CRIMINAL LAW.
1. Case arising under section 1782, Rev. Stat., relative to taking by United

States Senator of compensation in matters to which United States is a

party.
A Senator of the ited States was indicted and tried in the Eastern Dis-

trict of Missouri for a violation of g 1782, Rev. Stat., the indictment
averring that he had rendered services for a certain corporation before
the Post Office Department in matters in which the United States was
interested, that is whether a "fraud order" should issue against such
corporation, and that he had received payment at St. Louis therefor.
The defendant denied that the United States was interested in the
matters referred to in the indictment within the meaning of g 1782,
Rev. Stat., or that he had rendered any service in violation thereof
and alleged that the service which he had rendered to, and had been
paid for by, the corporation, were those of general counsel, and not
connected with the “fraud order.” It was proved without contradic-
tion that the compensation he received under certain counts was sent
to him from St. Louis and received by him in Washington in the form
of checks on a St. Louis bank which he deposited in his bank in Wash-
ington, receiving credit therefor at once, and which checks were sub-
sequently paid in due course. On the trial the jurisdiction of the court
was denied, the offense, if any there was, having been committed at
Washington and not at St. Louis, and the defendant also asserted his
privilege from arrest under $ 16, Art. I of the Constitution. The court
held that the privilege from arrest was waived and submitted to the
jury whether there was any agreement by which the place of payment
of the checks was St. Louis and not Washington. Held, that the facts
alleged in the indictment showed a case that is covered by the pro-
visions of $ 1782, Rev. Stat. Burton v. United States, 283.

2. Locus criminis where payment by check.
The payment of the checks to defendant in this manner was a payment

at Washington, and if any crime was committed it was not at St. Louis,
and, in view of the evidence, it was error to submit to the jury any
question as to where the payment was made, and those counts in the
indictment which were based on allegations of payments in St. Louis
should have been dismissed as the court had no jurisdiction thereover.
This is not the case of the commencement of a crime in one district
and its completion in another so that the court in either district would
have jurisdiction under $ 731, Rev. Stat. Ib.

See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 5;

EXTRADITION.

CUSTOM.
See CONTRACTS, 2.

DAMAGES.
Contribution; rule as to, held inapplicable.
A railroad company delivered a car with imperfect brakes to a terminal

company; both companies failed to discover the defect which could
have been done by proper inspection; an employé of the terminal
company, who was injured as a direct result of the defective brake,
sued the terminal company alone and recovered. In an action brought
by the terminal company against the railroad company for the amount
paid under the judgment: Held, that as both companies were wrong-
doers, and were guilty of a like neglect of duty in failing to properly
inspect the car before putting it in use, the fact that such duty was
first required of the railroad company did not bring the case within the
exceptional rule which permits one wrongdoer, who has been mulcted
in damages, to recover indemnity or contribution from another, on
the ground that the latter was primarily responsible. Union Stock
Yards Co. v. Chicago &c. R. R. Co., 217.

DEED OF TRUST.

See MORTGAGE.

DEFENSES.
See CONTRACTS, 3;

TAXATION, 7.

DELEGATION OF POWERS.

See Public Lands, 3.

DEMURRAGE.
See CONTRACTS, 2.

DEVISE.
See WILLS, 1.

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA.
See INSURANCE (Hunt v. Springfield F. & M. Ins. Co., 47).

MORTGAGE (1b).
STREETS AND HIGHWAYS (Wolff v. District of Columbia, 152).
WILLS (McCaffrey v. Manogue, 563; Keely v. Moore, 38).

DIVERSE CITIZENSHIP.
See ACTION; EMINENT DOMAIN, 2;
COURTS, 1; JURISDICTION, B 2;

REMOVAL OF CAUSES, 2.

DIVORCE.
See BANKRUPTCY, 7.

DOMICIL.
See JURISDICTION, B 2.

DUE PROCESS OF LAW,
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 3, 4.

EMINENT DOMAIN.
1. Taking must be for public purposes.
It is fundamental in American jurisprudence that private property can-

not be taken by the Government, National or state, except for pur-
poses which are of a public character, although such taking be ac-
companied by compensation to the owner. Traction Company v.

