the constitutional right of a foreign insurance company and deprive
it of its property without due process of law. Ib.
10. Ohio tax law construed-Effect of substitution of Government bonds for
others withdrawn from deposit.
The laws of the State of Ohio as construed by the Supreme Court of that
State have conferred the right to tax bonds deposited by a foreign
insurance company with the insurance commissioner under the laws
regulating the right to do business in the State. Where municipal
bonds so deposited are withdrawn before the return day and Govern-
ment bonds substituted therefor as provided by law the company is
not liable for taxation on the bonds so withdrawn. Ib.
VESSELS.
See MARITIME LAW.
1. Construction of-Legacies not subject to taxation under, prior to actual
enjoyment and possession.
Where a legacy under the will of one dying in September, 1899, was to be
held in trust by the executors, the legatee only to receive the income
until he reached a specified age, which would be subsequent to 1902,
when he was to receive the principal, §§ 29 and 30 of the war revenue
act of June 13, 1898, 30 Stat. 464, did not authorize the assessment or
collection, prior to the time when, if ever, such rights or interests
should become absolutely vested in possession and enjoyment, of any
tax with respect to any of the rights or interests of the legatee with
the exception of his present right to receive the income until the age
specified. Vanderbilt v. Eidman, 480.
2. Effect of amending and repealing acts of 1901 and 1902.
The amendatory act of March 2, 1901, 31 Stat. 946, as to the questions
involved in this suit reënacted §§ 29 and 30 of the act of 1898 and did
not enlarge them so as to embrace subjects of taxation not originally
included therein, and did not justify the new construction thereafter
placed upon the act by the Government, that death duties should
become due within one year as to legacies and distributive shares not
capable of being immediately possessed and enjoyed and therefore not
subject to taxation under the original act. The refunding act of
June 27, 1902, 32 Stat. 406, passed after §§ 29 and 30 of the act of
1898 had been repealed by the act of April 12, 1902, 32 Stat. 96, was
in a sense declaratory of the construction now given by this court to
those sections of the act of 1898 and was a legislative affirmance of
such construction of the act as it had been adopted by the Govern-
ment prior to the amendatory act of March 2, 1901, and a repudiation
of the opposite construction adopted thereafter. Ib.
1. Rights of Federal Government under agreement of September 16, 1833,
between New York and New Jersey.
The agreement of September 16, 1833, between New York and New Jersey,
confirmed by act of Congress of June 28, 1834, 4 Stat. 708, did not
vest exclusive jurisdiction in the Federal Government over the sea
adjoining those States, neither of which abdicated any rights to the
United States. Hamburg American Steamship Co. v. Grube, 407.
2. Effect on jurisdiction over littoral waters of New Jersey of act of 1846.
The act of the legislature of New Jersey of March 12, 1846, under which
the jurisdiction of the United States over Sandy Hook is derived is
merely one of cession and does not purport to transfer jurisdiction over
the littoral waters beyond low water mark. Ib.
1. Intention of testator—Effect of devise of land without words of limitation
or description.
The policy of the law in favor of the heir yields to the intention of the
testator if clearly expressed or manifested. The rule of law that a
devise of lands without words of limitation or description gives a life
estate only, does not apply, and devises will be held to be of the fee,
where it is plain that the testator's intention was to dispose of his
whole estate equally between his heirs, and there is no residuary clause
indicating that he intended passing less than all of his estate, and all
of his heirs at law are devisees under the will. McCaffrey v. Manogue,
563.
2. Attesting witness; vice consul certifying as to acknowledgment held to be.
The signature of a resident of the District of Columbia to a will executed
abroad was witnessed on the day of execution by two witnesses; on the
day following an American vice consul signed, as such and under seal,
a certificate that the testator had appeared before him and acknowl-
edged the will and his signature thereto. It did not state that the
testator signed in his presence. The law in the District of Columbia
required three witnesses in testator's presence, but did not require the
testator to sign in presence of witnesses. The will was attacked also
on grounds of testator's insanity and undue influence on the testator
who had, previous to the will, been for a short time in an insane asylum.
In an action affecting title to real estate there were issues sent to a
jury and the title under the will sustained. Held, that under the cir-
cumstances in this case the jury might properly draw the inference
that the vice consul executed the certificates in the ordinary course
of business and in presence of the testator. Although a notary taking
an acknowledgment as required by law is not, in the absence of separate
signature as such, to be regarded as a witness, inasmuch as the certifi-
cate in this case was not required by law and was unnecessary, it was,
together with the description appended to the vice consul's name,
immaterial and could be disregarded as surplusage and the vice consul's
signature regarded as that of a witness in his unofficial capacity.
Keely v. Moore, 38.
3. Testamentary capacity-Evidence of insanity-Insanity and mental
capacity.
The application of a relative, and the certificates of physicians, for the ad-
mission of testator to an insane asylum, from which he had been re-
leased apparently in sound condition prior to the execution of the
will, were properly excluded both because not sworn and given in a
different proceeding and on a different issue. There was no error in
submitting the question of testator's insanity to the jury with the in-
struction that if they found that the insanity was permanent in its
nature and character the presumptions were that it would continue
and the burden was on those holding under the will to satisfy the jury
that he was of sound mind when it was executed. A man may be
insane to the extent of being dangerous if set at liberty and yet have
sufficient mental capacity to make a will, enter into contracts, trans-
act business and be a witness. Ib.
WITNESS.
See WILLS, 2, 3.
WORDS AND PHRASES.
See CONTRACTS, 1;
STATUTES, A 5;
PUBLIC LANDS, 7.
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