be sworn before a registrar or deputy registrar of the court of bankruptcy. (a) Where an unmarried woman obtained judgment in a county court against the prisoner, and obtained a judgment summons against him under the City of London Small Debts Act, 15 & 16 Vict. c. 77, and on the hearing of the summons it appeared that the woman had married after she had recovered judgment in the county court, and thereupon the judge of the London court amended the summons by adding the name of the husband, and the prisoner was charged with perjury in his examination before the judge of the London court after the said amendment; it was held that the judge had no power to make the amendment, and consequently the false swearing was in a cause which had no existence and coram non judice (b) jury. A person may be indicted for perjury who gives false evidence Evidenco before a grand jury when examined as a witness before them upon before a grand a bill of indictment, and any person, not being a grand juryman, who hears the evidence given before the grand jury, is competent to prove the evidence so given. (c) Perjury was alleged to have been committed in taking a false Deputy oath on a material issue at the hearing of a county coroner's inqui- coroner. sition held before a deputy coroner in the absence of the coroner. The 6 & 7 Vict. c. 83, s. 1, gives a county coroner power to appoint a deputy, provided that no such deputy shall act for any coroner except during the illness of the said coroner, or during his absence from any lawful or reasonable cause. On the trial of the indictment for perjury, the prosecution gave evidence that the coroner, who was an attorney in practice, and registrar of the county court, and held other offices, was absent from his home and place of business in order to take a vacation, such absence and vacation and air and exercise having been recommended to him by his medical advisers as necessary for his health, which had become permanently impaired from an operation which he had undergone. He spent three or four days in every week, shooting. The vacation for registrars was appointed at that period of the year, and that was the only time of the year during which he obtained a vacation. The judge held at the trial, that there was lawful or reasonable cause for the absence of the coroner, and the prisoner was found guilty. Held, that the question of lawful or reasonable cause was to be decided by the judge and not by the jury, and that there was some evidence upon which the judge could so decide, and that the conviction was right. (d) The rule of law is that, unless a statute requires it, an information before a magistrate need not be on oath or even in writing. (e) (a) Reg. v. Dunn, 12 Q. B. 1026. (b) Reg. v. Pearce, 3 B. & S. 531; 9 Cox, C. C. 258. (c) Reg. v. Hughes, 1 C. & K. 519, Tindal, Č. J. See post, as to whether a grand juryman can give evidence of what passes in the grand jury room. (d) Reg. v. Johnson, 42 L. J. M. C. 41. (e) Per Parke, B. Reg. v. Millard, Dears. C. C. 166. See R. v. Shaw, 34 L. J. M. C. 169, where per M. Smith, J., 'Unless it is required by statute there need not be an information in writing Unless a sta- tion before justices need not be in writing or on oath. Justices have tion within the district Where therefore an information, but not on oath, was laid before a justice against a person for wilful damage to a carriage, and the prisoner was indicted for perjury committed on the hearing of that information, it was objected that by the 7 & 8 Geo. 4. c. 30, s. 30, (ee) the information ought to have been on oath; but it was held that that section did not render an oath necessary in all cases, but was a cumulative provision in order to compel the appearance of the party charged, or to hear the case ex parte if he did not appear, and therefore the justices had jurisdiction. (ƒ) Under the 7 & 8 Vict. c. 101, s. 2, an application for an order in only jurisdic bastardy is to be made to the justices acting for the petty sessional division in which the mother may reside;' and they have no jurisdiction to entertain such an application, unless she does reside mother resides within their division, and consequently, if she do not so reside, perjury cannot be committed on such an application. (g) where the to make a bastardy order. If a person charged with being the father of a bastard appears before the justice, and they hear the case without any objection on his part, any defect in the summons, or in the mode of issuing it, is waived. Upon an indictment for perjury alleged to have been committed by the prisoner upon the hearing of an application by Martha Humphreys for an order upon him for the maintenance of her bastard child, it appeared that the summons was issued by a magistrate on the personal application of M. Humphreys, who stated, but not on oath, that she had been delivered of a bastard child more than twelve months previous, and that money had been paid by the prisoner for its maintenance within twelve months of its birth. The summons alleged that the prisoner had paid money for its maintenance within twelve months after its birth,' instead of stating that proof thereof had been made. The prisoner appeared personally in answer thereto. He was also assisted by an attorney. No objection was made to any of the proceedings on which the summons was founded, and the case was gone into on the merits before the stipendiary magistrate, who examined M. Humphreys in support of the application, who proved the payment of money as alleged, and the prisoner in answer thereto, who swore he had never paid her any money. It was objected that, as there had been no proof on oath of money having been paid for the maintenance of the child within twelve months from its birth before the summons was issued, the magistrate had no jurisdiction to hear the petty sessions, when