Mining Company, 239.
2. State laws governing exercise, jurisdiction of Federal court not to be ex-

Proceedings in interstate rendition are summary; strict common law evi-

dence is not necessary, and the person demanded has no constitutional
right to a hearing. The governor's warrant for removal is sufficient
until the presumption of its legality is overthrown by contrary proof
in a legal proceeding to review his action. Munsey v. Clough, 364.

2. Presumption, on habeas corpus, as to validity of indictment.
The indictment found in the demanding State will not be presumed to be

void on habeas corpus proceedings in the State on which the demand is
made if it substantially charges an offense for which the person de-
manded may be returned for trial. Ib.

3. Discharge, on habeas corpus, where demand of other State is made on ground

of constructive presence.
Where there is no doubt that the person demanded was not in the demand-

ing State when the crime was committed and the demand is made on
the ground of constructive presence only he will be discharged on
habeas corpus, but he will not be discharged when there is merely
contradictory evidence as to his presence or absence, for habeas corpus
is not the proper proceeding to try the question of alibi or any ques-
tion as to the guilt or innocence of the accused. Ib.

FEDERAL QUESTION.
1. Not involved in construction by courts of one State of statute of another,

where no denial of validity—Exclusive jurisdiction of state court as to

comity.
The mere construction by a state court of a statute of another State and its

operation elsewhere, without questioning its validity, does not nec-
essarily involve a Federal question, or deny to the statute the full
faith and credit demanded by $ 709, Rev. Stat., in order to give this
court jurisdiction to review. The statutes of New York and Pennsyl-
vania prohibit foreign corporations from doing business in those States
respectively unless certain specified conditions are complied with. In
an action in New Jersey the state court held that contracts made in
New York and Pennsylvania by a corporation which had not complied
with the statutes of either State were not ipso facto void and might be
enforced in New Jersey. On writ of error held, that the writ must be
dismissed as the validity of the New York and Pennsylvania statutes
was not denied but the case turned only upon their construction and
the effect to be given them in another State. Whether, aside from a
Federal question, the courts of one State should have sustained the
action upon principles of comity between the States is a matter within
the exclusive jurisdiction of the state court. Allen v. Allegheny Co.,
458.

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3. State and not Federal— l'alidity of state statute under state constitution.
Whether or not a state statute violates the state constitution in not stating

distinctly the tax and the object to which it is to be applied is a local
and not a Federal question. Hodge v. Muscatine County, 276.

4. Setting up of Federal question in state court.
Where certain facts from which a Federal question might arise were argued

in the state court, but their Federal character was not indicated, they
cannot be made the basis of a writ of error. Where a petition to trans-
fer the case to the Supreme Court of the State, which contains a mere
suggestion of the violation of a Federal right without any reference
to the Constitution of the United States, is denied without opinion,
this court may infer that the petition was denied because the con-
stitutional point was not made in the courts below, and if it was con-
sidered, the burden to show it is on the plaintiff in error. It is too
late to set up a Federal question for the first time in the petition for
writ of error to this court. Because plaintiff in error relied solely for
title upon a decree of foreclosure and sale in a Federal court it does not
necessarily follow that a Federal question was set up and decided
adversely, no statute, state or Federal, or authority thereunder, being
called in question. Chicago, Indianapolis &c. Ry. Co. v. McGuire, 128.

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5. It is too late to raise a Federal question by petition for rehearing in the

Supreme Court of a State after that court has pronounced its final
decision unless it appears that the court entertained the petition and
disposed of the question. The certificate of the presiding judge of the
Supreme Court of the State, made after the decision, to the effect that
a Federal question was considered and decided adversely to plaintiff
in error, cannot in itself confer jurisdiction on this court; and on the
face of this record and from the opinions the reasonable inference is
that the application for rehearing may have been denied in the mere
exercise of discretion, or the alleged constitutional question was not
passed on in terms because not suggested until too late. Fullerton v.
Texas, 192.

See Cases EXPLAINED, 1;

JURISDICTION.

FRAUD.
See INTERSTATE COMMERCE, 5.

GOVERNMENT BONDS.

See Taxation, 6, 10.

GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS.

See Mails.

HABEAS CORPUS.
See ExTRADITION, 2, 3.