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A narrow construction, which will defeat this purpose, should not be adopted.

The statutes, specifically mentioning “investments in bonds,” were intended to reach and tax, and not to exempt, that class of personal property. The purpose to tax all real and personal property, declared in the statute, was further emphasized by express mention of certain classes of property, such as investments in bonds, so that by no process of exclusion could such securities escape the burdens imposed upon all property owned or held within the State.

The sections taxing individuals holding such securities were not intended to put limitations upon other sections of the law taxing the property of corporations held within the State and enjoying the protection of its laws, and affording a basis for credit in the transacting of business. There is no reason why the law should tax such securities in the hands of individual residents, whether owned or held by them for others, and permit them to escape taxation when they represent invested capital of incorporated companies, sharing the protection of the Government and equally bound in morals, at least, to help bear the burdens of the State.

That such securities might justly be taxed was freely admitted in the argument at bar, and the sole contention was that the lack of statutory power to tax these securities is a casus omissus in legislation which the courts cannot supply.

It may be conceded that no tax can be levied without express authority of law, but the statutes are to receive a reasonable construction with a view to carrying out their purpose and intent.

We have examined the decisions of the Supreme Court of Ohio, cited by counsel, construing the statutes of the State, and believe none of them to be inconsistent with the conclusions we have reached, and those above cited, in our opinion, are direct authority for the construction given. All the sections must be construed together to attain the object and intent of the law. Section 2731, standing alone, might limit the

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right to tax investments in bonds to residents of the State. It is certainly enlarged by section 2730 to include such investments when held for others by residents within the State. Read with sections 2734, 2735, 2744 and 2746, we think the purpose is manifest to require the return and taxation of all personal property, except the small exemptions allowed, within the jurisdiction of the State.

But it is urged if section 2744 could otherwise be held to require a return of these bonds by the insurance company, that the company comes within the exception of the statute excluding banking or other corporations whose taxation is specifically provided for in other parts of the Title. And it is argued that section 2745 of the Revised Statutes of Ohio makes express provision for the taxation of foreign insurance companies.

Examination of this section shows that it imposes a tax upon the business of the company in Ohio, and is not a property but a privilege tax. An insurance company is required to return in each county the amount of the gross premium receipts of its agency for the previous calendar year, and under certain regulations the company is taxed upon the amount of business done.

This section does not levy a tax upon property. There are subsequent statutory provisions of a special character, upon which the exception of section 2744 may operate, taxing the property of railroad companies, banks, express, telegraph and telephone companies, etc., but there is no other provision imposing a property tax upon foreign insurance companies within the State.

The requirement that these bonds should be deposited for the security of the local policyholders brought a part of the capital of such company into the State of Ohio upon the strength of which it transacts its business and obtains credit within the State. Clearly, such . property is not intended to be taxed within the provisions reaching the business done in the State of Ohio under section 2745.

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But it is said that there is no person within the State required to return this property. We think it is the duty of the officers of the insurance company, under section 2744, to return the property, and that the place to return it is where the property is situated. This is clearly required by the terms of this section, and section 2735, making provision for the place of listing personal property, provides:

“And all other personal property, moneys, credits, and investments, except as otherwise specially provided, shall be listed in the township, city, or village in which the person to be charged with taxes thereon may reside at the time of the listing thereof, if such person reside within the county where the same are listed, and if not, then in the township, city, or village where the property is when listed."

These bonds were the property of the corporation taxable under the statutes, and, at the time when they should have been listed, were held in the city of Columbus, Franklin County, Ohio, and should have been there returned.

It is further argued that to distrain the property of the company for the collection of these taxes would be a violation of the constitutional rights of the insurance company, and the taking of its property without due process of law. Section 1095 provides:

“SEC. 1095. [Overdue taxes may be collected by distress.]— When taxes are past due and unpaid, as stated in the preceding section, the county treasurer, or his deputy, may distrain sufficient goods and chattels belonging to the person or persons charged with such taxes, if found within his county, to pay the taxes so remaining due and the costs that have accrued; and shall immediately proceed to advertise the same in three public places in the township where such property was taken, stating the time when, and the place where, such property will be sold; and if the taxes and costs which have accrued thereon are not paid before the day appointed for such sale, which shall be not less than ten days after the taking of such property, such treasurer, or his deputy, shall proceed to sell such prop


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erty at public vendue, or so much thereof as will be sufficient to pay said taxes and the costs of such distress and sale. (29 v. 291, $ 19; S. & C. 1586.)”

This section authorizes the distraint of goods to satisfy taxes lawfully levied against property within the county and State. This method of collecting taxes is one of the most ancient known to the law, and has frequently received the sanction of the courts. Murray's Lessees v. Hoboken Land &c. Co., 18 How. 272, 276; Springer v. United States, 102 U. S. 586; Cooley on Taxation, 302; Palmer v. McMahon, 133 U. S. 660.

There is nothing in the exemption of Government bonds from taxation which prevents them from being seized for taxes due upon unexempt property. We have held that the taxes were lawfully assessed. The statute authorizing a distraint gave the right to proceed against personal property within the jurisdiction of the State. The taxes were lawful, and the property belonging to a foreign corporation which could be seized within the authority of the State might be taken under this statute, and we do not perceive that any constitutional right of the company is violated by seizing its property under such circumstances. Bristol v. Washington County, 177 U. S. 133; Marye v. Baltimore & Ohio R. R. Co., 127 U. S. 117.

As to the right to assess taxes for the year 1903, it appears that these municipal bonds were withdrawn from the State some time before the return day, which is the day preceding the second Monday in April, and such withdrawal was in the exercise of a lawful right of the company to do, and other securities were substituted as provided by law. We do not think that the fact that it had bonds in the State for a time which were taxable justified the imposition of this tax, where the non-taxable securities were substituted before the return day.

As to the question of personal liability of the insurance company to judgment in an action brought to recover the amount of the taxes, we think the court should not have issued an injunction, as was done, against the prosecution of civil suits

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for this purpose. If there is no personal liability for these taxes—a point which we do not feel called upon to decide it is perfectly clear that if service could be had which would make a personal judgment proper, the company could set up its defense by answer in the action at law, and there is no necessity to resort to a court of equity for relief. It will be presumed, if the claim of the company is right, no personal judgment will be rendered against it, and if its theory of the controversy is correct no such judgment can be lawfully rendered. In such case the authorities are uniform that equity will not interfere by injunction, but leave the party to his defense at law. Revised Statutes of United States, $ 723; Insurance Company v. Bailey, 13 Wall. 616, 623; Grand Chute v. Winegar, 15 Wall. 373; Deweese v. Reinhard, 165 U. S. 386.

Upon the whole case we reach the conclusion that the Circuit Court was right in sustaining the demurrer so far as the bill averred the non-taxability of these bonds, or the right of the treasurer to proceed by distraint, and in overruling the demurrer as to the taxes for the year 1903; but, for the reasons stated, erred in enjoining the prosecution of a civil action seek

a ing a personal judgment. In this view, the decree below will be reversed and the cause

remanded for further proceedings in conformity to this opinion.

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