the appellant was (ee) The 24 & 25 Vict. c. 97, s. 62, re- (f) Reg. v. Millard, Dears. C. C. 166. (g) Reg. v. Hughes, D. & B. C. C. 188. In this case the mother was delivered in March, and resided with her parents till November. She then went and lodged at D. in another petty sessional division for three weeks, and then applied to the justices of that division. Her lodging there was not for any improper or fraudulent purpose, but because the justices met in the town, and it was more convenient for her than to go a distance from her parents' house to the justices' meeting of the division in which her parents resided. After the order she went into service without returning home. The jury found that she had no other home than D., and that she was residing at D., if in point of law she could under the circumstances be considered to be so. It was held that the justices had jurisdiction to make the order, as her residence was at D. case; but, upon a case reserved, it was held that the prisoner had waived the objection. The proceeding against the putative father is not a proceeding in pœnam to punish for a crime, but merely to impose a pecuniary obligation, and the summons is mere process to bring the defendant into court in a civil suit. According to strict regularity, before the summons issued there ought to have been evidence on oath of the payment of the money, although it is not expressly required by the statute to be on oath, as in the case where the complaint is made before the birth of the child. Further, it would have been proper that the summons should have been in the form given by the statute; but supposing that, if the prisoner had not appeared, the petty sessions could not have lawfully proceeded to hear evidence of the paternity; or that, if he had appeared, and objected to the regularity of the summons, the objection ought to have prevailed; yet when he actually appeared, and, instead of objecting to the regularity of the summons, asked the Court to give judgment in his favour on the merits, and tendered evidence to absolve himself from liability, he waived any irregularity there might be in the process, and when he had thus submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the Court, the Court had jurisdiction to hear and decide the case. (h) Upon an indictment for perjury, it appeared that the perjury had been committed upon the hearing of a second application for a bastardy order, a former application having been heard by the magistrates and dismissed upon the merits. It was contended that the magistrates were functi officio after the first application had been dismissed on the merits, and had no jurisdiction to entertain the second application. But, upon a case reserved after conviction, the judges were unanimously of opinion that the magistrates had jurisdiction to hear the second application and administer an oath. The Court of Queen's Bench had decided that one inquiry on the merits did not make the matter a res judicata; but even if the previous dismissal were a defence, still the magistrates on the second application had jurisdiction to hear the application and administer an oath. (i) Justices have jurisdiction to hear a second application in a case of bastardy. An indictment alleged that T. Horne was duly licensed to keep Justices have a beer-house, and that an information had been laid against him a general for that he, being duly licensed to keep a beer-house, had it open over publicjurisdiction unlawfully on the morning of Sunday, the 6th of February, 1853, houses. and charged the defendant with falsely swearing that he had not been supplied with beer in the house on that morning. Horne's license was for a year, commencing on the 11th of May, 1853, but Horne was keeping the beer-house on the 6th of February previously. It was objected that the averment that Horne was duly licensed on the 6th of February was not proved, and that if he was not so licensed, the justices had no jurisdiction to hear the information. But Crompton, J., held that the justices had jurisdiction generally over the subject of keeping houses for the sale of beer (h) Reg. v. Berry, Bell, C. C. 46, Martin, B., dissentiente. The applica tion for the bastardy order was made under the 7 & 8 Vict. c. 101, and the 8 & 9 Vict. c. 110; R. v. Fletcher, L. R. 1 C. C. R. 320; 40 L. J. M. C. 123. See R. v. Simmonds, Bell, C. C. 168; 28 L. J. M. C. 183; Reg. v. Wiltshire, 12 Ad. (i) Reg. v. Cooke, 2 Den. C. C. R. 462; Master and Information under the Game Act not properly verified. The oath must the question depending. and other liquors open on Sunday; and that as, in order to establish an offence, it was not necessary to prove that the keeper of the house was licensed, what was sworn on the subject of Horne's keeping the house open brought the case within the jurisdiction of the justices, even if it turned out that he was not licensed at the time. () By 4 Geo. 4, c. 34, s. 2, all complaints which shall arise between masters or mistresses and their apprentices, as to wages, &c., may be heard and determined before a justice of the peace. After an apprenticeship was over, the former apprentice summoned his late master under this Act for wages alleged to be unpaid, and on the hearing swore falsely. It was held, that this was perjury, inasmuch as the magistrate had, at all events, jurisdiction to determine whether the relation of apprenticeship continued or not.