passing upon any other question than an absolute proposition of law, and that this proposition is that a vote in another precinct is fatal to a claim of residence. But the Secretary found, by implication, that the plaintiff not merely voted elsewhere, but resided elsewhere for voting. It was after this finding that he laid down the rule complained of. The case presents no exceptional circumstances which would warrant our going behind the finding of fact. Bohall v. Dilla, 114 U. S. 47; Lee v. Johnson, 116 U. S. 48, 51; Stewart v. McHarry, 159 U. S. 643, 650. The plaintiff admits that on one occasion after his entry he voted in a county other than that in which the land lies, so that it appears from the complaint that there was some evidence that his residence for voting was not in the latter county, and, as the Supreme Court of Montana remarks, it does not appear clearly that all the facts before the Secretary are those set forth. It is true that a vote in another county is only a circumstance to be considered, but when it leads to the conclusion of a voting residence elsewhere it leads to the conclusion of a residence elsewhere for all purposes by the very words of the Compiled Statutes of Montana on which the plaintiff relies. §§ 1007, 1020.

In view of what we have said it does not appear as matter of law that the Secretary's finding of voting residence was wrong, and it does not appear that his proposition, taken as a proposition of law, was wrong. But, further, the words, "without passing on any other question" cannot be taken absolutely to limit the ground of decision to the proposition of law. It hardly goes further than to emphasize one aspect of the facts as dominant in the Secretary's mind. He already had adopted the plaintiff's own words as establishing that the plaintiff's purpose was only to keep up a good showing. This goes to the general conclusion which the Secretary drew and shows that it was a conclusion, not from the plaintiff's voting residence merely, but from other facts.

Judgment affirmed.

196 U. S.

Statement of the Case.

HAMBURG AMERICAN STEAMSHIP COMPANY v.

GRUBE.

ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK.

No. 411. Submitted January 16, 1905.-Decided February 20, 1905.

The agreement of September 16, 1833, between New York and New Jersey, confirmed by act of Congress of June 28, 1834, 4 Stat. 708, did not vest exclusive jurisdiction in the Federal Government over the sea adjoining those States, neither of which abdicated any rights to the United States. Although when the charge of the state court is not before this court, and the record contains no exception to any part of it, the verdict and judgment must be held to have been rendered according to law, nevertheless, if a provision of the Federal Constitution was properly invoked the motion to dismiss may be denied.

The act of the legislature of New Jersey of March 12, 1846, under which the jurisdiction of the United States over Sandy Hook is derived i merely one of cession and does not purport to transfer jurisdiction over the littoral waters beyond low water mark.

THIS action was brought in the Supreme Court of New York by Minnie Grube, as administratrix of John Grube, against the Hamburg American Steamship Company, to recover damages for his death, under the statute of New Jersey in that behalf, occasioned by the sinking of the James Gordon Bennett, a vessel owned by a New Jersey corporation, by the steamship Alene, belonging to the steamship company. There was a conflict of evidence as to the place of the collision, evidence being given on the one hand that it occurred in waters beyond the three-mile limit of the coast of the State of New Jersey, and, on the other, that it occurred within the three-mile limit along that coast.

The record discloses no instructions to the jury requested by defendant below, and no exceptions were taken by it to the charge of the court, which was not included in the bill of exceptions or case made.

Statement of the Case.

196 U. S.

Defendant moved the court to direct a verdict in its favor upon the following grounds:

"Defendant claims the right, under the statute of the United States confirming and approving the agreement as to boundaries between the State of New York and the State of New Jersey, to be free in navigating the main sea to the eastward of Sandy Hook peninsula, from the operation of any law of the State of New Jersey giving a right of action for injuries causing death, and claims that under the statutes aforesaid, the jurisdiction of that State extends only to the main sea; that is to say, low water mark along its exterior coast line and to a line drawn from headland to headland across the entrance to the bay of New York. It, therefore, asks the court to direct the jury to return a verdict for the defendant, on the ground that it appears by uncontradicted evidence that the collision between the steamship Alene and the schooner James Gordon Bennett, to recover damages for which this suit is brought, occurred upon the main sea and to the eastward of the Sandy Hook peninsula, and at a distance of more than a mile to the eastward of low water mark upon the exterior line thereof.

