plans agreed upon by the robbers, watches the house of the offended party in order to prevent any possible surprise or danger of capture, is a principal and not an accomplice. (Sent. of November 29, 1916; Id., page 281.)

LESIONES; RESULTS OF AGGRESSION.-The wounds inflicted upon a person who attempts to snatch the weapon with which he is attacked from his assailer should be considered the direct and immediate consequences of such aggression and not merely accidental as alleged by the accused. (Sent. of December 9, 1916; Id., 298.)

ESTAFA; SUBSTITUTION OF A THING FOR ANOTHER OF LITTLE VALUE; INTENT OF GAIN.-The substitution of a movable property for another of little value with intent of gain, effected by the depositary of the said property constitutes the crime of estafa as provided for in Art. 535 of Penal Code, par. 5. (Sent. of December 19, 1916; Id., page 328.)

RAPE; THREATS; UNCHASTE DESIGNS.-The accused by means of threats, unchaste designs and force attempted to realize his carnal desires over a girl, but due to her resistance, the said accused was not able to satisfy his wants, Held-That

the defendant is guilty of rape as prescribed in art. 438 of Penal Code par. (1) which is characterized by dishonesty, violence and lewd designs of the accused. (Sent. of December 27, 1916; Id., page 359.)

(Decided by the Supreme Court of Porto Rico.

January 1918.

(Reported by A. C.)

PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW; DOCUMENTS EXECUTED IN A FOREIGN COUNTRY; “ESTATUTO REAL”; “ESTATUTO CONTRACTUAL.” -A document executed in New York evidencing the ownership of an inmovable property situated in this island, should possess all the requisites necessary for its validity in accordance with articles 10 and 11 of the Civil Code which require that inmovable property is subject to the laws of the country wherein it is situated and that the forms and solemnities of contracts, testaments and other public writings are regulated by the laws of the country where they are executed. (Rojas, Randail y Co. Inc., vs. Registrador Guayama, Revista de Legislación y Jurisprudencia de la Asociación de Abogados de Puerto Rico, Vol. V, No. 1, January and February 1919.)

DISALLOWANCE OF APPEAL; JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT; APPEAL OF CASES PROCEEDING FROM MUNICIPAL COURTS.— In this case which originated in the Municipal court of Caguas, the appellees asked for the disallowance of the appeal upon the following grounds: (1) that, according to their allegations and conclusions of the lower court, the value of the property pledged, the nullity of which the plaintiff-appellees are seeking for is below P300.00, for which reason they alleged that this court lacks jurisdiction; (2) that the defendants have not prosecuted the appeal with due diligence; Held-That the contract of pledge having been constituted to secure a loan of P251.00 plus P100.00 for costs in case of judicial demand, and the defendant-appellant having acquired the pledged property for P365.65, it should be noticed that the amount involved exceeds P300.00 and, therefore, according to art. 295, No. 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, this court has jurisdiction to consider the appeal, the denial of which neither proceeds from lack of diligence in its procedure, because the appellant acted with the consent of the lower court and recorded the transcript of the decrees before the hearing of the motion. (García vs. Fernandez Suarez et al., Id.)

RIGHT OF WAY; IMMEMORIAL USE; INJUCTION; PRESCRIPTION.— The plaintiffs as lessors of a certain farm brought an action for injuction to prevent the defendant who is the owner of a contiguous parcel of land from passing over the land of the plaintiffs. The defendant opposed the rights of the plaintiffs and the District

Court dismissed the complaint on the ground that the road in dispute constitutes an easement imposed upon the leased land in favor of the defendant as owner of the dominant estate. Upon appeal, this court held, that, deciding this case according to the laws prior to the Civil Code, the defendant could invoke the immemorial use of the road in order to show his right to pass over it, and could prove as he had proven such use by the testimony of witnesses, one of whom is from 65 to 67 years old, and another from 76 to 77 years whose testimony embraced a period of more than 40 years. (Nido y Co. vs. Albir Alicea, Id.)

1. CONTRACTS; PURCHASE AND SALE; ACCEPTANCE BY THE VENDEE.-Roas, Niese & Co., Inc., a corporation duly organized according to the laws of New York, sells an immovable property as evidenced in a public document executed in New York to Rojas, Randal & Co., another corporation organized also under the laws of New York without appearing in the said document that the vended corporation has intervened in the contract and has accepted it itself or through its legal representative, for its corporate seal and not that of the vendor corporation is stamped on the document, Held-That it is a defect which can be remedied and which does not prevent the inscription from being verified. (Rojas, Randal & Co., Inc. vs. Reg. de Guayama, Id.)