(k) The 6 & 7 Will. 4, c. 65, s. 9, renders it necessary that an information under the 1 Will. 4, c. 32, the Game Act, should be verified on the oath of a credible witness before any proceeding is taken upon it for summoning the party accused or compelling his appearance, and if this course has not been adopted, the justices have no jurisdiction to hear the case; and, consequently, a person giving false evidence on such an occasion is not guilty of perjury. (1) The oath must be material to the question depending for if it be material to be wholly foreign from the purpose, or altogether immaterial, and neither in any way pertinent to the matter in question, nor tending to aggravate or extenuate the damages, nor likely to induce the jury to give the readier credit to the substantial part of the evidence, it cannot amount to perjury, because it is wholly idle and insignificant; as, where a witness introduces his evidence, with an impertinent preamble of a story concerning previous facts, not at all relating to what is material, and is guilty of a falsity as to such facts. (m) If it is circumstantially material, it is sufficient. If it appear plainly that the scope of the question to a witness was to sift him as to his knowledge of the substance, by examining him strictly concerning the circumstances, and he gave a particular and distinct account of the circumstances which afterwards appears to be false; it seems he is guilty of perjury, inasmuch as nothing can be more apt to incline a jury to give credit to the substantial part of a man's evidence, than his appearing to have an exact and particular knowledge of all the circumstances relating to it. (n) And it is spoken of as a reasonable opinion, that a witness may be guilty of perjury in respect of a false oath concerning a mere circumstance, if such oath have a plain tendency to corroborate the (j) Reg. v. Kirton, 6 Cox, C. C. 393. Crompton, J., refused to reserve the point. (k) R. v. Sanders, 1 L. R. C. C. R. 75. See R. v. Bacon, 11 Cox, C. C. 540, a case where it was held that the magistrate had no jurisdiction, and consequently that the prisoner had not committed the offence of perjury. (1) Reg. v. Scotton, 5 Q. B. 493. See R. v. Western, 10 Cox, C. C. 93. (m) Rex v. Griepe, 1 Lord Raym. 256. Bac. Ab. tit, Perjury (A). See 2 Roll. 41, 42, 369. Hetl. 97. 1 Hawk. P. C. c. 69, s. 8. (n) See 1 Hawk. P. C. c. 69, s. 8. Upon an indictment for robbery committed on the 13th of April, between eight and ten o'clock at night, a witness for the prisoner swore, not only that the prisoner was at home at that time, but in answer to the judge said, that the prisoner had lived in the same house for the two years previous, and that during the whole of that time he had not been absent from the same house for more than three nights together. The last two statements were proved to be false, as the more material part of the evidence; as if, in trespass for spoiling the plaintiff's close with the defendant's sheep, a witness swears that he saw such a number of the defendant's sheep in the close; and being asked how he knew them to be the defendant's, swears that he knew them by such a mark, which he knew to be the defendant's mark, whereas, in truth, the defendant never used any such mark. (0) And it appears to have been holden not to be necessary that it should be shown to what degree the point in which a man is perjured was material to the issue, and that it will be sufficient if the point were circumstantially material. (p) And It need not be still less is it necessary that the evidence be sufficient for the sufficient to plaintiff to recover upon, since evidence may be very material, and point in quesyet not full enough to prove directly the point in question. (q) tion. Where A. advanced money to B. on two distinct mortgages, upon one of which the security was insufficient, and B. assigned the equity of redemption in both to C., who assigned the insufficient estate to an insolvent, and filed a bill against A. to redeem the other, to which bill A. put in his answer, and therein denied having had notice of the assignment to the insolvent; it was holden that the notice was a material fact upon which perjury might be assigned. (7) prove the affects the nation is material. If, therefore, a witness swears on cross-exa the date of a receipt, it is material, if his be affected by the fact of that credit would An indictment for perjury committed before commissioners of Whatever taxes on an appeal of W. Hewatt against a surcharge for a grey- credit of a hound used by him on the 24th of November, averred that it was witness on a material question whether a certain receipt produced by the pri- cross-examisoner on the hearing of the appeal was given to him before the 12th of September then last past, and that the prisoner falsely swore that the receipt was given to him before the said 12th day of September. At the commissioners' meeting, evidence was given that Hewatt and the prisoner were coursing, on the 24th of November, with two greyhounds, one of which had been Hewatt's, who had no certificate. Hewatt, in support of his appeal against a surcharge for this dog, said that the dog had been sold to the prisoner long before, and called the prisoner as a witness. The prisoner swore that he bought the dog on the 6th of September, and produced a receipt for the purchase money bearing that date. The surveyor asked him whether the receipt was given at the time of the sale, and he said it was not, but a few days after. On being pressed, he said it was given to him before the 12th of September. The surveyor pointed out to him that the recept bore date the 18th of November, so that the prisoner must be mistaken; but the prisoner persisted, and swore positively that it was given him before the 12th of September. Officers from the stamps proved that the paper, on which the receipt was written, was stamped on the 18th of November, and could not have been issued from the stamp office before that day. It was objected that the materiality of the question as stated in the indictment had not been shown; that the 1. See R. v. Naylor, 11 Cox, C. C. 13; (p) Rex v. Griepe, Ld. Raym. 256; (7) Reg. v. Rhodes, 2 Ld. Raym. 886. (r) Rex v. Pepys, Peake, N. P. R. 138, Lord Kenyon, C. J. date being false. |