posed upon the carrier by the statute in question here, which is much more onerous, and imposes a liability, unless the detailed information provided for in the statute is obtained and given to the shipper.

The case of Chicago, Milwaukee &c. Railway Company v. Solan, 169 U. S. 133, holds the same general principle as that involved in the case just cited. To the same effect are the cases referred to in the opinion of Mr. Justice Gray in the Solan case. It is idle to attempt to comment upon the various cases decided by this court relating to this clause of the Federal Constitution. We are familiar with them, and we are certain that our decision in this case does not run counter to the principles decided in any of those cases. The statute here considered we think plainly imposes a burden upon the carrier of interstate commerce and is not an aid to it, but in its direct and immediate effect it is quite the contrary.

The power to regulate the relative rights and duties of all persons and corporations within the limits of the State cannot extend so far as to thereby regulate interstate commerce. The police power of the State does not give it the right to violate any provision of the Federal Constitution. Being of the opinion that the statute in question when applied to an interstate shipment is a regulation of interstate commerce, we must hold the statute, so far as it affects such shipments, to be void on that account. The judgment of the Supreme Court of Georgia is reversed and the case remanded for such further proceedings as may be consistent with this opinion.

Reversed.

No. 68. Argued December 2, 1904.-Decided January 9, 1905.

An apt and sensible meaning must be given to words as they are used in a statute and the association of words must be regarded as designed and not as accidental, nor will a word be considered an intruder if the statute can be construed reasonably without eliminating that word. In the act of June 3, 1878, 20 Stat. 88, c. 150, permitting the use of timber on the public lands for "building, agricultural, mining and other domestic purposes," the word "domestic" is not to be construed as relating solely to household purposes omitting "other" altogether but it applies to the locality to which the statute is directed and gives permission to industries there practiced to use the public timber.

To enlarge or abridge a permission given by Congress to certain specified industries to use the public timber would not be regulation but legislation and under the provisions of the statute of June 3, 1878, 20 Stat. 88, the power given by the Secretary of the Interior to make regulations cannot deprive a domestic industry from using the timber.

THE facts are stated in the opinion.

Mr. Special Assistant Attorney Marsden C. Burch for the United States:

Rule 7 is within the authority granted to the Secretary of the Interior by the act of June 3, 1878. Nor. Pac. R. R. Co. v. Lewis, 162 U. S. 376; United States v. Williams, 12 Pac. Rep. (Mont.) 851.

This court has recognized the authority of Congress to grant a privilege or license and to clothe an executive officer with the right to grant or refuse or restrict such permission under such rules and regulations as he may see fit to adopt in view of conditions as they exist from time to time. See Williams v. United States, 138 U. S. 514, 524; Field v. Clark, 143 U. S. 649,

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OCTOBER TERM, 1904.

Argument for the United States.

196 U. S.

680, 692; Caha v. United States, 152 U. S. 211, 218, 220; In re Kollock, 165 U. S. 526; United States v. Ormsbee, 74 Fed. Rep. 207, 209; United States v. City of Moline, 82 Fed. Rep. 592, 598; Wilkins v. United States, 96 Fed. Rep. 837, 839, 841; United States v. Dastervignes et al., 122 Fed. Rep. 30; The Cin. Wil. & Z. Railroad Company v. Commissioners of Clinton County, 1 Ohio St. 77, 87; Lock's Appeal, 72 Pa. St. 22; P. F. Smith, 491, 498, 499; Port Royal Mining Company v. Hagood et al., 2 Law Rep. Ann. 841, 843, 844.

As to the phrase "and for other purposes," see United States v. Mullan Fuel Co., 118 Fed. Rep. 663; Cong. Rec., Part 4, 45th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 3328.

The construction of an act of Congress by those charged with its execution should not be disregarded by the judiciary unless the construction be clearly wrong. United States v. Johnston, 124 U. S. 236; Heath v. Wallace, 138 U. S. 573; Hawley v. Diller, 178 U. S. 476. If there be a doubt as to the meaning of Congress the construction given by the Executive Department should control. Pennoyer v. McConnaughy, 140 U. S. 1; United States v. Hill, 120 U. S. 169; United States v. Philbrick, 120 U. S. 52.

