"When two parties, acting together, commit an illegal or wrongful act the party who is held responsible for the act cannot have indemnity or contribution from the other, because both are equally culpable or particeps criminis, and the damage results from their joint offense. This rule does not apply when one does the act or creates the nuisance, and the other does not join therein, but is thereby exposed to liability and suffers damage. He may recover from the party whose wrongful act has thus exposed him. In such cases the parties are not in pari delicto as to each other, though as to third persons either may be held liable."

In a later case in Massachusetts, Boston Woven Hose Co. v. Kendall, 178 Massachusetts, 232, it was held that a manufacturer of an iron boiler known as a vulcanizer, which had been furnished upon an order which required a boiler which would stand a pressure of one hundred pounds to the square inch, which order was accordingly accepted, the manufacturer undertaking to make the boiler in a good and workmanlike manner, but which because of a defect in that the hinge of the door was constructed in such a way that it did not press tight enough against the face of the boiler to stand a pressure of 75 pounds, at which pressure the packing blew out and allowed the naphtha vapor to escape, was liable for the damages which the hose company had been compelled to pay to one of its employés injured by the accident, although the defect might have been discovered upon reasonable inspection by the hose company. In that case the boiler was sold upon a warranty. As was said by Mr. Chief Justice Holmes, delivering the opinion of the court:

"The very purpose of the warranty was that the boiler should be used in the plaintiff's works with reliance upon the defendants' judgment in a matter as to which the defendants were experts and the plaintiff presumably was not. Whether the false warranty be called a tort or a breach of contract, the consequences which ensued must be taken to have been contemplated and was not too remote. The fact that the reliance

was not justified as toward the men does not do away with the fact that the defendants invited it with notice of what might be the consequences if it should be misplaced, and there is no policy of the law opposed to their being held to make their representations good."

Other cases might be cited, which are applications of the exception engrafted upon the general rule of non-contribution among wrongdoers, holding that the law will inquire into the facts of a case of the character shown with a view to fastening the ultimate liability upon the one whose wrong has been primarily responsible for the injury sustained. In the present case there is nothing in the facts as stated to show that any negligence or misconduct of the railroad company caused the defect in the car which resulted in the injury to the brakeman. That company received the car from its owner, the Hammond Packing Company, whether in good order or not the record does not disclose. It is true that a railroad company owes a duty of inspection to its employés as to cars received from other companies as well as to those which it may own. more & Potomac Railroad Co. v. Mackey, 157 U. S. 72. the present case the omission of duty for which the railroad company was sought to be held was the failure to inspect the car with such reasonable diligence as would have discovered the defect in it. It may be conceded that the railroad company having a contract with the terminal company, to receive and transport the cars furnished, it was bound to use reasonable diligence to see that the cars were turned over in good order, and a discharge of this duty required an inspection of the cars by the railroad company upon delivery to the terminal company. But that the terminal company owed a similar duty to its employés and neglected to perform the same to the injury of an employé, has been established by the decision of the Supreme Court of Nebraska already referred to.

BaltiBut in

The case then stands in this wise: The railroad company and the terminal company have been guilty of a like neglect of duty in failing to properly inspect the car before putting it in

use by those who might be injured thereby. We do not perceive that, because the duty of inspection was first required from the railroad company, the case is thereby brought within the class which holds the one primarily responsible, as the real cause of the injury, liable to another less culpable, who may have been held to respond for damages for the injury inflicted. It is not like the case of the one who creates a nuisance in the public streets; or who furnishes a defective dock; or the case of the gas company, where it created the condition of unsafety by its own wrongful act; or the case of the defective boiler, which blew out because it would not stand the pressure warranted by the manufacturer. In all these cases the wrongful act of the one held finally liable created the unsafe or dai.. gerous condition from which the injury resulted. The principal and moving cause, resulting in the injury sustained, was the act of the first wrongdoer, and the other has been held liable to third persons for failing to discover or correct the defect caused by the positive act of the other.