"Defendant claims the right, by reason of the purchase by the United States of the Sandy Hook peninsula, and the cession to the United States by the State of New Jersey of jurisdiction over the same and the long continued use of that peninsula, and of the main sea to the eastward of it for military purposes, to be free in navigating the main sea to the eastward of that peninsula from the operation of any law of the State of New Jersey, giving a right of action for injuries causing death, and claims that the main sea to the eastward of said peninsula to a distance of three miles from the shore is subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States. It, therefore, asks the court to direct the jury to return a verdict for the defendant on the ground that it appears by uncontradicted evidence that the collision between the steamship Alene and the schooner James Gordon Bennett, to recover damages for which

196 U.S.

Argument for Plaintiff in Error.

this suit is brought, occurred upon the main sea and to the eastward of the Sandy Hook peninsula, and at a distance of more than a mile to the eastward of low water mark, upon the exterior line thereof."

The court denied the motion and defendant excepted. The jury found a general verdict for plaintiff below, and assessed the damages. Judgment was entered thereon, which was affirmed by the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court, and a writ of error from the Court of Appeals was denied. This writ of error was then allowed, and the case submitted on motions to dismiss or affirm.

Mr. Everett P. Wheeler for plaintiff in error:

The effect of the statutes and deeds was to vest in the United States title in fee to Sandy Hook and exclusive jurisdiction over it. All the prerequisite conditions were complied with. As to the effect of jurisdiction of the United States over lands ceded by the States see Story, Const. § 1227; In re Ladd, 74 Fed. Rep. 31; United States v. Tucker, 122 Fed. Rep. 518; Commonwealth v. Clary, 8 Massachusetts, 72; United States v. King, 34 Fed. Rep. 302. As the States have no longer legislative power over military tracts, so their inhabitants have none of the rights of citizens of the States to which they originally belonged. Sinks v. Reese, 19 Ohio St. 306; Opinion of the Justices, 1 Metc. (Mass.) 580; 6 Op. Atty. Gen. 577; United States v. Carter, 84 Fed. Rep. 622.

The jurisdiction over Sandy Hook acquired by the United States included the littoral waters lying to the eastward. Such waters within three miles are subject to the jurisdiction of the sovereign. Wheaton Int. Law, § 177; Dana's note to same (105), citing Bynkershock; Pomeroy on Int. Law, § 144; 1 Hautefeuille, Droit des Nation Neutres, 53; Ex parte Tatem, 23 Fed. Cas. 708. Jurisdiction over these waters is vital to the United States and a matter of indifference to New Jersey, and to realize the object of the cession control of the waters is essential and when the use of a thing is granted everything

Argument for Plaintiff in Error.

196 U.S.

is granted by which the grantee may have and enjoy the same. Kent's Comm. 467, note g; United States v. Appleton, 1 Sumner, 492; Potter v. Boyce, 73 App. Div. N. Y. 383; S. C., 176 N. Y. 551; Huttemeier v. Albro, 18 N. Y. 48; Richardson v. Bigelow, 15 Gray (Mass.), 154; Voorhees v. Burchard, 55 N. Y. 98; Simmons v. Cloonan, 81 N. Y. 557; Middleton v. La Compagnie, &c., 100 Fed. Rep. 866, distinguished.

The effect of the transfer of jurisdiction over Sandy Hook and the adjacent waters was to deprive New Jersey of power to legislate for that region, and the death act of that State, passed subsequent to the cession, has no operation there. Before the cession, Sandy Hook was subject to the common and statute law of the State of New Jersey. The cession did not ipso facto abrogate this body of law, for it is well recognized that change of sovereignty over territory does not ipso facto work a general change of the law then existing. Halleck Int. Law, ch. 34, § 14; Am. Ins. Co. v. Canter, 1 Pet. 511, 542; Commonwealth v. Chapman, 13 Metc. (Mass.) 68; Chappell v. Jardine, 51 Connecticut, 64; Chi. & Pac. Ry. Co. v. McGlinn, 114 U. S. 542; Barrett v. Palmer, 135 N. Y. 336; Madden v. Arnold, 22 App. Div. N. Y. 240. The act of cession was in 1846. The statute giving a right of action for death by wrongful act in 1848. This act is no more operative upon the Sandy Hook peninsula than legislation of the State of Maryland enacted after the cession of the District of Columbia is operative in that District.

Such a cession severs the territory ceded from all further political relations with the State of which it was formerly a part. Thenceforth all legislation must be by the new sovereign. In re Ladd, 74 Fed. Rep. 31; Mitchell v. Tibbets, 17 Pick. (Mass.) 298; Commonwealth v. Clary, 8 Massachusetts, 72, Contzon v. United States, 179 U. S. 191.

The proviso in the New Jersey act as to retention of jurisdiction in certain cases contains nothing at variance with this proposition. Ft. Leavenworth R. R. Co. v. Lowe, 114 U. S. 525; United States v. Cornell, 2 Mason, 60; United States v.