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cago, and after reviewing some of the authorities on the subject of interstate commerce, the court said (p. 450):

"Indeed, the cases upon this subject are almost too numerous for citation, and the one under consideration is clearly controlled by them. The sewing machine was made and sold in another State, shipped to North Carolina in its original package for delivery to the consignee upon payment of its price. It had never become commingled with the general mass of property within the State. While technically the title of the machine may not have passed until the price was paid, the sale was actually made in Chicago, and the fact that the price was to be collected in North Carolina is too slender a thread upon which to hang an exception of the transaction from a rule which would otherwise declare the tax to be an interference with interstate commerce."

The controlling force of the two cases last reviewed upon this becomes doubly manifest when it is borne in mind that the power of the States to levy general and undiscriminating taxes on merchandise shipped from one State into another may attach to such merchandise before sale in the original package when the merchandise has become at rest within the State, and therefore enjoys the protection of its laws, and this upon the well-recognized distinction that the movement of merchandise from State to State, whilst constituting interstate commerce, is not an import in the technical sense of the Constitution. American Steel & Wire Company v. Speed, 192 U. S. 500.

As from the foregoing considerations it results that the court below erred in refusing to apply and enforce the commerce clause of the Constitution of the United States, its judgment must be reversed.

The judgment of the Supreme Court of Iowa is reversed, and the cause is remanded to that court for proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.


196 U. S.

Opinion of the Court.



No. 82. Argued December 2, 1904.-Decided January 3, 1905.

American Express Co. v. Iowa, ante, p. 133, followed.

THE facts are stated in the opinion.

Mr. Lawrence Maxwell, Jr., for plaintiff in error.1

Mr. Charles W. Mullan, Attorney General of the State of Iowa, for defendant in error.1

MR. JUSTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the court.

This was an indictment against the Adams Express Company, in a court of Iowa, for maintaining a nuisance in violation of a section of the code of that State. It was charged in the indictment in substance that the Adams Express Company, between July and December, 1900, at St. Charles, Madison County, Iowa, used a building for the purpose of selling intoxicating liquors therein, contrary to law, and that the company owned and kept in said building intoxicating liquors with the intent unlawfully to sell them within the State, contrary to an Iowa statute. There was a plea of not guilty, a trial and verdict of guilty, and a sentence imposing a fine of $350 and costs.

An agreed statement of facts was stipulated, from which it appears that the Adams Express Company was a common carrier, engaged in the express business between the States of Missouri and Iowa; that it received the liquor in question at

1 This case was argued simultaneously with American Express Co. v. Iowa, for abstracts of arguments see p. 134, ante.

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St. Joseph, Missouri, to be carried to St. Charles, Iowa, there to be delivered to the consignees, whose names were upon the packages, and that each and all were marked C. O. D., meaning that they were not to be delivered by the express company to the consignees until the purchase price and the express charges were paid to the agent of the express company. It was further recited in the statement of facts that the only connection of the Adams Express Company with the transaction or transactions in relation to said liquors was as a common carrier, having received the same in Missouri for carriage to the consignees at St. Charles, Iowa.

The trial court charged the jury, in substance, that if from the evidence it appeared, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant express company held at its depot for delivery to the consignees packages of liquor shipped from other States, upon which the price was to be collected under a C. O. D. arrangement, the defendant must be found guilty of keeping and maintaining a place for the sale of intoxicating liquors within the meaning of the Iowa statutes.

On appeal to the Supreme Court of Iowa from the judgment of conviction the action of the trial court was approved upon the authority of the case of the State of Iowa against the American Express Company, and at bar it was conceded that the issues in this case "are identical in every particular" with those which were involved in that case. As we have just re

versed the judgment of the Supreme Court of Iowa in the American Express Company case, it follows, for the reasons stated in the opinion in that case, that the judgment in this must also be reversed.

The judgment of the Supreme Court of Iowa is reversed, and the cause is remanded to that court for proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.


196 U.S.

Statement of the Case.



No. 110. Submitted December 13, 1904.-Decided January 3, 1905.

The bankruptcy court has jurisdiction to determine on a claim asserted by the bankrupt whether property in the hands of the trustee is exempt; and while an erroneous decision against the asserted right may be corrected in the appropriate mode for the correction of errors, the jurisdiction of the court is not in issue within the meaning of the act of March 3, 1891, and a direct appeal to this court will not lie.

THIS is an appeal from a decree of the District Court of the United States for the Southern District of Alabama, sitting in bankruptcy, establishing and directing the enforcement of a lien upon the proceeds of two policies of insurance in the hands of the trustee in bankruptcy. The District Court filed findings of fact and its conclusions of law, in pursuance to the third subdivision of General Order in Bankruptcy 36; and an appeal was taken upon the question of jurisdiction alone, under the supposed authority of the fifth section of the judiciary act of March 3, 1891.

In substance the pertinent facts stated in the findings were as follows:

D. D. Lucius, a resident citizen of Alabama, was, in voluntary proceedings, adjudged a bankrupt, and the case was sent to a referee. In his schedules, Lucius claimed as exempt drugs to the value of $1,000 and $1,000 of a balance of $1,150 due upon the aforementioned policies of insurance. The policies subsequently came into the possession of the trustee in bankruptcy.

The Cawthon-Coleman Company were creditors of Lucius for about the sum of $1,000, evidenced by a note containing a

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waiver of exemption of personal property, and secured by a mortgage upon the homestead of Lucius, which mortgage contained a stipulation for insurance for the benefit of the mortgagees. The two policies above referred to were obtained in consequence of the stipulation referred to, and while in force and before the adjudication in bankruptcy the dwelling insured was destroyed by fire. Claiming, by reason of the facts just stated, an equitable lien upon the proceeds of the insurance, the Cawthon-Coleman Company filed a petition in the bankruptcy proceedings to establish and enforce their alleged lien. During the pendency of this proceeding the trustee in bankruptcy collected the balance due upon the policies. The trustee reported an allowance of the exemption out of such proceeds as claimed by the bankrupt, and shortly afterwards the bankrupt filed a plea denying jurisdiction in the court to hear and determine the claim of lien. This plea was overruled by the referee, who also refused to confirm the allowance of the exemption claimed by the bankrupt, and an order was made by the referee directing the trustee to pay to the CawthonColeman Company on the mortgage indebtedness the sum of $1,001.40 out of the insurance proceeds. Thereafter, to quote from the findings, "upon a review by the district judge sitting in bankruptcy, of the referee's decision, the judge affirmed it, and rendered a decree asserting that the bankruptcy court had jurisdiction to hear and determine this matter, and granted the relief prayed by the petition of Cawthon-Coleman Company." This appeal on the question of jurisdiction was then taken direct to this court.

Mr. Harry Pillans and Mr. William James Johnson for appellant:

The bankruptcy court is of limited jurisdiction and has only the authority conferred by the statute creating it. Re Morris, Fed. Cas. 9,825; Collier on Bankruptcy, 11. Where jurisdiction of the court has been sustained see Re Turnbull, 106 Fed. Rep. 667; Re Mayer, 108 Fed. Rep. 599; McGahan v. Anderson, 113

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