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or District Court of the United States, and, under the act of 1890, in a Circuit Court of the United States? Did Congress intend that only courts of the United States, invested by the Third Article of the Constitution with the judicial power of the United States, McAllister v. United States, 141 U. S. 174 should have original jurisdiction of suits of that character? The questions suggested by these inquiries were not much discussed by counsel, and we pass them as being, in our view of the case, not necessary to be now decided; for, if a controversy like that raised by the plaintiff is equally cognizable by a Territorial District Court or by a Circuit or District Court of the United States, it would still remain to inquire whether the defendant company was brought before the court in which the suit was instituted in such way that a personal judgment could be rendered against it?
It is firmly established that a court of justice cannot acquire jurisdiction over the person of a defendant, “except by actual service of notice within the jurisdiction upon him or upon some one authorized to accept service in his behalf, or by his waiver, by general appearance or otherwise, of the want of due service.” Goldey v. Morning News, 156 U. S. 518, 521; Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714; Mexican Central Railway v. Pinkney, 149 U. S. 194, 209; United States v. American Bell Tel. Co., 29 Fed. Rep. 17. This principle is applicable to all courts.
We are of opinion that the service of summons upon Ripley, as president, while he was passing through the Territory on a railroad train was insufficient as a personal service on the company of which he was president. It is true that the company owned lands in the Territory, but its office, at which the meetings of its directors were held, was in the city of New York, while the office of its land commissioner was at Topeka, Kansas, and the office of its president was at Chicago, Illinois. The mere ownership of lands in New Mexico, or the bringing of suits there to protect its lands against trespasses, could not have had the effect to put the company into that Territory for the purposes of a personal action against it based on service
of summons upon one of its officers while passing through the Territory on a railroad train. If by the laws of New Mexico a party having a cause of action against the company, based on the acts of 1887 and 1890, could have sued out an attachment and caused it to be levied upon its lands in the Territory in order to secure the satisfaction of any judgment he might finally obtain in such action—upon which point we express no opinion-it would not follow that a personal judgment could have been rendered against the company. In such case the judgment of the court could not affect anything except the lands attached. No personal judgment could have been rendered against the company by reason merely of such attachment.
It is contended that the case is covered by section 450 of the Compiled Laws of New Mexico, 1897. That section provides that: “In suits against any corporation, summons shall be served in that county where the principal office of the corporation is kept or its principal business carried on, by delivering a copy to the president thereof, if he may be found in said county, but if he is absent therefrom, then the summons shall be served in like manner in the county, on either the vice-president, secretary, treasurer, cashier, general agent, general superintendent or stockholder, or any agent of said corporation, within such time and under such rules as are provided by law for the service of such process in suits against real persons, and if no such person can be found in the county where the principal office of the corporation is kept, or in the county where its principal business is carried on, to serve such process upon, a summons may issue from either one of such counties, directed to the sheriff of any county in this Territory where
such person may be found and served with process. If such corporation keeps no principal office in any county, and there is no county in which the principal business of such corporation is carried on, then suit may be brought against it in any county where the above-mentioned officers, or any or either of them may be found; Provided, That the plaintiff may,
in all cases, bring his action in the county where the cause of action accrued."
Counsel for appellant substantially concedes that this statute applies only to domestic corporations, that is, corporations created by or organized under territorial enactments. But if it is to be assumed that these provisions could be made applicable to a corporation created by an act of Congress, and that for the purposes of suit such a corporation may be deemed a domestic corporation in any State or Territory which it might lawfully enter, still, it is evident that the above section cannot avail the plaintiff. The Santa Fé Railroad Company, when sued in the Territorial District Court, was not an inhabitant of the district within the meaning of the local statute; it had no principal or other office in the Territory; nor did it have an officer who could, in a legal sense, be "found” there; nor did it, in any just sense, carry on business in the Territory. The company simply owned lands there, and that fact was not sufficient by itself to bring the case within the provisions of the territorial statute. This state of the law may sometimes operate injuriously upon those who may wish to sue the railroad company in the territorial courts. But the situation cannot be changed by the courts. That can only be done by legislation.
For the reasons stated the judgment of the Supreme Court of the Territory must be
Statement of the Case.
SMILEY v. KANSAS.
ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS.
No. 13. Argued October 20, 21, 1904.-Decided February 20, 1905.
This court will not inquire whether the finding of the jury in the state court
is against the evidence; it will take the facts as found and consider only
whether the state statute involved is violative of the Federal Constitution. The power in the state court to determine the meaning of a state statute
carries with it the power to prescribe its extent and limitations as well as
the method by which they shall be determined. Where the highest court of a State has held that the acts of a person con
victed of violating a state statute defining and prohibiting trusts were clearly within both the statute and the police power of the State, and that the statute can be sustained as a prohibition of those acts irrespective of the question whether its language was broad enough to include acts beyond legislative control, this court will accept such construction although the state court may have ascertained the meaning, scope and validity of the statute by pursuing a rule of construction different from
that recognized by this court. While there is a certain freedom of contract which the States cannot destroy
by legislative enactment, in pursuance whereof parties may seek to further their business interests, the police power of the States extends to, and may prohibit a secret arrangement by which, under penalties, and without any merging of interests through partnership or incorporation an apparently existing competition among all the dealers in a com
munity in one of the necessaries of life is substantially destroyed. The act of the legislature of Kansas of March 8, 1897, defining and pro
hibiting trusts, is not in conflict with the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution as to a person convicted thereunder of combining with others to pool and fix the price, divide the net earnings and prevent competition in the purchase and sale of grain.
On March 8, 1897, the legislature of Kansas passed an act, the first section of which is as follows:
“SEC. 1. A trust is a combination of capital, skill, or acts, by two or more persons, firms, corporations, or associations of persons, or either two or more of them, for either, any or all of the following purposes: First.–To create or carry out restrictions in trade or commerce or aids to commerce, or to
carry out restrictions in the full and free pursuit of any business authorized or permitted by the laws of this State. Second.—To increase or reduce the price of merchandise, produce or commodities, or to control the cost or rates of insurance. Third. - To prevent competition in the manufacture, making, transportation, sale or purchase of merchandise, produce or commodities, or to prevent competition in aids to commerce. Fourth.-To fix any standard or figure, whereby its price to the public shall be, in any manner, controlled or established, any article or commodity of merchandise, produce of commerce intended for sale, use or consumption in this State. Fifth.–To make or enter into, or execute or carry out, any contract, obligation or agreement of any kind or description by which they shall bind or have to bind themselves not to sell, manufacture, dispose of or transport any article or commodity, or article of trade, use, merchandise, commerce or consumption below a common standard figure or by which they shall agree in any manner to keep the price of such article, commodity or transportation at a fixed or graded figure, or by which they shall in any manner establish or settle the price of any article or commodity or transportation between them or themselves and others, to preclude a free and unrestricted competition among themselves or others in transportation, sale or manufacture of any such article or commodity, or by which they shall agree to pool, combine or unite any interest they may have in connection with the manufacture, sale or transportation of any such article or commodity, that its price may in any manner be affected. And any such combinations are hereby declared to be against public policy, unlawful and void.” Laws of Kansas, 1897, p. 481.
Subsequent sections prescribe penalties, and provide procedure for enforcing the act. On September 27, 1901, the county attorney filed in the District Court of Rush County, Kansas, an information charging that the defendant did, on November 20, 1900, " then and there unlawfully enter into an agreement, contract and combination, in the county of Rush