"Roasting" ore is not a "mining" purpose. For definition of "smelt" and "mining," see Standard Dictionary; Century Dictionary; United States v. Richmond Mining Co., 40 Fed. Rep. 415; 2 Snyder on Mining Law, § 134. See also act of March 3, 1891.

The statute does not plainly indicate the sense in which Congress used the word "domestic." That word appears to have four possible meanings:

(1) Belonging to the house or household and its relations. (2) Addicted or adapted to family life, etc. (3) Tame. (4) Of or pertaining to one's own State or country. It will be conceded that the sense in which Congress used the word is embraced either in No. 1 or No. 4. But the real intention is rendered obscure by the use of the word "other." The specific enumeration, "building, agricultural, and mining," is of no

196 U.S.

Argument for Appellee.

value whatever if the word "other" means "local," because Congress could easily have said "for domestic purposes" without any specific enumeration. We urge upon the court the simple proposition that Congress used the word "domestic" as belonging to the household.

If the real intention of Congress cannot be ascertained from the act itself, or from the meaning of the words used therein, we urge that the character of the act must be considered and the proper rules of construction applied. The statute is permissive. Statutes which grant property privileges are to be construed most strictly in favor of the Government and a use not unequivocally authorized by the language of the act must be excluded. Sutherland, Stat. Const. § 378; Slidell v. Grandjean, 111 U. S. 412, 437; Central Transp. Co. v. Pullman Co., 139 U. S. 24, 49; United States v. Dastervignes, 118 Fed. Rep. 199; Endlich, § 354.

Mr. Alfred B. Cruikshank for appellee:

The acts of defendant come well within the permissive provisions of § 24 of the Act of June 3, 1878, c. 150. The phrase "domestic purposes" means the same as "local purposes." For prior judicial constructions of the word "domestic," see United States v. Richmond Mining Co., 40 Fed. Rep. 415; United States v. Copper Queen Con. Mining Co., 185 U. S. 495. Roasting ore is a mining purpose within the meaning of the act. See Webster; Encyclopedia Brittanica. The statute is remedial and should be liberally construed in favor of the citizen. See Endlich, § 354.

Rule 7 of the Interior Department did not make defendant's acts unlawful.

The rule is to be interpreted as not including the roasting of ore in its prohibition of smelting. The difference between roasting and smelting is not merely technical but substantial. In smelting a chemical change in the ore itself is produced; in roasting there is no such process or result. Smelting includes fusion; roasting does not. For some of the accepted definiVOL. CXCVI-14

tions of smelting and roasting, see Webster, Worcester and Standard Dictionaries.

The regulation of the Secretary is illegal and invalid. Cases cited by the Government are inapplicable both as to meaning of phrase "for other purposes" and as to construction of statute.

MR. JUSTICE MCKENNA delivered the opinion of the court.

Action brought by the United States against the appellee, which we shall call the Copper Company, for the sum of $38,976.75, the value of timber cut and removed from certain unsurveyed mineral land in the Territory of Arizona.

The timber or wood was alleged to have been cut by one Rafael Lopez, a resident and citizen of Arizona, and amounted to 6,496 cords, of the value of $6 per cord, or the sum of $38,976.75.

It is alleged that the timber belonged to the United States, and "was used and consumed by the said defendant for the purpose of roasting ore at the United Verde Copper mines, said mines being the property of defendant herein, at Jerome, Yavapai County, Arizona Territory, in violation of the act of Congress of June 3, 1878, 20 Stat. 88, c. 150, and of the rules and regulations of the Secretary of the Interior, promulgated under the authority of said act of Congress."

The Copper Company demurred to the complaint. The demurrer was sustained. The United States refused to amend, and judgment was entered for the Copper Company. It was affirmed by the Supreme Court of the Territory.

Section 1 of the act of June 3, 1878, upon which the action is based, is as follows:

"That all citizens of the United States and other persons, bona fide residents of the State of Colorado or Nevada, or either of the Territories of New Mexico, Arizona, Utah, Wyoming, Dakota, Idaho, or Montana, and all other mineral districts of the United States, shall be, and are hereby, authorized and