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upon the business carried on upon such property may not be made a lien as well as a claim against the owner. The owner is not only chargeable with a knowledge of the law in respect thereto, but he is presumed to know the business there carried on, and to have let the property with knowledge that it might become encumbered by a tax imposed upon such business. Sheldon v. Van Buskirk, 2 N. Y. 473; Brown Shoe Co. v. Hunt, 103 Iowa, 586; Polk Co. v. Hierb, 37 Iowa, 361; State v. Snyder, 34 Kansas, 425; Hardten v. State, 32 Kansas, 637; Sears v. Cottrell, 5 Michigan, 251; Walderon v. Lee, 5 Pick. 323; Spencer v. M'Gowen & Shepard, 13 Wend. 256; Simpson v. Serviss, 2 Ohio Circuit Decisions, 246.
Acts of Congress impressing liens upon real estate for taxes or penalties arising from business illegally carried on there, have been the frequent subject of controversy in this court.
Conceding that the landowner is entitled to notice before he can be personally liable, or before his property can be impressed with a lien, we are of opinion that he is protected by sections 2441 and 2442, which permit him to make application at the meeting of the board of supervisors next following the listing of the property, the sessions of which board are fixed by law, Iowa Code, sec. 412, to remit the tax. This application may be made at any time after the property has been assessed, upon eight days' notice being given to the county attorney. Witnesses are examined under oath before the board, which determines by a majority vote whether the tax shall stand or be remitted. If the petition be denied, the owner of the property can appeal to the District Court for a judicial determination of his liability. This is sufficient. If the taxpayer be given an opportunity to test the validity of the tax at any time before it is made final, whether the proceedings for review take place before a board having a quasi judicial character, or before a tribunal provided by the State for the purpose of determining such questions, due process of law is not denied. It was held by this court in Pittsburg &c. Ry. Co. v. Backus, 154 U. S. 421, 426, that a hearing before
judgment, with full opportunity to present the evidence and the arguments which the party deems important, is all that can be adjudged vital. See also King v. Mullins, 171 U. S. 404.
In the amendment to the petition in this case the landowner states that she had no knowledge whatever that her real estate was being used for the sale of cigarettes until after the assessment was levied, and never consented to the same; that she resides in Illinois, and rented the property through an agent, who had had no knowledge himself of the sale of cigarettes upon the premises. There is no allegation, however, that she did not have knowledge within ample time to make application to the board of supervisors for the remission of the tax. If such application had been made, it would have been the duty of the board to take the matter into consideration and determine whether her want of knowledge would justify the remission of the tax. It is not for us to determine whether the defense be a valid one, since, having the opportunity to make it, she declined to do so.
The question is made whether section 5007 violates the constitution of Iowa in not stating distinctly the tax and the object to which it is to be applied, but as this is purely a local question, we are not called upon to consider it.
The CHIEF JUSTICE, MR. JUSTICE BREWER and MR. JusTICE PECKHAM dissented.
ERROR TO THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI.
No. 343. Argued November 30, December 1, 1904.-Decided January 16, 1908.