2. ID.; CONSENT; CAPACITY OF PARTY APPEARING.-The contract is inscribable as in the present case wherein a person swears to be the president of the vendor corporation without documentally acrediting his capacity as such, for that circumstance only constitutes a remediable defect. (Id.)

SUFFICIENCY OF COMPLAINT; ACTION TO RECOVER A SUM OF MONEY; LIQUIDATION OR RENDITION OF ACCOUNTS.-The default of a defendant admits all the facts clearly alleged in the complaint. Having been considered the matter alleged in said complaint, held, that it does not require the liquidation or rendition of accounts, the same being sufficient to constitute a cause of action. (Muniz vs. "El Zenit," Id.)

HABEAS CORPUS; MURDER IN THE FIRST DEGREE; BOND DURING THE TRIAL; DEATH PENALTY.-It being clearly provided for in sec. 2 of the Organic Law of this island, effective March 2, 1917, that any person can, before being convicted, give bond with sufficient surety except in capital crimes when guilt is evident or the presumption great, and the petitioner, not having been accused of a crime which is penalized by death for not having at present according to our Penal Code as amended any crime punishable by death which has been abolished until April 30, 1921, by the law of Nov. 30, 1917, No. 36 of the Legislative Assembly of Porto Rico, has the right to furnish bond in order to be free while the trial for the crime of which he is accused is going on. (Barreal vs. Labiosa, Alcaide, Id.)

(Decided by the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands.)

(Reported by A. C.)

BAILMENTS; LIABILITY OF BAILEE; LOSS THROUGH ACCIDENT.— Where plaintiff left 160 photographic films with defendant to be washed and refixed, and two or three days later said films were burned in an accidental fire which occurred in defendant's place of business, Held-That defendant is not liable. This was a bailment "locatio operis faciendi causa," which term is applied to that bailment where compensation is given for labor and service done upon a chattel or in connection with it; in this bailment ordinary care and diligence are required of bailee and is not liable for the inevitable loss or destruction of chattel, not attributable to his fault. (Per Street, J. in Brown vs. Robert Inc., R. G. No. 14390, decided June 24, 1919.)

ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE; DURESS; AGE.-Plaintiff, 12 years of age asked for annulment of marriage between her and defendant, 21 years old. Parents of plaintiff forced her to answer "Yes" to every question put to her by the protestant minister who performed the marriage ceremony. After ceremony, she went home and never sustained marital relations with defendant who alleged that there was consent for they were in love with each other. Held-The tender age of plaintiff, the natural influence which a father and mother would have over such a child, and particularly to the plain and straightforward testimony of the girl who appears never to have had, nor now to have any desire to live with defendant, shows that consent of girl was obtained by force and that after the marriage it is proved that she did not freely cohabit with said defendant as his wife. (Per Malcolm, J. in Bocareli vs. Mislang, R. G. No. 13882, decided June 25, 1919.)

PROBATE OF WILLS; ITS REQUISITES; CONSTITUTIONALITY OF ACT No. 2645.-Plaintiff alleges that Act No. 2645 is void and unconstitutional because the fact that Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, ratifies and confirms all acts of Philippine Commission to this date; and Act 190 being one of them, the Philippine Legislature cannot amend section 618 of said Act 190 by enacting Act No. 2645 Held-Congress had ratified and confirmed only in its Act of July 1, 1902, the action of the President of the United States as specified in section first of the said act and not all the laws promulgated until that date by the Philippine Commission. (Per Avanceña, in In Re Francisco Artizada, R. G. No. 13484, decided June 27, 1919.)

APPOINTMENT OF ADMINISTRATOR; WHEN NOT NECESSARY.— When there are no debts outstanding against the estate and when the property is in possession of one who pretends to be only heir of the deceased, there is no reason to require the appointment of an administrator. (See Malahacan vs. Ignacio, 19 Phil. 434.) If the petitioner in this case is also an heir, he has a perfect right to present an action and set up this fact and have a partition of the property left by the deceased. (Per Moir, J. in Igne vs. Cansino, R. G. No. 13358, decided June 27, 1919.)