In the present case the negligence of the parties has been of the same character. Both the railroad company and the terminal company failed by proper inspection to discover the defective brake. The terminal company, because of its fault, has been held liable to one sustaining an injury thereby. We do not think the case comes within that exceptional class which permits one wrongdoer who has been mulcted in damages to recover indemnity or contribution from another.

For the reasons stated, the question propounded will be answered in the negative.

196 U. S.

Statement of the Case.

SLAVENS v. UNITED STATES.

APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF CLAIMS.

No. 228. Argued December 7, 8, 1904.-Decided January 9, 1905.

Under the mail contract in this case, which was made in pursuance of the Postal Laws and Regulations, and after the service had materially decreased by changed methods of transporting mail and the Postmaster General had offered the contractor, who had refused to accept it, the remaining work at a lower compensation, it was within the power of the Postmaster General to put an end to the contract by order of discontinuance, allowing one month's pay as indemnity, and to relet the remaining service; the power to terminate the contract on allowing a month's pay as indemnity was not predicated on an abandonment of the entire service.

While the provisions in a similar contract that the contractor should perform without additional compensation all new or changed service that the Postmaster General should order, might not be construed as extending to services of different character and not within the terms of the contract, where the changed service is to take the mail to and from street cars, met at crossings, instead of landings and stations, it comes within the power reserved to the Postmaster General and the contractor is not entitled to additional compensation therefor.

In the absence of authority shown, a local postmaster has no power or authority to contract in respect to mail messenger service, and is not the agent of nor can he bind the Government for that purpose, and if a contractor performs services which he protests against as not being within his contract, solely on the postmaster's order, he is not entitled to extra compensation therefor after his protest has been sustained and the serIvice let to others.

THE appellant filed his petition in the Court of Claims to recover for the alleged wrongful termination of certain mail contracts in the cities of Boston, Brooklyn and Omaha; and, also, for extra services performed in connection therewith. The Court of Claims, in disposing of the case, made separate findings of fact and conclusions of law. The findings of fact may be abridged for the purpose of this case, reference being made for fuller details to the findings in the Court of Claims. 38 C. Cl. 574. In pursuance of an advertisement for proposals for transporting the mails-"covered regulation wagon, mail,

messenger and mail station service"-the appellant entered into contracts for four years each for the cities of Boston and Brooklyn, and two years for the city of Omaha. The Boston and Brooklyn contracts began on July 1, 1893, and the Omaha contract on July 1, 1894. Compensation for the Boston contract was at the rate of $49,516 per annum; for the Brooklyn contract, $18,934 per annum, and for the Omaha contract at $3,780 per annum. During the terms of the Boston and Brooklyn contracts the Postmaster General determined to carry certain of the mails within the district contracted for on electric street railway lines. In both cases the appellant was offered the privilege of continuing the contract for the reduced service, but refused to do so in each case. The Postmaster General terminated the Boston and Brooklyn contracts, above referred to, the former on February 1, 1896, the latter on March 1, 1896, acting, as he avers, under the authority vested in him by law and the contract between the parties, but not because of any negligence or default on the part of the contractor. He afterwards relet the same service, as thus reduced, to another contractor, for the remaining period of the contract of the seventeen months of the Boston contract, at the compensation of $37,000 per annum. The difference between the contract price and the amount it would cost the appellant to furnish the service in Boston during said seventeen months would be $18,884.14. The service of the Brooklyn contract for the remaining period of sixteen months was let to another contractor at a compensation of $9,720 per annum. The court did not find the amount of the loss to the appellant by reason of the termination of this contract. The contracts contained certain stipulations, as set forth in the opinion.

The contracts covered certain specified stations, landings and mail stations from which the contractor was required to carry the mail, and during the terms of such contracts he was required to perform certain services, which he alleges to be extra services, and for which he was entitled to extra compensation-in the Boston contract, carrying the mails from the gen