A Senator of the United States was indicted and tried in the Eastern Dis
trict of Missouri for a violation of g 1782, Rev. Stat., the indictment averring that he had rendered services for a certain corporation before the Post Office Department in matters in which the United States was interested, that is, whether a "fraud order" should issue against such corporation, and that he had received payment at St. Louis therefor. The defendant denied that the United States was interested in the matters referred to in the indictment within the meaning of $ 1782, Rev. Stat., or that he had rendered any service in violation thereof, and alleged that the services which he had rendered to, and had been paid for by, the corporation, were those of general counsel, and not connected with the "fraud order.” It was proved without contradiction that the compensation he received under certain counts was sent to him from St. Louis and · received by him in Washington in the form of checks on a St. Louis bank which he deposited in his bank in Washington, receiving credit therefor at once, and which checks were subsequently paid in due course. On the trial the jurisdiction of the court was denied, the offense, if any there was, having been committed at Washington and not at St. Louis, and the defendant also asserted his privilege from arrest under $ 6, Art. I of the Constitution. The court held that the privilege from arrest was waived and submitted to the jury whether there was any agreement by which the place of payment of the checks was St. Louis and not Wash
ington: Held that, The facts alleged in the indictment showed a case that is covered by the
provisions of $ 1782, Rev. Stat. Whether a Senator of the United States has waived his privilege from
arrest and whether such privilege is personal only or given for the purpose of always securing a representation of his State in the Senate are not frivolous questions; and, if properly raised in the court below and denied, this court has jurisdiction to issue the writ of error directly to the District Court, and then to decide the case without being restricted to the
constitutional question. It is not the habit of this court to decide questions of a constitutional
nature unless absolutely necessary to a decision of the case. The deposit of checks in a bank and drawing against them by a customer
constitutes the relation of debtor and creditor and the bank becomes the
absolute owner of the checks so deposited, and not the agent of the customer to collect them; this relation is not, in the absence of any special agreement, affected by the right of the bank against the customer, and
his liability therefor, in case the checks are not paid. The payment of the checks to defendant in this manner was a payment
at Washington, and if any crime was committed it was not at St. Louis, and, in view of the evidence, it was error to submit to the jury any question as to where the payment was made, and those counts in the indictment which were based on allegations of payments in St. Louis should
have been dismissed as the court had no jurisdiction thereover. This is not the case of the commencement of a crime in one district and
its completion in another so that the court in either district would have
jurisdiction under $ 731, Rev. Stat. Certain of defendant's requests to charge which were allowed were referred
to as mere abstract propositions of law and not otherwise specifically charged; after having been out thirty-eight hours the jurors returned and were instructed by the court in relation to their duty as jurors, and the foreman having stated in answer to questions of the court that they stood eleven to one, the court charged that it was their duty to agree if possible. Counsel then asked the court to instruct that defendant's requests to charge which had been allowed were as much a part of the charge as
that which emanated from the court. This was refused. Held: Error, and, under the circumstances of this case, it was a matter of right,
and not of discretion, that the jury should be charged as to the char
acter of the requests. When a jury is brought before the court because unable to agree, it is not
material for the court in order to instruct it as to its duty and the propriety of agreeing to understand the proportion of division of opinion, and the proper administration of the law does not require or permit such a question on the part of the presiding judge.
The plaintiff in error having been convicted in the District Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Missouri of a violation of the Revised Statutes of the United States, sec. 1782, (1 U. S. Comp. Stat., p. 1212), and set forth in the margin," has brought the case here directly from that court by writ of error.
11 U. S. Comp. Stat. 1212. Sec. 1782. No Senator, Representative, or Delegate, after his election and during his continuance in office, and no head of a Department, or other officer or clerk in the employ of the Government, shall receive or agree to receive any compensation whatever, directly or indirectly, for any services rendered, or to be rendered, to any person, either by himself or another, in relation to any proceeding, contract, claim, controversy, charge, accusation,
The defendant was a member of the Senate of the United States, representing the State of Kansas. The indictment under which he was tried contained nine counts. The first count, after averring that the defendant was a Senator from the State of Kansas, averred that on the twenty-sixth day of March, 1903, he received at St. Louis, Missouri, from the Rialto Grain and Securities Company $500 in money, as compensation for his services theretofore on November 22, 1902, and on divers other days between that day and the twenty-sixth day of March, 1903, rendered for the company before the Post Office Department of the United States, in a certain matter then and there pending before that Department, in which the United States was directly interested, that is to say: Whether the company had violated the provisions of section 5480 of the Revised Statutes of the United States, in that the company had through its officers devised a scheme and artifice to defraud, which was to be effected through correspondence by means of the post office establishment of the United States, and whether the correspondence of the company at St. Louis, Mo., should not be returned with the word "Fraudulent” plainly written or stamped upon the outside, as authorized by law. It also averred that the services rendered by defendant to the company consisted in part of visits to the Postmaster General, the chief inspector, and other officers of the Post Office Department, and of statements made to the Postmaster General, the chief inspector, and other officers, which visits and statements made by the defendant were made with a view and for the purpose of inducing the Postmaster General, the chief inspector, and other officers to decide the question then pending before
arrest, or other matter or thing in which the United States is a party, or directly or indirectly interested, before any Department, court-martial, Bureau, office, or any civil, military, or naval commission whatever. Every person offending against this section shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and shall be imprisoned not more than two years, and fined not more than ten thousand dollars, and shall, moreover, by conviction therefor, be rendered forever thereafter incapable of holding any office of honor, trust, or profit under the Government of the United States.